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Although many of Plato’s dialogues contain reflections on the correct method of 
philosophical argument, scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the Phaedo in 
this regard. This thesis explores Plato’s Phaedo from an overlooked perspective, 
namely its metaphilosophical component and its prescriptions on the correct 
philosophical practice. The findings presented in this thesis thus help to better 
understand Plato’s thoughts on philosophical argument and the possibility of human 
knowledge. In Chapter 1 and 2, I present a theoretical framework of the epistemic 
(or intellectual) norms governing the correct philosophical conversation and 
argument. I claim that metaphilosophy is a significant component of the Phaedo and 
the epistemic norms rely on the idea of philosophical humility. Chapter 3 examines 
Socrates’ so-called defence speech at the Phaedo 63-69. I argue that the content of 
the defence partially shapes the epistemic norms that are developed and put into 
practice in the Phaedo. I suggest that Socrates’ defence speech specifies the limits 
of human cognition and that the concept of philosophical humility should arise out 
of the recognition of these limits. In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the argument against 
misology presented at Phaedo 88-91. I argue that the misology argument is 
metaphilosophical in the sense that it stresses the danger of putting all our trust in 
arguments before possessing expertise in argument; hence the misology argument 
adds to the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry. Chapter 5 
investigates Socrates’ autobiography portrayed in the Phaedo 96-101, with special 
emphasis on the meaning of second-sailing. I offer a novel interpretation of the 
second-sailing according to which the distinction is not simply between the best and 
the second-best method, but another contrast stems from the purpose-relative aspect 











Plato’s Works Cited by Abbreviations 
 
 
Ap.  = Apology 
Crt. = Crito 
Gorg. = Gorgias 
Parm. = Parmenides 
Phd. = Phaedo  
Prot. = Protagoras 
Rep. = Republic 
Soph. = Sophist 
Ti.  = Timaeus  





Note on Translations and Greek Texts 
 
All translations of the Phaedo are from Long & Sedley (2011). The translations of 
Plato’s other dialogues are taken from Cooper & Hutchinson (ed.) (1993). All Greek 
texts are retrieved from Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library. Ed. Maria C. 
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For Plato, establishing the correct epistemic (or intellectual) norms of philosophical 
argument is a precondition for attaining knowledge and the truth. Plato deals with 
this task in many dialogues such as the Apology, Republic, Sophist, and Phaedo. 
Plato even promised to write a dialogue called the Philosopher, as anticipated in the 
Sophist and Statesman, but he never wrote it.  
The purpose of my study is to shine new light on the discourse concerning Plato’s 
view about the correct method of philosophical argument. To this end, I focus on the 
metaphilosophical and meta-dialogical components of the Phaedo, although 
analytical studies, such as the works of Gallop (1975) and Bostock (1986), 
interpreting the dialogue’s individual arguments have their own merits.  
Among the dialogues mentioned above, the Phaedo is the least studied with respect 
to Plato’s thoughts on the correct method of philosophical conversation and inquiry. 
The relative paucity of criticism concerning the metaphilosophical component of the 
Phaedo seems to be a result of scholars focusing more on the proofs of the 
immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms, which are ‘the twin pillars of 
Platonism’ for Cornford (1935). Besides, Plato’s ideas on the right method of 
philosophical argument are rather implicit.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to review the evidence for the metaphilosophy 
component of the Phaedo and to explore the relationship between the correct 
epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing philosophical argument/conversation. I 
also engage with the first-order investigations of the Phaedo to understand the 
correct philosophical practice since the results of these investigations are supposed 
to be used in the business of philosophy. I thus explore some first-order theories 
presented in the Phaedo, if these theories seem to contribute to our understanding of 
the metaphilosophical component.  
Although scholars offer a variety of interpretations of the Phaedo, there is no 
thorough investigation into Plato’s insights on the correct method of philosophical 
argument and his awareness of the assertional status of first-order arguments. 
Regarding the latter, Plato invites the readers to engage critically with the proofs of 
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the immortality of the soul (Peterson 2011). That said, I disagree with the view that 
Plato does not share Socrates’ opinions on the practice of philosophy, and hence the 
weaknesses of the arguments do not pertain to Plato (Butler 2015). Instead, I suggest 
that not only do the weaknesses belong to Plato, but also that he is aware of these 
weaknesses. Plato believes some arguments are open for modification (or expansion) 
by means of either retracting or adding a hypothesis.  
To this end, I scrutinize some of the much-discussed passages of the Phaedo by 
concentrating on their metaphilosophical aspect. Fundamental questions include:  
(A) What is the role of agreement and persuasion in describing the correct 
philosophical practice? 
(B) What is the relationship between the Phaedo’s metaphilosophy and the limits 
of human epistemic access? 
(C) What are the metaphilosophical dimensions of Socrates’ defence (63-69), the 
argument against misology (89-91) and Socrates’ autobiography (96-101)?  
(D) How does philosophical humility (i.e. recognizing the fallibility of human 
understanding or of our epistemic faculties) contribute to the metaphilosophical 
component of the Phaedo?1 
Regarding the first question, most of the works on the Phaedo, for instance those 
belonging to Archer-Hind (1883), Burnet (1911), Hackforth (1955), Bluck (1955), 
Gallop (1975), Dorter (1982), Bostock (1986), Rowe (1993), paid little attention to 
the fact that Socrates is defending himself as if in court, save for a couple of studies 
including Rowe (2007) and Peterson (2011). I presume that the concept of defence 
involves accusation and conflict; hence the goal of persuasion and agreement must 
be the chief aim of the defendant, namely Socrates. Then I argue that the structure 
of the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors (Simmias and Cebes) can 
provide a model of the correct norms of philosophical argument, as well as a method 
for productively dealing with disagreements (Long 2013).  
                                                          
1 ‘Philosophical humility’ and ‘epistemic modesty’ are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis.  
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Concerning the question of humility, some scholars (Chen 1990) claim that Plato’s 
ideas on philosophical practice in the Phaedo point to a sort of epistemological 
pessimism, for according to the dialogue, full knowledge is impossible in this world. 
Although it may seem a prima facie case that Plato’s ideas imply a sort of 
epistemological pessimism (since the soul’s cognitive capabilities are diminished by 
the body), I describe Plato’s position as a kind of epistemic optimism and modesty, 
since knowledge exists and is discoverable, but its acquisition is laborious and 
success cannot be predicted or guaranteed.  
Concerning the three passages mentioned in (C), I suggest that Plato stipulates the 
conditions of correct philosophical practice, in addition to a theory of psychology 
and pleasure (in Socrates’ defence), a critique of antilogic (in the misology 
argument), a method of philosophical investigation and a theory of causation (in 
Socrates’ autobiography). I argue that these metaphilosophical norms are partly 
based on philosophical humility. Philosophical humility is then a condition of correct 
philosophical practice and a condition which should be fulfilled by true philosophers.  
In Chapter 1, I suggest that the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical component conforms 
with the norms governing philosophical humility. This chapter discusses 
contemporary views on  epistemic modesty and disagreement to a certain degree. I 
draw on the contemporary literature on the epistemology of disagreements to 
develop the conceptual framework from which I develop my interpretation. Next, I 
explore the Phaedo’s overall metaphilosophical theme by using the model 
established through the most recent discussions on epistemic modesty. 
In chapter 2, I claim that the goal of philosophical conversation is agreement. To this 
end, I draw on the Protagoras for inspiring a model of the philosophy of 
conversation. I then apply this model to the Phaedo. According to this model based 
on several epistemic norms, such as careful checking and epistemic peerhood, proper 
communication and mutual understanding are necessary for dissolving 
disagreements and completing a philosophical investigation (McCabe 2015). In this 
respect, one of Plato’s aims in the Phaedo is to lay down the conditions of successful 
philosophical argument. 
In the same chapter, I maintain that disagreements contribute to philosophical 
progress and the acquisition of knowledge in the Phaedo. That is, the dialogue 
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suggests that had interlocutors not disagreed with Socrates, he would not have 
advanced the proofs of the soul's immortality and the theory of Forms. In addition, 
Socrates encourages his interlocutors to proffer counter arguments. With this 
intention, Socrates considers them epistemic peers, whose cognitive capacity 
Socrates recognizes and respects. 
In Chapter 3, I explore the practice of philosophers by focusing on the true 
philosophers’ willingness to die (hereafter willingness-to-die) discussed at the 
Phaedo 61b7-c10. The willingness-to-die argument consists of three elements: [1] 
true philosophers’ detachment from the body as much as possible, [2] their passion 
for knowledge and the truth, [3] and their awareness of the limits of human epistemic 
access.  
Regarding [1], I agree with scholars who claim that Socrates does not promote an 
ascetic life; rather, Socrates suggests that we should correctly evaluate bodily 
pleasures and pains (Woolf 2004, Russell 2005). This interpretation of the theory of 
pleasure is also in line with the recollection argument at the Phaedo 73a6-77a5, 
where Socrates underlines that we should not ignore but correctly assess sensory data 
(Gordon 2007).  
Concerning [2], I show that purification is central to the amelioration in our cognition 
and that purification is an activity belonging to the embodied soul. In this activity, 
true philosophers pursue wisdom and hope to attain it after they die. The awareness 
of the limits of human epistemic access and the nature of human cognition are the 
most relevant points to my purposes, since these points lay the foundations of Plato’s 
view about the correct philosophical method and the epistemic (and assertional) 
status of arguments advanced in the Phaedo. 
In Chapter 4, I scrutinize Socrates’ warning against the hatred of arguments (or 
misology) at Phaedo 89b9-91b7. This argument plays a key role in developing the 
correct norms of philosophical argument. The misology argument stresses that if we 
lack expertise in argument, we should not put all our trust in arguments. In this 
respect, I argue that Socrates’ warning against misology promotes epistemic 




In addition, I claim that Socrates introduces the warning against misology to show 
how to deal with arguments and how to overcome epistemic fear. Epistemic fear 
refers to the fear of being incapable of discovering sound and firm arguments. I also 
suggest that the misology argument partly classifies the correct norms of 
philosophical argument; it aims to encourage those who lack expertise in argument 
but care for knowledge and the truth. In this respect, I disagree with the scholars who 
claim that the misology argument is only a diagnosis of the dangers of sophistry or 
contradiction-mongering (Gallop 1975, Hackforth 1955). Rather, I suggest that the 
misology argument also endows the readers with the correct norms of philosophical 
arguments.  
In Chapter 5, I first offer a new interpretation of Socrates’ second-sailing in the 
Phaedo 99c-102a. In contrast to taking the second-sailing to mean “the second-best” 
without closely considering Socrates’ motive (Bluck 1957, Hackforth 1955, Rose 
1966, Gallop 1975, Taylor 1956), I suggest that the second-sailing should be 
interpreted in terms of its purpose-relative nature. From the perspective of purpose-
relativeness, I ask (a) why Socrates decided to embark on the second-sailing, (b) 
which aspect(s) of the second-sailing might be better, and (c) why the second-sailing 
was successful.  
The second-sailing, despite scholarly opinion to the contrary, is not completely 
worse than the first-sailing in an axiological scale. Although scholars do not say that 
the second-sailing is inferior in every respect, neither do they ask whether the 
second-sailing can be better in some respect. I thus hope to offer a multi-dimensional 
and more balanced reading of the second-sailing by considering both worse and 
better aspects of it. Socrates decided to embark on it because he was afraid of 
becoming incapable of discovering the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. The 
second-sailing is a better method since it is safer and feasible; it might be considered 
worse since it is more laborious and its outcomes are provisional (Martinelli 
Tempesta 2003).  
Secondly, I argue that Socrates was interested in Anaxagoras’ idea of nous when 
accounting for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, since this idea offers a universal 
explanation. That said, I do not ignore that Socrates was attracted to Anaxagoras’ 
idea of intelligence (nous) as it orders everything according to what is best (i.e. 
teleological explanations). The concept of universal explanation refers to a theory 
14 
 
which can explain all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. In this respect, the theory of 
Forms satisfies the condition of universality, although Socrates would still be happy 
to learn teleological explanations. 
Thirdly, I distinguish the manner of the second-sailing and its goal (Benson 2015). I 
submit that its manner is the hypothetical method while its goal is to find a universal 
theory which explains each and all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be consistently. In 
contrasting the identification of Socrates’ second-sailing with the theory of Forms 
(Rose 1966), I argue that it does not seem plausible that Socrates discovered the 
theory of Forms just after he had decided to take refuge in logoi.  
Finally, I would like to comment briefly on the peculiar features of the Phaedo 
regarding the dialogue’s metaphilosophical component: 
[a] Socrates’ speech is described as if a defence in court; hence his speech ought to 
involve the correct dialogical elements enabling him to persuade his jurors, Simmias 
and Cebes. Although most philosophical writing is supposed to be persuasive, 
especially those writings in the dialogue form, the idea of defence in the Phaedo 
strengthens the ideal of persuasion. In this respect, the meta-dialogical element is 
particularly significant to better understand the Phaedo, although other dialogues 
also come with metaphilosophical component.  
 
[b] Socrates’ wife Xanthippe says, ‘Socrates, this is now the very last time that your 
friends will speak to you and you to them (60a)’. Firstly, these words underline that 
the conversation is reciprocal rather than Socrates is giving his interlocutors a 
lecture. Secondly, it is likely that Socrates, in their final conversation, would like to 
endow his friends with the correct method of philosophical argument and the correct 
epistemic (or intellectual) norms. That is, (i) not only does Socrates wish to give 
them “the doctrine” to preserve, (ii) but also wishes to give them the key to 
philosophising, and developing that doctrine as well as discovering other doctrines. 
My reading of the Phaedo focuses on (ii) and tries to show that Socrates’ friends 
(and the readers of the Phaedo) are invited to take (ii) to be the legacy of Socrates. 
 
[c] Socrates is talking to his inner circle and some of them will become philosophers. 
For instance, Euclides, founder of the so-called Megarian school, and Phaedo wrote 
Socratic dialogues. We are also told that the interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, are 
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students of the Pythagorean Philolaus. This specific dramatic framework tells us that 
the Phaedo exemplifies how we should talk to fellow philosophers and those who 
are oriented towards philosophy. In this respect, the Phaedo is similar to the 
Theaetetus, which also has a philosophical-minded interlocutor, namely Theaetetus, 
and in both dialogues we see the dominance of question-and-answer exchanges. 
 
[d] As the conversation taking place in the Phaedo is reciprocal and interactive 
where Socrates and his friends talk to each other, the interlocutors play a key role in 
the dialogue. In addition, as this is the final conversation, not only does Socrates 
present some metaphysical/epistemological commitments but he also explores some 
metaphilosophical thoughts. The latter of the two, I submit, models the way in which 
Socrates discusses with his interlocutors some philosophical questions and Socrates’ 
epistemic stance.  
A full discussion of Plato’s metaphilosophy lies beyond the scope of this study, and 
therefore this study cannot provide a comprehensive review of Plato’s other 
dialogues, although other dialogues are involved in critical and analytical reflections 
on the right method of philosophical arguments. For instance, Plato’s Theaetetus 
includes some metaphilosophical reflections. 
In contrast with the Phaedo, the Theaetetus deals with the viewpoints of those who 
are not present (for instance Protagoras), and these views are presented by Socrates 
and two other characters of the dialogue, namely Theodorus and Theatetus. The 
Theaetetus therefore provides a metaphilosophical framework to deal with the views 
of others who cannot defend themselves in person. The Phaedo, by contrast, explores 
how to examine dialectically the views that are represented by someone present.  
 
The Theaetetus is thus worthy of attention to understand how to deal dialectically 
and skilfully with a specific sort of arguments, that is, the Theaetetus shows how 
other philosophers’ views are examined in absentia. The Phaedo emphasizes how 
we should conduct a joint inquiry with our epistemic peers in person and how we 
should act if we lack expertise in arguments.  
 
In addition, the Phaedo provides some insights on the manner by which we can save 
ourselves from becoming antilogicians. This manner is that ‘if someone were to cling 
to the hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and not answer until you had managed 
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to consider its consequence and see whether or not you found them harmonizing with 
each other (101d)’. By saying this, however, Socrates does not advise against talking 
to those who cling to the hypothesis itself. Rather, Socrates renders a methodological 
judgment that we should first explore the consequences of a hypothesis; we then 
should discuss the hypothesis itself.  
Finally, the reader should bear in mind that I am not attempting to generalize the 
metaphilosophical component of the Phaedo. That is, I have no claim about the 
applicability of the Phaedo’s metaphilosophy to all dialogues written by Plato. 
Rather, I have a more modest claim: Plato explores the correct method of 
philosophical argument in the Phaedo and surveys the intellectual virtues governing 
that method. Moreover, Plato introduces a metaphilosophical model through the 
conversation of Socrates and his interlocutors/friends, and each character contributes 
to the display of intellectual virtues, and sometimes of intellectual vices. Thus, from 
a metaphilosophical perspective, I am not particularly interested in the question 










Chapter 1: A Terminological Framework for Reading Plato’s 
Phaedo  
1.1 Introduction 
As outlined in the Introduction, this study offers an investigation of the Phaedo’s 
metaphilosophical component. In this chapter, I analyse the following epistemic (or 
intellectual) norms, which I refer to in this dissertation: the equal weight view, the 
conciliatory approach, and epistemic modesty. To this end, I examine the most 
relevant studies on epistemic modesty and the epistemology of disagreements. The 
aim of this analysis, however, is not to give Plato credit for the topic of disagreements 
that contemporary philosophers assume to be a significant aspect of philosophical 
conversation/inquiry. Rather, I submit that contemporary epistemology can help us 
understand the method of philosophical argument illustrated in the Phaedo.  
The epistemology of disagreement is relevant to the Phaedo, as Socrates’ speech is 
considered a defence as if in court. In this respect, the aim of Socrates’ speech is 
persuasion and agreement.2 Socrates says, ‘I suppose you [his interlocutors Simmias 
and Cebes] mean that I must defend myself in answer to these charges [accepting his 
departure without a fight], as if in court’.3 Here, Socrates modifies the idea of trial 
by saying as if in a court simply because this is not an official court.  
In an actual court, we do not need to show our jurors the method that we use to 
persuade them, but we simply aim at persuading them. It might even be permitted to 
stray from the truth or misrepresent things in order to persuade our jurors. However, 
when we defend our actions before our friends, if we care about our friends and 
believe that they are sane, we would not try to deceive them.4 In addition, if our 
                                                          
2 Note that I do not distinguish ‘the historical Socrates’, ‘Socrates the mouthpiece of 
Plato’ and ‘Plato himself’. My aim is to find out what is going on in the Phaedo. 
Besides, nothing I argue hangs on the question of ‘Socrates contra Socrates in Plato’. 
On this issue, see Vlastos 1991, ch.2. 
3 Phd. 63b4-5 together with Simmias’ assent to be the jurors and how he waits for 
persuasion at Phd. 63d1-2. Rowe (2007, 99-101) argues that the Phaedo defence 
completes the Apology of Socrates by explaining ‘the cheerfulness’ of Socrates 
before death. In the Phaedo, Socrates’s cheerfulness is explained with regard to true 
philosophers’ willingness to die. The cheerfulness in the Phaedo, I submit, might 
result from the pleasure of philosophical conversation, as Phaedo tells Echecrates (to 
whom he relates the last day of Socrates in his eponymous dialogue) at Phd. 59a3-
4.  
4 Peterson (2011, 172) appears to ignore the idea that Socrates aims at persuading 
himself primarily (See Phd. 91a5-b7), and hence she thinks that Socrates does not 
need to believe his speech. Although I cannot justly review her ideas here, I disagree 
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friends care about the truth and are able to understand philosophical arguments, we 
would try to persuade them by using philosophical arguments.  
Now, I suggest that Socrates’ interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, seem to meet certain 
philosophical criteria which warrant philosophical argument. They are sane, for they 
do not act like Apollodorus, who ‘howled out as he wept and lamented’ once 
Socrates drank the poison.5 They appear to be students of philosophy because they 
are associated with Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus and are present at the prison 
during Socrates' last day.6 Thus, readers of Phaedo are placed in a setting in which 
Socrates aims at persuading his interlocutors by using the correct method of 
philosophical argument.7   
1.2 The Framework of the Metaphilosophical Reading 
Besides developing metaphysical and epistemological arguments through and within 
the proofs of immortality of the soul, Plato carries out a metaphilosophical analysis 
in the Phaedo. The metaphilosophical component is significant to understand the 
epistemic (and assertional) status of metaphysical and epistemological arguments 
presented in the Phaedo. For instance, for Socrates, the affinity argument leaves 
room for misgivings (Phd. 84c5-8) while the theory of Forms and the proofs of the 
immortality of soul require further investigation (Phd. 107a7-b9). From a 
metaphilosophical perspective, the epistemic (and assertional) status of first-order 
arguments are compatible with epistemic modesty. 8  
                                                          
with the way in which Peterson (ibid., 177-178, 193-194) explains Socrates’s 
hesitance in the Phaedo and his lack of intellectual rigour. For Peterson, the 
arguments do not belong to Socrates and his aim is to persuade his interlocutors to 
follow the philosophical path defined in the dialogue. In contrast, I explain Socrates’ 
hesitant and careful attitude in terms of philosophical humility. 
5 For Apollodorus’ rather sentimental and weepy manner see Phd. 59b1 and 117d2-
6. 
6 Phd. 61d  
7 By emphasizing dramatic setting, I do not mean that the Phaedo does not have a 
philosophical or metaphilosophical direction. Cf. Rowe 2015, 2. McCabe (2015, 
126) argues that ‘we must read him [Plato] whole, tackle the arguments in context, 
attend to the detailed settings in which his characters speak’. See also Dorter 1971, 
279. 
8 One needs to bear in mind that ‘judged by the standards of metaphilosophy, Plato 
seems hopelessly naïve and clumsy’ (Griswold 1988, 147). This is because Plato 
does not make any systematic analysis of “metaphilosophical questions”. Therefore, 
as Griswold (1988, 149) observes, we should focus on the dialogue form.   
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1.2.1 The Scope of Metaphilosophical Reading  
Some philosophers argue that metaphilosophical investigation is not necessary if 
philosophers are able to solve philosophical problems.9 For others, on the contrary, 
metaphilosophical studies are deemed to be a prerequisite for the practice of 
philosophers, as these studies might provide remedies for ‘the difficulties and 
disagreements’ in philosophy.10 Again, some propose that reformulating 
philosophical expressions is essential to form a proper bond between ‘facts’ and 
‘expression of these facts’.11    
In this thesis, I focus on the following metaphilosophical questions: [1] what are the 
norms governing the correct philosophical inquiry/conversation, and [2] why are 
persuasion and agreement required to accomplish the aim of philosophical 
conversation.12 Regarding [1], I suggest that if we lack expertise in arguments, we 
should not put all our trust in arguments (as is discussed in Chapter 4). Regarding 
[2], I argue that philosophical activity, for Plato, is by nature dialogical and the 
success of philosophical activity depends on effective and productive 
communication (discussed in Chapter 2).  
1.2.2 The Epistemology of Disagreements 
One major theoretical question that has dominated contemporary scholarship on 
disagreement explores the rational response of “epistemic peers” to disagreements.13 
In general, scholars suggest that we can choose either “the conciliatory approach” or 
“the steadfast approach”. In simple terms, the former view advocates that if we come 
to disagree with our epistemic peers, we ought to become much less confident about 
our argument. 14   
                                                          
9 Popper 1962, 66-68.  
10 Moore 1932, vii.   
11 Ryle 2009, 44. 
12 Contemporary debate on the question ‘what is philosophy?’ lies between two 
extreme positions: ‘philosophy-as-science’ and ‘philosophy-as-distinct-from-
science’. See Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood 2013, 23-44. For Plato, however, there 
seems to be no distinction between science and philosophy. See Gregory 2000, 
Introduction. 
13 Epistemic peers are described as follows: ‘[W]here one has good reason to believe 
that the other person is one’s (at least approximate) equal in terms of exposure to the 
evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc.’ (Christensen 2009, 756).   
14 The basic tenets of this approach are: ‘[1] that we may make mistakes in assessing 
evidence; [2] that the disagreement of others who have assessed the same evidence 
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Thesteadfast approach, on the contrary, asserts that notwithstanding our 
disagreement with our epistemic peers, we should ‘maintain [our] confidence in 
[our] initial beliefs despite knowledge of disagreement by those who seem, 
independent of the disagreement, to be as well positioned as [ourselves] to arrive at 
accurate views on the disputed matter’.15 This approach can even result in thinking 
that our opponents are irrational because they have arrived at a different conclusion 
although we both look at the same evidence.16  
1.2.3 The Phaedo on Disagreements 
The Phaedo revolves around a disagreement about the immortality of the soul. 
Simmias and Cebes ask Socrates to show that the soul is immortal, then they disagree 
several times with Socrates about the strength of his proofs of the immortality of the 
soul. Socrates, in turn, produces many of his arguments in response to his 
interlocutors’ counterarguments and their disapproval. In this respect, the Phaedo 
presents an interactive conversation, that is, the interlocutors play a key in 
developing the proofs of the immortality of the soul. Analysing the interlocutors’ 
approach to philosophical argumentation would also help to understand Plato’s 
insights on the method of philosophical argument.  
Now, I suggest that Simmias and Cebes generally adopt the conciliatory approach. 
At the outset, Cebes wants to hear arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. 
This, however, does not mean that Cebes does not believe that the soul is immortal; 
rather, he seems to be inquisitive. In fact, when Simmias and Cebes mention 
arguments openly against the immortality of the soul, they either attribute them to 
other people or desire to hear Socrates’ argument in a response to them.17  
                                                          
differently provides at least some reason to suspect that we have in fact made such a 
mistake; and [3] that reason to suspect that we’ve made a mistake in assessing the 
evidence is often also reason to be less confident in the conclusion we initially came 
to’ (Christensen 2013, 76).  
15 Ibid, 78. Elgin (2010, 55) describes this position as resoluteness. She points that 
resoluteness ‘seems to deprive epistemic agents of resources for correcting their 
mistakes’ since resoluteness impede re-examining our own position, seeking further 
evidence, or advancing better methods of assessment. In addition, Elga (2010, 177-
178) defines the stubborn epistemic view as follows: ‘according to which 
disagreement is never cause for changing one’s view on a disputed issue’. 
16 Elgin 2010, 66. 
17 At Phd. 70a1-3, Cebes tells that people have “strong doubts” about the immortality 
of soul and at Phd. 77e3-8 Cebes says not that we fear that our soul will disperse 
after death, but the child in us fears of the dispersal of the soul. At Phd. 86d1-3, 
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Socrates, in his turn, gladly receives the interlocutors’ questions and they begin 
reflecting on the nature of the soul. On the one hand, as Socrates produces new 
arguments, Simmias and Cebes become less doubtful about the immortality of the 
soul. The interlocutors are eventually convinced, although Simmias is still willing to 
retain some doubts.18 On the other hand, Socrates takes his interlocutors’ questions 
and arguments seriously, and he himself expresses his doubts a couple of times.19 
While defending the immortality of the soul, Socrates is not resolute but willing to 
re-examine the arguments about the soul’s immortality, to seek further evidence on 
this topic and to adopt new methods to inquire further.20 
1.2.4 The Implications of Socrates’ Defence Speech 
The idea of defence clearly alludes to Socrates’ actual trial, which Plato reports in 
the Apology.21 The Apology of Socrates can also be considered as metaphilosophical. 
That is, if Socrates had persuaded the Athenians’ jury that he was not guilty of 
wrongdoing, his ideas on a life worth living would be acquitted too.22 The Athenians’ 
jury basically convicted Socrates of impiety and of corrupting the youth with his 
                                                          
Simmias asks, ‘what we’ll say in reply to this argument [sc. the soul-attunement 
theory]’. Regarding Simmias’ statement, however, there is an ambiguity. A few lines 
above at Phd. 86b5-7, Simmias says ‘we take the soul to be something of precisely 
this kind [sc. an attunement]’. It is a question whether ‘we’ refers to a Pythagorean 
circle or people in general. For the latter see Hackforth 1955, 101-3 and for the 
former see Burnet 1911, 86. Sedley (1995, 11 fn.8) rules out the options of ‘the circle 
of Socrates’ and of ‘people in general’, and he prefers ‘the Theban [Pythagorean] 
circle’ over ‘Simmias and Cebes’. It is, I presume, not implausible that Simmias 
assumes himself to be a member of both Pythagorean and Socratic circle, though 
perhaps his commitment to each group may vary.  
18 See Phd. 106e-107b. 
19 For Socrates’s seriousness see Phd. 95e7-9; for his doubts see Phd. 84c6-8, 91b1-
7. 
20 By this, I do not mean that Socrates does not strongly believe that the soul is 
immortal. Rather, Socrates is willing to change and re-examine his beliefs no matter 
how strong his belief is. See e.g. Phd. 84c1-85b9, 107b6-9. Grote (2009 [1865], 157) 
suggests that ‘the full liberty of dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate—
is one of the most memorable characteristics of the Phaedon’.  
21 At Phd. 69e3-5, Socrates says, ‘if you find me any more persuasive in my defence 
than the Athenians’ jury did, that would be welcome’. Plato’s report in the Apology 
is probably not totally accurate but it should be faithful to the original defence, at 
least to a certain degree. For the issue of historicity see Allen 1980, 33-36.  
22 Ap. 36a5-6.  
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philosophy. If Socrates was found non-guilty then this would have also proven that 
his philosophy is beneficial for the youth.23   
In the Phaedo, Socrates’ interlocutors accuse him of dying too lightly, and Socrates 
aims at gainsaying this accusation from the perspective of true philosophers., who 
are willing to die.24 With this aim, Socrates tries to persuade Simmias and Cebes that 
‘there is something in store for the dead... [which is] much better for the good than 
for the bad’,25 and therefore Socrates is not resentful.26 
Socrates then attempts to establish two sets of premises to convince Simmias and 
Cebes. They can be summarised as follows: 
Set 1: 
[1a] True philosophers desire wisdom.  
[1b] Only those who practice philosophy correctly can attain wisdom and only they 
shall dwell with gods.  
[1c] The correct practice of philosophy is a release and parting of the soul from the 
body. 
[2] Wisdom can be attained only by the soul itself. 
[3] The soul can be by itself only after death.  




[1*] Socrates has striven in every way to practice philosophy aright. 
[1b] Only those who practice philosophy aright can attain wisdom and shall dwell 
with gods.  
[C2] Therefore, Socrates is not resentful of dying. 
Besides proving Set 1 and Set 2 above, Socrates must demonstrate that the soul is 
immortal.27 Otherwise, the practice of philosophers would be vain (no reward would 
                                                          
23 See Ap. 29d-30e. The Apology, too, seems to have a metaphilosophical aim, which 
is about the philosophical way of life. See Sellars 2014. 
24 See especially Ap. 23c-28a 
25 Phd. 63c5-7 
26 Socrates could not kill himself since ‘it [sc. suicide] isn’t sanctioned (Phd. 61c10)’. 
Xenophon interestingly reports that Socrates’s motivation was to escape the evils of 
old age, and hence he ‘talks big (μεγαληγορίᾳ)’ so that the Athenians’ jury would 
sentence him to death. Cf. Apologia Socratis 2.1-3.  
27 It is questioned by scholars whether the Phaedo brings in ‘partial’ immortality, 
which is implied by the phrase οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον at Phd. 95d1. It is 
suggested that soul can survive many deaths, hence it can be partially immortal, but 
this does not entail that it is ‘fully’ immortal, i.e. imperishable. I agree with Gallop 
(1965, 168-169) that the only immortality that is mentioned throughout the dialogue 
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be gained) because if the soul perishes once we die, we can neither attain wisdom 
nor dwell with gods. The primary aim of Socrates’ defence, however, is neither to 
attain wisdom nor dwell with gods. That is, although Socrates is practicing 
philosophy in his defence, and his defence should contribute to the attainment of this 
aim, Socrates’ success in defending himself alone is not sufficient to attain wisdom 
and dwell with gods.  
Rather, a whole life that has been spent in accordance with the correct norms of the 
practice of philosophy is the condition of the reward, as [1b] above suggests. In this 
respect, the success of Socrates' defence depends upon persuading Simmias and 
Cebes that (a) true philosophers are willing to die and that (b) the soul is immortal.28 
The interlocutors are ready to assent to (a) if Socrates can show that (b) is true. Then 
Socrates’ motive for proving (b) is to persuade his interlocutors to live according to 
(a).  
However, in his defence speech, Socrates does not say anything about the 
immortality of the soul, although the immortality of the soul constitutes an integral 
part of his defence of philosophical practice. Socrates only makes them believe that 
true philosophers are willing to die.  The inquiry on the nature of the soul begins 
once Cebes has raised his doubts about the immortality of the soul. In response to 
this, Socrates asks, ‘Would you like us to spend our conversation on these very 
questions, and discuss whether or not it’s likely to be so?’.29  
Why then did Socrates remain silent about the immortality of the soul during his 
defence? Firstly, it is possible that Socrates expects his interlocutors to notice this 
gap in his defence.30 Plato, likewise, may wish it to be observed by his readers, as he 
might want his readers to engage with the text. Here, I would like to underline that 
                                                          
is ‘full’ immortality. Cf. O’Brien 1968, 67. In his final proof (see Phd. 105b-106a), 
Socrates aims to show that the immortal is also imperishable.  
28 Aiming at persuading others, of course, does not mean that Socrates does not also 
seek self-persuasion. Later at Phd. 90e-91b, Socrates declares that he is primarily 
trying to persuade himself on the immortality of soul, and if he persuades others too, 
it would just be incidental. This passage is discussed in Chapter 2. In his defence 
speech, however, Socrates primarily aims at persuading others, and he does not 
mention self-persuasion. An explanation of the need of self-persuasion can be as 
follow: after hearing his interlocutors’ questions and objections, Socrates realizes 
that there may be some gaps in his arguments presented up to 90e, and hence he 
becomes relatively less confident about his belief.   
29 Phd. 70b5-c3.  
30 Similarly, the last argument for the immorality of soul is initiated with the 
objections of Simmias and Cebes. Phd. 95d2-d7.  
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Simmias and Cebes urge Socrates to give “reassurance (παραμυθίας)” and 
“persuasive arguments (πίστεως)” on the immortality of the soul.31 If the 
interlocutors had accepted Socrates’ defence as complete, and had failed to see that 
Socrates must prove that the soul is immortal, either the dialogue would stop at the 
end of the defence speech or they would begin discussing something else. From a 
dialogical perspective, the interlocutors’ doubts and questions give rise to the proofs 
of the immortality of the soul.  
Secondly, Plato emphasizes that we need to subscribe to the correct practice of 
philosophers before developing the conversation further. That is, Socrates might 
wish to test his interlocutors’ ability of philosophical and critical thinking, on the 
one hand, or Socrates might wish to check whether his interlocutors share some of 
his metaphysical and epistemological commitments, on the other. For instance, in 
the course of Socrates’ defence speech, Simmias agrees that there is a Just itself, a 
Beautiful itself, etc. and that bodily senses are not reliable.32 To sum up, Socrates’ 
defence [1] establishes the correct practice of philosophers, [2] confirms the 
interlocutors’ intellectual capacity and [3] verifies philosophical like-mindedness.33 
1.3 The Norms of Philosophical Humility 
1.3.1 The Equal Weight View 
Thus far, I have suggested that the idea of defence stresses the role of agreement and 
persuasion; and that Socrates’ defence speech has a metaphilosophical aspect. In 
outline, Simmias and Cebes agree with Socrates about the true philosopher's 
willingness to die, yet they are uncertain about the immortality of the soul. Socrates 
welcomes their uncertainty, as he gladly receives their questions and is willing to 
give further explanation. Socrates is willing to do further inquiry and open to modify 
his arguments  since he trusts his interlocutors’ intellectual capacity.  
                                                          
31 Phd. 69e6-70b4. 
32 Although Socrates addresses his defence to Simmias, once Socrates finished, 
Cebes approves everything Socrates says apart from the assumption that the soul is 
immortal. See Phd. 69e6-7   
33 Chen (1990, 53-57) argues that Socrates’ views on the practice of philosophers are 
in line with the ideas that will emerge later in the dialogue. He suggests that all 
philosophical methods of the Phaedo, such as the method of hypothesis, involve a 
kind of ‘epistemological pessimism’, a notion which Chen places at the centre of the 
practice of philosophers. Later, I object to the epistemological pessimism and argue 




For instance, Simmias tells Socrates that ‘ever since I’ve been considering what has 
been said [about the immortality of soul], both on my own and with Cebes here, it 
hasn’t seemed entirely sufficient’.34 Socrates replies, ‘Yes, my friend, and maybe 
you’re right’.35 Elsewhere, in reaction to Cebes’ question concerning the 
imperishability of the soul, we are told that Socrates ‘paused for quite some time and 
considered something’.36 This pause indicates that the interlocutors are able to reveal 
critical weaknesses for Socrates, which require him to momentarily retreat from the 
conversation in order to seek a solution.37  
In this respect, Socrates’ interlocutors are deemed epistemic peers. As defined above, 
we should give our epistemic peers’ intellectual capacity the same weight as our 
own;38 therefore, if our epistemic peers come to disagree with us, we ought to 
become less confident about our position. That said, Socrates, not unexpectedly, has 
a central role in the Phaedo as he often advances the most complex arguments. Be 
that as it may, we must also observe that Socrates produces his arguments to counter 
his interlocutors’ queries.39 
Socrates has some strong beliefs, and sometimes he seems to be dogmatic about his 
beliefs. For instance, it is supposed that Socrates suggests that things themselves, 
such as the Form of the Beautiful, exist without justifying this proposition.40 
Although I agree that Socrates firmly believes in the existence of Forms, his 
                                                          
34 Phd. 85d7-9. 
35 Phd. 85e1-2. 
36 Phd. 95e7-8. McCabe (2015, 90) maintains that argument may mean ‘giving truths 
with reasons’ and ‘a controversy between two (or sometimes more sides)’. For her, 
controversy and reasonable argument are intertwined, since controversy forces either 
side to give ‘vigorous reasons’. 
37 With regards to the dramatic setting, Plato might wish to indicate that Socrates is 
going to talk about a significant topic. This option is compatible with the idea that 
Cebes brings up an important difficulty. 
38 For Cohen (2013, 99), ‘EW [the equal weight view] says I should give my peer's 
opinion the same weight I give my own. EW can seem quite plausible when one 
considers that our status as peers entails a symmetry between our epistemic 
positions.’  
39 Zagzebski (2012, 52) calls the following position ‘extreme epistemic egoism‘: ‘I 
have reason to believe p only when the direct exercise of my faculties gives me 
reasons for p. The fact that another person has a belief p gives me no reason to believe 
it.’ For Zagzebski (ibid., 61), ‘my reason to believe other persons are conscientious 
depends upon observation of them and inferences about their inner efforts and 
abilities from their external behaviour.’ Socrates, according to these definitions, is 
not an epistemic egoist, as he believes, at least prima facie, that his interlocutors 
might have a reason relating to conscientious grounds. 
40 E.g. Burnet 1911, 33; Hackforth 1955, 50; Gallop 1975, 97. 
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dogmatism is “forward-looking”. Forward-looking dogmatism may be defined as 
follows: if no existing argument can invalidate a proposition, then there is legitimate 
ground to assume that that proposition is true. In this respect, forward-looking 
dogmatism is based on “belief-revision” under necessary circumstances, such as the 
emergence of a valid counterargument.41  
An argument against the theory of Forms, however, does not emerge in the Phaedo. 
Therefore, it is not possible to know whether Socrates dogmatically clings to the 
existence of Forms (and their role in explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be), 
and thus we cannot know whether he would flatly dismiss a counterargument. 
However, I suggest that Socrates does not suppose that he completed the exposition 
of the theory of Forms. With the aim of explaining my claim, allow me to quote:  
[T1] ‘Well,’ said Simmias, ‘on the strength of what has been said I too no 
longer have any room for doubt. All the same, because of the magnitude of the 
issues discussed in our arguments, and because of my low regard for human 
weakness, I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has 
been said.’  
‘Yes, not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but you’re right to say so, and, 
besides, even if you all find the first hypotheses trustworthy, nonetheless you 
should consider them more clearly. And if you analyse them well enough, you’ll 
follow the argument, I imagine, as far as a human being can follow it up. Should 
this itself become clear, then you won’t seek anything further.’42 
This conversation is taking place after Socrates has finished the last proof for the 
immortality of the soul. Just before this conversation, however, Socrates comments 
on his proof: ‘more surely than anything, Cebes, the soul is immortal and 
imperishable, and our souls really will exist in Hades’. Cebes agrees with Socrates 
and says, ‘I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any 
                                                          
41 See Fantl 2013, 37-38. Forward-looking dogmatism rules out ‘the flat dismissal 
principle’ too. Fantl (ibid, 34) defines the term ‘flat dismissal’ as follows: ‘It is 
“legitimate” to “flatly dismiss” the evidence or argument in the following sense: you 
know that the evidence or argument is misleading without knowing how it is.’ 
42  Phd. 107a8-b9 Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ’ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε 
τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν 
εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ’, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ 
τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι 
σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, 
καθ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ’ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς 
γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. 
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way’. 43 It seems thus Socrates is both confident about his proof about the immortality 
of the soul and thinks that this proof and other arguments need further justification. 
I find it curious that if Socrates is so sure about the soul’s nature, why did he welcome 
Simmias’ doubts? Above all, Socrates addresses all his friends when he says, ‘you 
should consider them more clearly’.44 In this respect, Socrates does not only 
welcome Simmias’ doubts, but he invites all his friends to make further inquiry. Here 
we might ask whether Socrates casts doubt upon his own account as well. Otherwise, 
is he merely recommending that his friends examine by themselves the proofs of the 
immortality of the soul and all other arguments?45  
If Socrates himself was so sure that his arguments are certain, I believe that he would 
not have easily approved of Simmias’ doubts. At least Socrates could say that his 
arguments were as certain as possible for humans, and that his friends still had a right 
to doubt them. Moreover, Simmias admits that ‘on the strength of what has been said 
I too no longer have any room for doubt’. Simmias thus believes that the proof is 
strong, but he does not accept that the issue of the soul’s immortality is closed. Since 
the issues discussed are so great, and since human arguments are open to suspicion, 
Simmias prefers to keep some doubt. Socrates's subsequent position then becomes a 
delicate balancing act between the need to persuade interlocutors about the 
immortality of the soul and the need to encourage them to seek further support.  
Earlier, Socrates also voiced his reservations about the limits of human 
understanding. To put it briefly, in his defence Socrates emphasized that human 
cognitive abilities are diminished during incarnate existence since the body makes 
reason go astray.46 Similarly, when warning against the misology argument, Socrates 
stressed that if we lack expertise in arguments, we should not put all trust into 
arguments.47 In this respect, Simmias seems to pay attention to Socrates’ instructions 
and prefers to be careful.48 
                                                          
43 Phd. 106e9-107a3. 
44 Socrates uses the second person plural: ὑμῖν at 107b6, διέλητε and ἀκολουθήσετε 
at b7, and ζητήσετε at b9. 
45 See Gallop 1975, 222. 
46 See especially Phd. 66c5-67b5. 
47 See Phd. 88d1-91b7. 
48 Sedley (1995, 14-17) suggests that the misology argument was especially targeted 
at Simmias since he had been too quick to accept arguments throughout the Phaedo. 
Archer-Hind (1883, 137) writes: ‘The contrast between the clear-headed logician 
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Further emphasis should be placed on the fact that Socrates says, ‘you all should 
examine’. This could mean that Socrates has already discovered the truth for himself 
and it is now his friends’ duty to do the same. That is, Socrates does not actually 
doubt his arguments, yet he tries to encourage his friends to attain the same degree 
of certainty, and to follow the philosophical path.  
However, I disagree with this idea for the following reason: One reason of Socrates’ 
differing attitude towards Simmias and Cebes might be the philosophical character 
of each. As said earlier in the dialogue, ‘Cebes is always scrutinizing arguments, and 
refuses to be convinced straight away of whatever anyone says’ and ‘he’s [Cebes] 
more resolute than anyone in not believing arguments’.49 In this respect, Cebes’ 
confirmation of the last proof of the immortality of the soul can be taken as an 
indicator of the proof’s strength.  
Simmias, however, is assumed to be less critical; he ‘can be relied on on to say ‘yes’’ 
and this is why Socrates prefers to discuss the unwarranted matters with Simmias, 
such as the definition of death.50 Sedley thus argues that ‘Simmias' residual doubts 
are not meant to reflect entirely favourably on him as a philosopher. They are surely 
further signs of his misology - the legacy of his uncritical attitude to argument in the 
past’. In this respect, Simmias’ hasty acceptance of several arguments and incautious 
attitude towards argument make him doubt arguments in general; hence Simmias’ 
attitude ‘has now left him unconvinced even where conviction would have been 
justified’.51 
 
Although I agree with Sedley that Simmias showed some signs of misology earlier 
and Plato does not consider Simmias to be a true philosopher, it is possible that 
Simmias has undergone a philosophical transformation. That is to say, Simmias has 
                                                          
Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought here. Kebes, 
sceptical as he is [Phd. 77a8-9], has found an argument that is in his judgement free 
from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not 
because he can find any defect in reasoning, but rather because the ‘child in him 
[Phd. 77e3-8]’ cannot be soothed by reason.’ However, we need to note that it is 
Cebes who mentions the ‘child in us’ and that Socrates recommends doing further 
inquiry not only to Simmias, but to all his friends. Moreover, his words do not allude 
to the fear of the child in us; rather, they allude to the limits of human understanding.  
49 Phd. 63a1-3 and Phd. 77a8-9 respectively. See Sedley 1995, 14-15. 
50 Sedley 1995, 15. Sedley (ibid., 16) also underlines that ‘from his questioning of 
Simmias, it emerges that Simmias has accepted the harmony theory without strict 
proof, attracted by the plausibility which has made it such a popular view.' 
51 Ibid., 17. 
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now been cured of the symptoms of misology and decided to become more critical. 
Simmias now wishes to inquire further into the issues surrounding the nature of the 
soul himself, and Socrates encourages Simmias and others to search for further 
justification and evidence. In a sense, Plato warns the readers not to put all their trust 
in the last proof and other arguments.  
Moreover, Socrates does not say that his arguments are certain nor that he believes 
that they are certain after Simmias voiced his suspicions. Due to the absence of such 
judgement, we cannot decide whether Socrates considers his arguments certain. It is 
also plausible that Plato intentionally keeps Socrates’ final judgement open. In a 
sense, the case is left open for discussion since Socrates does not only wish to 
convince his interlocutors that the soul is immortal, but also wishes his interlocutors 
to convince themselves. And yet, his interlocutors seem to consider Socrates their 
epistemic superior, since Socrates is supposedly the only person who can properly 
give an account of Forms.52  
Therefore, if Socrates claimed that his demonstrations are certain and complete (as 
much as is possible for humans), then the interlocutors would have become reluctant 
to conduct further inquiry, as they would have believed that Socrates had perfected 
his demonstrations. Socrates’ strong belief might thus hinder his interlocutors to 
inquire further. In this respect, Socrates’ epistemic modesty as a dialogical tool 
allows his friends to look for further evidence, and philosophical inquiry might 
benefit from epistemic modesty as epistemic modesty encourages critical thinking. 
To sum up, although we cannot certainly know to what extent Socrates believes that 
his arguments are complete and certain, the crux of Socrates’ approval of Simmias’ 
doubt is that his final judgement stresses a sort of epistemic modesty. To conclude, 
I surmise that it would be strange if Socrates said that we should examine together, 
since he was going to die soon. Socrates’ friends had been assigned the mission to 
inquire and to pursue the argument ‘as far as a human being can follow it up’.  
1.3.2 The Conciliatory Approach 
The intellectual virtues governed by the conciliatory approach play a key role in the 
making of the method of philosophical argument in the Phaedo. The conciliatory 
approach can be defined as follows: I believe that P on the basis of some justification 
                                                          
52 Phd. 76b10-12. 
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E. My opponent believes that Q on the basis of some justification E*, where E+Q no 
longer justifies belief that P. In this case, according to the conciliatory approach, I 
ought to acknowledge that my opponent’s belief of Q might be true on the basis of 
E*. The benefit of this approach is that we can attain greater knowledge (i.e. gaining 
more information about P), on the basis of further justification [E**] to defeat Q, 
and we continue to believe P on the basis of some justification E**.53 In other words, 
I can expand my knowledge about P if I believe that my opponent might be correct 
that a certain case Q might defeat P.54   
Chapter 2 explores what I mean by greater knowledge. For now, let it suffice to say 
that [1] Socrates acknowledges that his interlocutors might have an argument that 
defeats the argument that the soul is immortal. For instance, later in the Phaedo, 
Cebes would argue that Socrates’ argument [the affinity argument] does not properly 
address the question that the soul continues to subsist once its present existence ends; 
hence a soul’s current existence might be its last life. This is because, for Cebes, 
Socrates has only proved that the soul is ‘long-lasting and existed somewhere 
previously for an unimaginably long time’.55 That is, unless Socrates can show that 
the soul is imperishable, we cannot be sure whether the soul’s current existence is its 
last life.  
In response to Cebes’ question, Socrates says, ‘[w]hat you’re seeking is no small 
matter, Cebes; we must study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be 
and ceasing-to-be’.56 To this end, Socrates begins relating his intellectual 
autobiography and presenting his solution to the question of coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be. He next produces what is perhaps the most complex proof of the 
immortality of soul by using that solution, namely the theory of Forms. 57 Therefore, 
it is significant to observe that even though Cebes does not teach anything to Socrates 
as such, Cebes’ question helped Socrates give birth to his ideas, as it were.58 This 
                                                          
53 Long (2013, 64-67) argues that Socrates ‘profits from the opposition of essentially 
sympathetic interlocutors (Author’s Italics)’.  
54 Hawthorne & Srinivasan 2013, 11-12. 
55 Phd. 95c7-8. 
56 Phd. 95e8-96a1. 
57 Scholars question whether the final argument conclusively shows that the soul is 
immortal. See especially O’Brien 1967 and 1969; Frede 1978. Even though it 
assumed to be unsuccessful and inconclusive, we cannot ignore the significance of 
the hypothetical method and the theory of Forms, which result from Socrates’ 
attempt to address Cebes’ question.  
58 Blattberg (2005,121), in his study of the Phaedo, claims that ‘Socrates is never 
shown to have learned something substantial through discussion with others 
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postulation does not mean that Simmias and Cebes midwife Socrates as Socrates 
claims to have midwifed Theaetetus in his eponymous dialogue.59 Rather, it is 
sufficient for my purposes to suppose that Simmias and Cebes accompany Socrates 
and assist him in his inquiries. 60 
One might question why Plato expects us to discern the metaphilosophical 
component of the Phaedo instead of explicitly addressing it. For instance, we, by 
reading Phaedo, may only wish to acquire some proofs of the immortality of the 
soul; hence we might ignore the metaphilosophical component. Regarding the 
Phaedo, however, it seems plausible to think that since Socrates is talking to fellow 
philosophers and students of philosophy, the Phaedo’s target audience should be 
those who wish to learn the correct practice of philosophy.61  
1.3.3 Pessimist Epistemology 
Epistemic modesty demands the recognition [a] of the limits (and fallibility) of 
human understanding, and [b] of the possibility of making mistakes because of the 
limitations of our method of inquiry.62 The endorsement of [a] and [b] may lead to 
an unwanted consequence, namely epistemic pessimism.63 What I mean by the term 
epistemic pessimism is that ‘we can never attain infallible knowledge due to the 
fallibility of our cognitive capacities (supposing that until now we all have failed at 
                                                          
(Author’s italics)’. I strongly disagree with Blattberg, and I hope to establish that 
‘discussing with others’ and following the correct norms governing conversation 
help Socrates to advance arguments.    
59 Theae. 148e-151d. On midwifery see Burnyeat 1977; Sedley 2004. 
60 Hackforth (1972, 14) observes that ‘the argument [in the Phaedo] is perhaps more 
than anywhere one between men who genuinely like and respect each other’.   
61 Sedley (1995, 13-14) points out that Plato ‘takes two students of philosophy who 
have had every opportunity to acquire understanding about the soul's survival from 
a Pythagorean teacher, and portrays them as still hopelessly confused on the issue’. 
For Sedley, Socrates is successful to this end. The success, on the one hand, results 
from the components of Platonic philosophy, such as the theory of Forms and the 
method of hypothesis. On the other hand, from a metaphilosophical perspective, I 
think that the success partially lies in the Phaedo’s metaphilosophy, specifically the 
way in which Socrates and his interlocutors talk to each other.  
62 See Evnine 2001, 173-174. 
63 In his investigation of the epistemology of the so-called Socratic dialogues, Smith 
(2012, 29-31) suggests that epistemic optimism is inherent to the Socratic method 
and defines it as ‘a form of optimism about the epistemic value of what we do when 
inconsistences in our views are revealed to us’. According to epistemic optimism, 
even though we might propose something inconsistent again, this proposition ‘is 
likely to be an improvement in [our] cognitive system’. I discuss how we can foster 
our optimism and rule out epistemic despair in Chapter 4 where I examine the 
misology argument.  
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least for once), and hence we should not trust any argument’.64 The way we interpret 
the implications of [a] and [b], however, can lead to opposite directions, namely 
either epistemic pessimism or epistemic optimism. 
Epistemic pessimism recognizes that we will certainly fail to attain knowledge no 
matter how rigorously we apply some rule or method. An example of the epistemic 
pessimist approach is: no matter how rigorously I inquire, I can never prove that the 
soul is immortal due to the limits of my cognitive capacities. Epistemic optimism, 
on the other hand, recognizes that while our arguments may go wrong, this 
recognition does not imply that rigorous application of some method or rule is 
doomed to failure.  
An epistemic optimist, on the contrary, would say that although my current argument 
might not be complete and certain, and hence it might go wrong, if I conduct further 
inquiry, then I would be able to show that the soul is immortal. Epistemic pessimism 
suggests that we can never attain knowledge as we are cognitively incapable; it thus 
has negative effects on us since it discourages further inquiry. Epistemic optimism 
positively affects our inquiries as it motivates us to conduct further inquiry.  
Socrates prefers epistemic optimism. Besides the passage I have discussed above 
about Socrates’ comment on the last proof about the immortality of the soul, there is 
another passage which hints at the idea of epistemic optimism: 
[T2] Now when Socrates had said that [about the so-called affinity argument], 
a long silence fell, and Socrates himself was absorbed in the argument he had 
given, or so it seemed from his appearance, and most of us were too. But Cebes 
and Simmias continued to talk with each other in an undertone. Socrates caught 
sight of them and asked: ‘What is it? Do you think that there is something missing 
in what was said? Because of course it still contains many grounds for suspicion 
and counter-attack, at least if one is to go right through it properly.’65  
In this passage, Socrates admits that the affinity argument ‘contains many grounds 
for suspicion and counter-attack’, if one would examine it sufficiently. As Socrates 
                                                          
64 This definition is adopted from Aikin (2011, 69-70) but is heavily modified for 
my purposes.  
65 Phd. 84c1-c7 Σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, 
καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ 
πλεῖστοι· Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης 
ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς 
γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. 
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similarly stresses in T1 above, in this passage Socrates underlines the possibility of 
misgivings, which could be revealed and corrected through further inquiry.  That is, 
although Socrates recognizes weaknesses, he does not give up searching and even 
encourages his friends to accompany him in his examination.66 In this respect, the 
recognition of the limits and fallibilities of human understanding above motivates 
Socrates to examine the nature of soul further.  
1.3.4 Educational v. Scientific Reasons  
As argued, epistemic optimism is linked to epistemic modesty in that both encourage 
further inquiry and demand the recognition of cognitive fallibilities. Now, a 
significant difficulty of my reading of epistemic modesty is to determine its scope. 
One may argue that Socrates embraces epistemic modesty only for the sake of 
encouraging his interlocutors. That is, Plato, via Socrates, aims at presenting the 
fundamental values concerning teaching and learning (the pedagogical component), 
but the method of philosophical argument that Socrates uses in his inquiries has 
nothing to do with the epistemic (or intellectual) norms governed by epistemic 
modesty (the metaphilosophical component).  
The pedagogical component seems to be less controversial, and hence I will only 
make some brief comments. As suggested above, Socrates advances most of his 
arguments in response to his interlocutors’ questions and objections. The 
interlocutors express disapproving comments and Socrates welcomes their 
criticisms.67 This picture could be taken as an emphasis on two principles of teaching 
and learning: [1] students should critical, and [2] tutors should encourage critical 
thinking amongst students.  
Accordingly, one might limit the scope of epistemic modesty to the pedagogical 
component. Then it might be claimed that Plato does not use epistemic modesty in 
describing the method of correct philosophical argument. For instance, it could be 
argued that Socrates knows the affinity argument does not prove that the soul is 
immortal, but he presented it as a dialectical exercise. That is, Socrates uses 
epistemic modesty as a pedagogical tool to encourage his interlocutors to ask 
                                                          
66 See Phd. 88e-89c. 
67 See, for instance, Phd. 84d4-85d10 where Socrates encourages his interlocutors, 
who hesitate to ask questions, since they do not wish give trouble to Socrates. 
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questions and to actively participate; thus he can give new information without 
appearing didactic.68   
Now, the most compelling evidence in favour of the pedagogical reading (which 
ignores any metaphilosophical component) is that Socrates does not seem to be 
willing to change his original position about the immortality of the soul. This, 
however, does not pose any difficulty to my reading. This is because, as mentioned 
above, epistemic modesty does not hinder believing in an argument. Nor does it lead 
to a lack of trust in our cognitive abilities and philosophical skill. Rather, by adopting 
epistemic modesty, we simply recognize the fallibilities of human cognitive 
capacities. That is, believing in an argument is compatible with epistemic modesty 
if we are willing to accept that we might be mistaken and to pay heed to 
counterarguments.69     
Another objection can be made that by maintaining the hypothesis that Forms exist, 
that hypothesis is simply assumed and not defended.70 Against this, I would like to 
note that the epistemic modesty I defend here basically governs the way we dissolve 
disagreements. In this respect, it is an open question whether Socrates would reject 
discussing or modifying the theory of Forms.71 Socrates and his interlocutors agree 
on the existence of Forms; hence it is not possible to know how Socrates would react 
if he encountered an objection against the theory of Forms. However, even if the 
theory of Forms would seem to be assumed throughout the Phaedo, Socrates, as 
discussed above regarding Socrates’ comment on the last proof of the immortality of 
the soul, implies that the theory of Forms is open for modification and extension, 
although Socrates’ friends find it trustworthy.72 
                                                          
68 For a good discussion of Plato’s pedagogical aim and its relationship with 
epistemological values in the Sophist see Leigh 2007. Her reading of the Sophist 
seems to be parallel with my claims about the philosophical and pedagogical values 
in the Phaedo such as open-endedness and critical thinking.  
69 As we shall see in Chapter 5, the method of hypothesis is in line with what I suggest 
here in the following ways: [1] ‘I set down as true whatever I think harmonizes with 
it [the strongest logos]’, and [2] I ought to be willing to examine the strongest logos 
too, which is my initial hypothesis. See Phd. 100a3-7 and Phd. 101d1-102a1 
respectively. 
70 In the Phaedo, the theory of Forms is ‘nowhere defended, but is simply accepted 
without argument by all parties (65d5, 74b1, 78d8-9, 92d6-e2, 100c1-2, 102a10-b1)’ 
(Gallop 1975, 97).  
71 Long (2013, 68-69) underlines that agreeing on the theory of Forms has enabled 
the inquiry of ‘afterlife and death’.  




The primary aim of this chapter is to devise a model to understand Plato’s 
metaphilosophy in the Phaedo. To this end, I reviewed some contemporary literature 
on the epistemology of disagreements to frame the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical 
component, which, I submit, is partly governed by epistemic modesty. By stressing 
the idea of defence, I suggest that Plato directs our attention towards thinking about 
persuasion and agreement. Epistemic norms discussed in this chapter are careful 
checking, critical thinking, epistemic peerhood and epistemic modesty.  
Next, I show that Socrates encourages his interlocutors to be critical on the one hand, 
and that his interlocutors show flexibility in changing their views on the other. 
Moreover, Socrates assumes Simmias and Cebes are epistemic peers and he respects 
their objections. Epistemic modesty suggests that arguments are analysed carefully 
and objections are received respectfully.73 In doing so, Socrates and his interlocutors 
are able to expand their knowledge.  
The metaphilosophical component of the Phaedo suggests that we should assume 
that our opponents may have a legitimate reason for disagreeing with us and that our 
arguments are prone to failure. In this respect, if we encounter a disagreement, we 
should become less confident about our argument. By becoming less confident, I do 
not mean that we should not trust in our arguments and in our cognitive abilities.  
On the contrary, epistemic modesty demands that we should not discard our 
arguments so quickly and easily, but be willing to examine counterarguments. As is 
the case in the Phaedo, Socrates attaches too much importance to the immortality of 
the soul, although attaching importance to it does not hinder Socrates from gladly 
receiving, or even prompting, criticism. In sum, the norms governed by epistemic 
modesty partially shape the dialogical structure of the Phaedo.  
 
                                                          
73 See Christensen 2009, 758-79; 2011, 8-9. 
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Chapter 2: The Epistemic Norms of Philosophical Argument 
in the Phaedo 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, Plato’s Protagoras is first reviewed to set up a model for the method 
of philosophical argument. This model will be employed when reading the Phaedo, 
in terms of its metaphilosophical component. However, the Protagoras model must 
be approached with some caution, as the findings might not be consistent with all 
other dialogues of Plato. Rather, this model provides inspiration which assists in 
examining the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical component.  
In the former part of this chapter, firstly some reasons for choosing the Protagoras 
are given. Secondly, by investigating the preliminary conversation between 
Hippocrates and Socrates in the Protagoras, I argue that the goal of conversation is 
agreement, a goal which also frames the dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras. 
Thirdly, I examine the intervention of the listeners in the hope of arbitrating the 
dispute about the style of speech.  Then I try to outline the norms governing 
communication and philosophical argument.  
In the latter part, a reading of the Phaedo is offered in terms of the concepts of 
agreement and communication. I then claim that philosophical humility is a key 
component of effective and productive philosophical argument. Finally, I show that 
the Phaedo results in greater knowledge thanks to the disagreement of Simmias and 
Cebes. The phrase “greater knowledge” refers to the fact that Socrates and his 
interlocutors expand their knowledge about the nature of the soul and the practice of 
philosophers, for instance. There are two opinions which act as catalysts for the 
expansion of knowledge in the Phaedo: [1] Socrates and his interlocutors consider 
each other epistemic peers rather than epistemic rivals, and [2] the goal of agreement 
is the outcome of conversation. 
2.2 Plato on Persuasion and Agreement in the Protagoras 
2.2.1 Why the Protagoras? 
My choice of examining the Protagoras is not random. Although nothing I claim 
hangs on the grouping of Plato’s dialogues, it is safer to analyse a dialogue which is 
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widely acknowledged to be written before the Phaedo.74 That said, just because the 
Protagoras was written beforehand cannot alone prove that it therefore must have 
provided the same vision on metaphilosophy as the Phaedo. Rather, my claim is that 
Plato's argument about his vision for the method of argument in the Protagoras 
offers a helpful comparison to the  method in the Phaedo.  
Some other dialogues (e.g. the Phaedrus, Theaetetus and Republic) are supposed to 
be written around the same period when Plato composed the Phaedo, though they 
probably came after the Phaedo.75 Here, I am not going to discuss these dialogues 
because a thorough analysis of them would go beyond this chapter’s scope and 
because they are not directly addressing my interpretation of the Phaedo’s 
metaphilosophical component as much as the Protagoras.76  
In addition, it seems convenient to me to stress the Protagoras’ metaphilosophical 
component, since Socrates talks with a sophist in a dramatic setting where other 
sophists are present. Here I would like to note that the sophistic manner of speech is 
frequently criticized by Plato.77 I suggest that Plato’s aim in the Phaedo is to display 
the correct norms governing philosophical inquiry/conversation; hence it is fitting to 
examine a dialogue where a sophist and Socrates are talking. That is, Socrates and 
Protagoras seem to represent competing manners (or methods) of speech, thus the 
conversation of Socrates and Protagoras might provide valuable insights into the 
method of philosophical argument.  
In reviewing the Protagoras, I do not aim to offer an interpretation of the content of 
Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras, such as the question whether virtue is 
teachable. I instead examine the Protagoras with the aim of discovering some 
reflections on disagreement and philosophical argument. To this aim, I try to find 
                                                          
74 For a valuable discussion on the chronology Vlastos 1991, 45-47; Wolfsdorf 2008, 
3-7, Irwin 2008, Benson 2015, 8-11. For a discussion that focuses on the place of 
Protagoras see Kahn 1981, 310-320. 
75 One of my examiners rightfully protested that the Theaetetus is a rich and 
interesting dialogue about metaphilosophy. I have tried to address these worries 
raised about the Theaetetus in the Introduction.  
76 Another dialogue addressing a similar issue is the Euthydemus. For an analysis on 
the nature of conversation in the Euthydemus see McCabe 2015, Ch. 7. 
77 See Nehamas (1990) for a discussion on the distinction between philosophy and 
sophistry in Plato’s dialogues. Another problematic exclusion might be the Gorgias, 
which is supposed to be written before the Phaedo and depicts the conversation 
between Gorgias, who is a sophist too, and Socrates. However, like the dialogues 
mentioned above, the Gorgias, I have decided, would not assist my reading of the 
Phaedo as much as the Protagoras. 
38 
 
answers to the following meta-dialogical aspects: [1] the meta-dialogical norms that 
would enable agreement, and [2] the correct norms governing philosophical 
argument.78  
2.2.2 Agreement and the Goal of Conversation 
In the Protagoras, Socrates had a conversation with Protagoras at the house of 
Callias, which Socrates retells to an unnamed friend. Socrates went to Callias’ house 
because a friend of his, Hippocrates, asked for his company. Hippocrates wished to 
meet Protagoras and to ask whether Protagoras would accept his wish and make him 
wise.79 Socrates and Hippocrates initially decided to wait until morning to go to 
Callias’ house, though Hippocrates was raring to go.  
In the meantime, Socrates questioned Hippocrates about Protagoras’ profession and 
what Hippocrates expected to learn from Protagoras. For Socrates, they should know 
the answer to these questions if Hippocrates was going to entrust his soul to 
Protagoras.80 However, they were unable ‘to decide on such an important subject 
(τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι)’, most likely because, for Socrates, they were young; 
hence, they agreed to consult their elders.81 Finally, Socrates and Hippocrates 
decided to go to Callias’ house and talk to Protagoras and ‘many other wise men 
(314c2 καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί) who are at the house of Callias’.82 
My first point about the Protagoras’ metaphilosophy is the relationship between the 
goal of conversation and agreement. Allow me to quote:  
[T3] When we got to the doorway [of Callias’ house] we stood there discussing 
some point which had come up along the road and which we didn’t want to leave 
unsettled before we went in. So we were standing there in the doorway discussing 
it until we reached an agreement.83 
                                                          
78 Long (2013, 26-27) argues that conversation is ‘more resourceful’ than any other 
sort of inquiry, although Socrates does not advocate the extreme thought that the 
only way of inquiry is conversation. 
79 Prot. 310d4-6. 
80 Prot. 312c8-b4. The issue is that if they do not know what Protagoras’ profession, 
provides they cannot determine whether it is harmful or not. 
81 Prot. 314b5-9.  
82 Prot. 310a8-314c2. 
83 Prot. 314c3-7 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου 
διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν’ οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ 
διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως 
συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις.  
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This passage hints at the role of agreement, which seems to be the goal of 
conversation. We, unfortunately, are neither told what Socrates and Hippocrates are 
discussing nor why they disagree. Nor are we informed whether they disagree 
[Socrates says P, Hippocrates Q about E] or whether they do not have an answer 
about a topic, which would make both happy [neither of them has a satisfactory view 
about E]. No matter whether they are just ignorant about E, have opposing views 
about E, or are expecting satisfactory justification of E, it is significant to observe 
that they prefer to reach an agreement.84 Thus, agreement is associated with 
completeness.85  
I suggest that agreement, as the goal of conversation, is a theme underpinning the 
basic qualities of the conversation of Socrates and Protagoras. About the midpoint 
of their conversation, Socrates tells Protagoras that he has a bad memory, and, as a 
result, if someone ‘speaks at length’86  to Socrates, he will ‘fail to recall what the 
logos was about’.87 Then Socrates asks Protagoras to speak to him ‘as if…[he] 
happened to be hard of hearing’.88  
Since Socrates' condition of having a bad memory is made analogous to being hard 
of hearing, there appears to be an association made between cognitive abilities and 
understanding, a link which is essential for successful philosophical argument. 
Imagine that we are speaking to a person who is hard of hearing: we should speak to 
her with the proper loudness and pace. Likewise, if Protagoras does not speak to 
Socrates in the proper manner, by changing his style of speech, Socrates would fail 
to understand Protagoras’ argument or what the argument was about.89  
                                                          
84 Long (2013, 39) argues that ‘the question-and-answer mode…allows Socrates to 
take his interlocutor through the argument step by step…So if Socrates can find the 
right argument for his current interlocutor, the exchange of questions and answers 
promises to deliver just what he needs to confirm his ideas, namely evidence of the 
interlocutor’s agreement’. I agree with Long that a true agreement should result from 
the interlocutor’s sincere approval of each step of the justification.  
85 See μὴ ἀτελὴς “not incomplete” at Prot. 314c5 with διαπερανάμενοι “finishing 
up” at c6. 
86 Prot. 335c9 μακρὰ λέγῃ. 
87 Prot. 334d1 ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος.  
88 Prot.334d1-2 ὥσπερ…εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν. 
89 It is debatable whether Socrates really has a bad memory or he is just ironic. If we 
are going to trust what Alcibiades says (Prot. 336d2-d5), Socrates does not have a 
bad memory, he is just joking. Even if Socrates is ironic, it would hardly be 
surprising that Socrates does not prefer to speak at length. That is, Socrates might be 
good at understanding lengthy speeches and at speaking at length, yet this, for him, 
40 
 
However, Protagoras is not willing to fulfil Socrates’ wish, which is ‘brevity in 
speech’,90 since he thinks that he would not surpass anyone if he accepted the manner 
‘his opponent (335a6 ὁ ἀντιλέγων)’ requested. Socrates offers a solution: he could 
ask the questions and Protagoras could answer. Socrates, nevertheless, observes ‘that 
he [Protagoras] was uncomfortable with his previous answers and that he would no 
longer be willing to go on answering in a dialectical discussion’.91 The conversation 
thus is on the verge of collapse.  
Socrates once more tries to persuade Protagoras to speak briefly as he is willing to 
hear Protagoras’ arguments. Socrates thus says the following, which has some meta-
dialogical implications:  
[T4] But if you are ever willing to hold a discussion in such a way that I can 
follow, I will participate in it with you. People say of you—and you say 
yourself—that you are able to discuss things speaking either at length or briefly. 
You are a wise man, after all. But I don’t have the ability to make those long 
speeches: I only wish I did. It was up to you, who have the ability to do both, to 
make this concession, so that the discussion could have had a chance. But since 
you’re not willing, and I’m somewhat busy and unable to stay for your extended 
speeches—there’s somewhere I have to go—I’ll be leaving now. Although I’m 
sure it would be rather nice to hear them.92 
Firstly, Socrates is willing to carry on the discussion if Protagoras would speak 
briefly (as he is able to speak briefly) so that Socrates could understand him. 
Secondly, if Protagoras is unwilling to make this concession, they cannot carry on 
the discussion. Now, as argued above, the goal of conversation is agreement. Here, 
too, we can think in terms of the idea of agreement. That is, if Socrates and 
Protagoras are unable to communicate, then an agreement is not even a prospective 
outcome for there would be no understanding. 93 
However, one can object to my claim above by maintaining that Socrates decides to 
leave, but not because he thinks that it is impossible to agree. For instance, we can 
suppose that Socrates wants to understand Protagoras’ argument to refute him or to 
                                                          
does not need to be the correct method of philosophical argument. Rather, Socrates 
wishes to establish an agreement step-by-step as it is the right way to do so.  
90 Prot. 335a2-3 τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. 
91 Prot. 335a9-b2. 
92 Prot. 335b3-c7. 
93 McCabe (2015, 135-137) claims that in philosophical conversation, we listen to 
others to truly understand them, but not just to refute them like sophists.  
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defend the opposite argument. That is, Socrates can defend the opposite argument 
and refute Protagoras, yet Protagoras might still disagree with Socrates. However, as 
T3 above implies, the aim or telos of the conversation is agreement. Moreover, 
Socrates does not just wish to refute Protagoras, but, on the contrary, Socrates wants 
to understand Protagoras and hopes for agreement.94  
2.2.3 The Intervention of Listeners  
Socrates’ decision to leave the conversation initiates an important episode. Once 
their listeners, including some sophists, see that the conversation would come to an 
end, they decide to intervene. This intervention provides significant insights for the 
Protagoras’ meta-dialogical and metaphilosophical aspect in the sense that the 
intervention presents norms for productive communication and of manners of debate.  
Productive communication is required, for if one cannot understand another because 
of the lack of communication, there is no reason for carrying on discussions. It 
therefore is not even theoretically possible to agree. I say theoretically because the 
Protagoras, as we shall see, did not end up with an agreement, but with a ‘terrible 
confusion’.95 That said, in the same section, it is also underlined that if Socrates and 
Protagoras would keep on talking and examining, it is still theoretically possible to 
agree in the future, although they cannot find an agreement that makes them both 
happy. In other words, if we can communicate successfully, it is theoretically 
possible to reach an agreement. 
The listeners, however, are divided on the issue of the style of speech: whether 
Protagoras should compromise or should not accept the standards imposed on him. 
Alcibiades supports Socrates’ demand of brief speeches, Callias backs Protagoras’ 
uncompromising position and Critias, Hippias and Prodicus remain somewhat 
neutral in this conflicting situation. 96 Plato seems to show approval for the last 
                                                          
94 Long (2015, 34) rightly emphasizes that those whom we debate should confirm 
our discoveries, especially if they are strong and experienced adversaries. A 
confirmation coming from such adversaries might provide additional warrant. In this 
respect, an agreement might provide strong support for Socrates’ position, of course, 
if it is a sincere agreement in favour of Socrates. I say sincere because I do not think 
that Socrates is trying to deceive Protagoras. 
95 Prot. 361c2-3. 
96 Prot. 336d7-e4.  
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group’s intervention as the proposal presented in the Protagoras comes from them. 
Now, I would like to outline the structure of intervention: 
[1] The listeners ‘should not take sides (336e2 οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν)’, rather they 
should encourage the discussants not ‘to dissolve the conversation in the middle 
(336e3 μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν)’. The idea that there is a midpoint of the 
conversation seems to suggest that there is a goal of the conversation. If so, 
considering the implication of [T1] above (the goal of conversation is agreement), 
the neutral group appears to reiterate a similar thought. 
[2] The listeners should listen ‘impartially’ (337a3 κοινοὺς),97 but ‘not without 
discrimination (337a4 ἴσους δὲ μή)’. Whilst ‘distributing the value (337a5 νεῖμαι)’, 
the listeners should not deem all sides as equals, since the wiser should have more 
value than the unlearned in the conversation. 
[3] In conversations, friends should ‘agree (συγχωρεῖν)’ to ‘argue (ἀμφισβητεῖν)’ 
about ‘logoi’ rather than to ‘dispute (ἐρίζειν)’ about logoi. This is because eristic is 
for enemies. 98 
[4] In a good conversation, the speakers would earn the good opinion of the listeners 
rather than their praise, as praise is ‘merely a deceitful verbal expression’.99  
[5] Regarding the style of conversation, the debaters should meet ‘on some middle 
course’ which is agreed by all sides.100 In the case of the Protagoras, Socrates ‘must 
not insist on that precise, excessively brief form of discussion’, while Protagoras 
‘must not let out full sail in the wind and leave the land behind to disappear into the 
Sea of Rhetoric’. 101  
                                                          
97 LSJ s.v. IV.3.  
98 Prot. 337a7-b3. I would like to note that ἐρίζειν is used to signify sophistical 
disputations, or eristic in general, and it is contrasted with dialectic. E.g. Rep. V 
454a5 οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι. 
99 Prot. 337b4-7.  
100 Prot. 337e4-338a1 ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον. See also 
Prot. 338a6 μέσον τι τέμνειν “to hold a middle course” regarding the length of 
speech. 
101 Prot. 338a1-9. Socrates says if Protagoras does not stick to the question by 
making long speeches which go off the subject, then he would ‘ruin the conversation 
(Prot. 338d7-e1 διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν)’. This rule applies to Socrates too, as 
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Let me recap my initial argument:  the goal of conversation is agreement; without 
understanding and communication, agreement is not even theoretically possible.102 
In this respect, the five points above, I believe, aim at providing the correct norms of 
argument with a view to supporting the constructive exchange of communication 
between Socrates and Protagoras.  
In addition, the “arbitrators”,103 as Hippias calls those who are going to monitor the 
conversation, do not take part in the discussion apart from arbitrating between 
Socrates and Protagoras. As this is the only occasion that temporarily breaks the core 
conversation off, it seems to mark a significant point, namely the method of 
successful and productive communication.104 To look at the matter from a different 
point of view, Plato presumably steps in to give some reflections on the correct 
norms of philosophical argument.   
2.2.4 Case I: the Equal Weight View 
So far, I have regarded the goal of agreement as the outcome of conversation and 
have suggested that that the correct norms of conversation are presented in the 
intervention passage. In what follows, I will continue examining other passages of 
the Protagoras to describe some other norms of correct philosophical argument, 
namely the equal weight view, philosophical humility and careful checking. 
The equal weight view suggests (a) our opponents might have legitimate ground for 
challenging our views, and that (b) we ought to assume that their cognitive abilities 
are as good and effective as our own. In the Protagoras, Socrates believes that 
excellence cannot be taught while Protagoras thinks that it can be taught. Socrates’ 
claim is that since the wisest and best citizens could not pass their excellence to their 
children, excellence cannot be taught.105 Socrates then asks Protagoras to show him 
how excellence can be taught. Notwithstanding his judgement on this matter, 
Socrates is willing to listen to Protagoras and states:  
                                                          
he (ἅπερ…ἐμοῦ) has already been asked not to do so. See also Gorg. 449b4-c8 for 
another example of Socrates’ demand for precision from another sophist, Gorgias.  
102 Gorg. 457c4-d5 for the role of respecting and listening to the other to ‘bring 
reconciliation to their conversation (διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας)’.   
103 Prot. 337e4 διαιτητῶν. 
104 Consider also that Hippias wants to expound his own views on the poem that 
Socrates examines, yet Alcibiades asks him not to do so. See Prot. 347a6-b7. 
105 Prot. 319e1-2. 
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[T5] But when I hear what you have to say, I waver (κάμπτομαι); I think there 
must be something in what you are talking about (οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν). I consider 
you to be a person of enormous experience who has learned much from others 
and thought through a great many things for himself. So if you can more 
manifestly (ἐναργέστερον) show to us how virtue is teachable, please don’t 
begrudge us your explanation [slightly modified].106 
Not only is Socrates ready to accept the explanation, should Protagoras show it 
(having a legitimate ground), but Socrates also thinks Protagoras is a learned and 
experienced person (possesses on par cognitive abilities). This, however, might not 
mean that Socrates adopts the equal weight view. Imagine that I believe that London 
is the best city, yet you believe that Paris is the best city, on the assumption that both 
of us have seen Paris and London. It, then, is clear that our views about what makes 
a city best are incompatible. When we decide to talk about this issue, I may listen to 
you not because I believe you have some legitimate ground, but because I think you 
are wrong; hence you need to be corrected.  
In the Protagoras, however, Socrates does not seem to presuppose that Protagoras is 
wrong. Rather, as stated in the quote above, Socrates believes that Protagoras is 
learned and experienced.107 In this respect, Socrates appears to credit Protagoras with 
the cognitive capacity that would enable him to demonstrate his point and convince 
Socrates. Even if Socrates is not convinced by Protagoras’ argument, he still seems 
to believe that Protagoras can positively help him continue the inquiry.108 In terms 
of the city analogy above, I assume that you have seen enough cities to decide that 
Paris is the best one, and I am eager to see how you are going to prove this.   
In this respect, trusting in his argument does not hinder Socrates from listening to 
Protagoras, and he keeps an open mind while listening to Protagoras. Socrates 
considers Protagoras as having a par cognitive ability; hence the argument is between 
                                                          
106 Prot. 320b5-c1. 
107 Prot. 320b6-7. I do not think that Socrates praises Protagoras ironically. As 
Gagarin (1969, 133-34) suggests, Socrates and Protagoras seem to share some views 
about the importance of ‘aretē and paideia’ and the purpose of the Protagoras is not 
to show that Socrates is superior to Protagoras although Socrates ‘advances beyond 
Protagoras’.  
108 Long (2013, 42) argues that ‘Socrates’ reason for continuing to talk with 
Protagoras must be that Protagoras can help the inquiry into virtue’. By referring to 
the Protagoras 333b–c and 352c–353b, Long notes that Socrates and Protagoras 
‘have the same opinion’. Next, Protagoras assumes the role of the Many and answers 
on behalf of them, whose views conflict with Socrates’ view.  
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epistemic peers.109 Therefore, if Socrates persuades Protagoras, their agreement 
would indicate a solid and compelling position. If epistemic peers who hold opposite 
views would agree, the argument on which they agree is strongly confirmed.110  
2.2.5 Case II: Careful Checking  
Now, with the aim of explaining careful checking and the perils of steadfastness and 
overconfidence, I examine the passage where Socrates and Protagoras analyse a 
poem of Simonides. When Protagoras is concluding his analysis of Simonides’ 
poem, he asks Socrates which qualities ‘a fine and properly written poem 
(καλῶς…πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς)’ should have. Socrates, then, agrees with Protagoras 
that to be considered to have composed a fine poem a poet should not ‘contradict 
(ἐναντία λέγει)’ himself. That is, a good poem should be consistent. 
Before concluding the analysis of the poem, Protagoras asks Socrates, ‘Do you know 
this lyric ode, or shall I recite it all for you?’111 Socrates reports his reply: ‘I told him 
there was no need, for I knew (ἐπίσταμαί) the poem, and it happened to be one to 
which I had given especially careful attention (πάνυ…μεμεληκὸς).’112 Protagoras, 
however, tries to urge Socrates again by saying, ‘take a better look (Ὅρα…βέλτιον)’, 
and Socrates replies, ‘As I’ve said, I’m already familiar enough with it (ἔσκεμμαι 
ἱκανῶς).’113  
Protagoras proceeds by showing how Simonides contradicts himself. According to 
Protagoras, Simonides ‘asserts (ὑπέθετο) himself that it is hard for a man truly to 
become good’, but then Simonides also denies this. Protagoras then asks Socrates 
whether the lines mentioned are ‘consistent (ὁμολογεῖσθαι)’. Socrates states that they 
seem consistent, although he adds, ‘I was afraid he [Protagoras] had a point there 
                                                          
109 Protagoras, too, seems to consider Socrates as his epistemic peer: ‘I commend 
your enthusiasm and the way you find your way through an argument. I really don’t 
think I am a bad man, certainly the last man to harbour ill will. Indeed, I have told 
many people that I admire you more than anyone I have met, certainly more than 
anyone in your generation. And I say that I would not be surprised if you gain among 
men high repute for wisdom (Prot. 361e1-7)’. 
110 See Long 2013, 43-44. 
111 Prot. 339b3-b5. 
112 Prot. 339b3-5. 
113 Prot. 339b9-c1.  
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(καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι)’. 114 Protagoras concludes his analysis in the 
following way: 
[T6] He [Simonides] forgets (ἐπελάθετο) and criticizes (μέμφεταί) Pittacus for 
saying the same thing as he did, that it is hard for a man to be good, and refuses 
to accept from him the same thing that he himself said (οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι 
αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ). And yet, when he criticizes (μέμφεταί) him for saying the 
same thing as himself, he obviously criticizes himself (αὑτῷ μέμφεται) as well, 
so either the earlier or the later must not be right.115  
Socrates describes the events and his feelings resulting from Protagoras’ analysis as 
follows: ‘Protagoras got a noisy round of applause for this speech. At first I felt as if 
I had been hit by a good boxer. Everything went black and I was reeling from his 
speech and the others’ shouting [in token of approval] (slightly modified).’116  
I submit that the cause of Socrates’ cognitive dizziness, as it were, is his belief that 
he studied Simonides’ poem carefully and knew it well. Because of his confidence, 
Socrates turned down Protagoras’ proposal to examine the poem closely. If Socrates 
had looked at the poem once more, he might have noticed that Simonides appeared 
contradictory. Then Socrates would not have felt as if he was hit by a good boxer, 
since Socrates, as we shall see, was eventually able to show that Simonides’ poem 
is not inconsistent.  
At any rate, having fallen into a sort of cognitive dizziness, Socrates asks Prodicus 
to assist him in saving Simonides from contradiction, although Socrates admits that 
he was merely finding extra time to examine ‘what the poet meant’.117 After 
analysing the relevant lines at length, Socrates demonstrates that Simonides is not 
contradicting himself by stressing that Simonides distinguishes being good and 
becoming good. That is, for Simonides, becoming a good man is possible, though 
difficult, but it is impossible to stay in the state of goodness, i.e. “to be”, forever.118  
This scene stresses the risks of overconfidence and recognizes possible shortcomings 
of it in analysis and argument. The message of this passage, then, is compatible with 
                                                          
114 Prot. 339c4-8. 
115 Prot. 339d3-d9. The distinction between “to be” and “become” good will be the 
basis of Socrates’s rebuttal of Protagoras. However, how Socrates contests 
Protagoras is not relevant for my purpose.  
116 Prot. 339d10-e3. 
117 Prot. 339e4-6. 
118 Prot. 344b6-c3. 
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the norms governed by philosophical humility. That is, the metaphilosophical aspect 
of the passage is that we always benefit from reconsidering our arguments and 
beliefs; hence, we ought not to be so sure that our analysis is complete and our 
arguments are correct before we listen to counterarguments. If we are not careful and 
willing to have a second look, we can experience a cognitive dizziness, such as 
Socrates has suffered. 119  
In addition, Plato’s characterisation of Socrates in this section is not just negative.120 
By inviting Prodicus to assist him, Socrates buys time to consider the case and find 
out whether Simonides is contradicting himself. Socrates’ re-examination and 
explanation, I submit, shows the reader why overconfidence hinders us from further 
inquiry and why critical reasoning and careful checking are necessary for effective 
investigation and successful demonstration.121  
2.2.6 Interim Conclusion 
Let me take stock. I have argued that the goal of conversation is agreement and this 
goal is theoretically possible if the discussants are able to communicate. I have 
examined a couple of passages of the Protagoras to provide some norms for the 
correct manner of conversation and inquiry. In addition, I have suggested that 
Socrates adopts the equal weight view, which renders Protagoras an epistemic peer 
and maintains the belief that Protagoras might have legitimate ground for holding 
                                                          
119 In the Gorgias, there are, for Socrates, questions which he asks for “further 
inquiry (sc. ἐπανερωτῶ)” even though something seems “clear (δῆλον)”. Such 
questions are not aimed at the opponent herself, but they allow ‘the discussion to 
proceed in due order (τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον)’. These questions also 
prevent us from being ‘accustomed to guess the other person’s meaning because of 
jumping to conclusions’. See Gorg. 453b9-c5. This remark neatly illustrates the 
necessity of critical reasoning although an argument seems to be clear and the 
advantage of understanding what the other’s argument is in its entirety.  
120 Prot. 339e5ff. 
121 However, note also that Socrates in the Gorgias stresses that an agreement should 
not result from having more than enough sense of shame (οὔτ᾽ αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ). 
Any agreement, for Socrates, should stem from “adequate testing” of an idea if the 
opponent does not lack wisdom and has the “appropriate” amount of shame. See 
Gorg. 487e1-e6. If this is so, giving credence to others’ skill and ideas does not mean 
underestimating one’s own skills. See also Ap. 34d9-35a5 for the fine line between 
arrogance (αὐθαδιζόμενος) and esteem (δόξαν), and the relationship between esteem 




the opposite view. I also showed that careful checking and critical thinking have a 
key role in attaining deeper understanding.  
As stated above, however, the discussion did not conclude with an agreement on 
whether excellence can be taught, which was the main point of disagreement. In fact, 
Socrates and Protagoras come to believe the opposite of their original opinion in the 
end: the latter believes that excellence can be taught while the former believes it 
cannot.  Surely, the discussion is not totally in vain. On the one hand, each side has 
become aware of the fact that some cases or arguments do not support their original 
claim. On the other hand, Socrates, for instance, comes to have a better 
understanding of Simonides’ poem, of the distinction between being and becoming, 
and of the nature of excellence.122   
Moreover, from a metaphilosophical perspective, we see that although Socrates and 
Protagoras cannot reach an agreement, both showed flexibility, as they came to hold 
the opposite view to their original position.123 The lack of agreement, however, did 
not undermine Socrates’ eagerness. He suggests that Protagoras further examine the 
nature of excellence and whether it can be taught.  Protagoras, too, agrees with 
Socrates that there is need to discuss these questions, but not now.124 By underlining 
the need for further inquiry, Protagoras and Socrates stress that the conversation is 
not complete for there is no agreement yet. This picture, then, is in line with my 
initial claim that agreement is the goal of conversation. Agreement, I presume, is 
theoretically possible for [1] Socrates and Protagoras agreed on the style of speech, 
[2] they consider each other epistemic peers, and [3] they are not steadfast. 
2.3 The Phaedo’s Metaphilosophical Component 
The aim of this part is to review the epistemic (or intellectual) norms of philosophical 
conversation/inquiry in the Phaedo with reference to the model derived from the 
Protagoras. Since the Phaedo depicts a conversation consisting of 
epistemic/philosophical peers, the dialogue should contribute to understanding of the 
practice of philosophers. I also suggest that the Phaedo delivers more positive results 
                                                          
122 For the last issue see Prot. 328-334. 
123 Prot. 361af. 
124 Prot. 361d7-362a4. 
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than the Protagoras because the Phaedo takes place in a more philosophical 
environment. 125   
2.3.1 Socrates’ Second Defence Speech 
In chapter 1, I have emphasized the fact that Socrates’ speech in the Phaedo was 
called a defence as if in court. The aim of conversation in the Phaedo, I suggest, is 
shaped by the idea of defence; hence the notions of agreement and persuasion have 
a key role in the successful philosophical conversation.126 As also argued in Chapter 
1, the Apology and the Phaedo have different contexts because each dialogue has a 
different target audience. While the former defence addresses the Athenians’ jury, 
Socrates, in the Phaedo, defends himself against the allegations of Simmias and 
Cebes.  
In fact, in the early stages of the Phaedo, Socrates stresses this context-dependency, 
i.e. the structure of conversation is shaped by the target audience and the participants’ 
character. Socrates prefers to talk about their own arguments among themselves, 
rather than discussing others’ opinions, although this does not mean that it is not 
possible to talk about others’ opinions among themselves. At any rate, Simmias tells 
Socrates that for most people the philosophers do not deserve to live, and they are in 
a sense dead already since they do not care for bodily pleasures. Socrates replies, 
‘let’s speak among ourselves [about the philosopher’s willingness to die] and ignore 
them’.127    
                                                          
125 The dramatis personae of the Phaedo are extensively studied, and I do not wish 
to go over the issue thoroughly. In addition to the Phaedo commentaries, some 
valuable discussions of the dramatis personae are: the prosopographical work of 
Nails 2002; the examination of the philosophy of Phaedo of Elis in Boys-Stones 
2004; the philosophical characters of Simmias and Cebes in Sedley 1995. Euclides, 
Antisthenes and Aristippus are supposed to be eminent intellectuals, if not 
philosophers per se. In addition, the first two are supposed to have established their 
own schools of thought, Euclides was ‘the head of a philosophical school at Megara’ 
and Antisthenes is the ‘well-known founder of the Cynic school’ (Burnet 1911, 9-
11). 
126 By emphasizing the metaphysical aspect of the defence, Pakaluk (2003, 90) 
suggests that Socrates is ‘offering an argument for a real distinction between soul 
and body’. For Pakaluk, the arguments in the rest of the dialogue ‘articulate and 
defend, with some power and success, a philosophical dualism which is deeply 
problematic’. I am not going to examine the metaphysics of Socrates’ defence, 
rather, I simply underline its metaphilosophical aspect. 
127 Phd. 64a10-c2. 
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The nature of the defence in the Phaedo, therefore, is different than that of the 
Apology. The difference lies in the fact that the jury of the Phaedo, Simmias and 
Cebes, are willing to understand Socrates and to learn from him. They also share 
some of Socrates’ ideas, such as the existence of Forms and the value of 
philosophy.128 However, the philosophical alliance might not grant a successful 
defence. I submit that Socrates needs to use a persuasive style of speech in addition 
to presenting persuasive arguments. That is, Socrates needs to make his interlocutors 
truly believe and care for his arguments. With the goal of persuasion, Socrates 
neither remains resolute nor receives his interlocutors’ criticisms offensively, nor 
does he resent the fact that some of his arguments might be weak. This attitude is 
governed by the epistemic (intellectual) norms of philosophical humility.  
2.3.2 Philosophical Humility and Persuasion 
Now, I would like to discuss Socrates’ insights into the notion of persuasion and its 
role in philosophical argument. For Socrates, we should primarily care for 
persuading ourselves and look for the truth. To explain the role of persuading 
oneself, Socrates discusses the idea of desiring argumentative victory: 
[T7] It will be much better to assume that we are not sound yet, but must make a 
manly effort to be sound. You and the others should do this for the sake of your 
whole life to come, but I for the sake of my death considered in its own right, 
because concerning that very thing I’m now in danger of desiring not wisdom but 
victory, like those who are utterly uneducated. For when they are at odds about 
something, they also do not care about the facts of the matter they are arguing 
about, but strive to make what they themselves have proposed seem true to those 
who are present.129  
Socrates reflects on the fact that he is going to die shortly and therefore tries to 
persuade himself that the soul is immortal. Socrates states that he is in danger of 
becoming a man who desires not wisdom but victory, and who does not care about 
                                                          
128 Long (2013, 72-73) appropriately defines them as “critical allies”.  
129 Phd. 90e3-91a6 ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ 
ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα 
βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι 
φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ 




the facts about the immortality of souls. In fact, Socrates believes that he is not 
dealing with the subject like those who desire victory: 
[T8] I think that now I will differ from them only to this extent: I won’t strive to 
make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as byproduct, but 
instead to make it seem so as much as possible to myself.130   
T8 suggests that there is a fundamental difference between (I) desiring victory and 
aiming at persuading others and (II) to be in danger of desiring victory and aiming 
at persuading oneself. As is clear from T7, a person who acts in the spirit of (I) does 
not care about the truth. Socrates none the less primarily aims at persuading himself. 
That is, by straying from the way of truth, Socrates would primarily deceive himself, 
hence, as a byproduct, his friends.131 Socrates, however, wants to deceive neither 
himself nor his friends. He advises his friends to care about the truth: 
[T9] [I]f you take my advice, you’ll give little thought to Socrates and much more 
to the truth: if you think I say something true, agree with me, and if not, use every 
argument to resist me, making sure that my eagerness doesn’t make me deceive 
myself and you simultaneously, and that I don’t leave my sting in you, like a bee, 
before I depart.132 
[T9] seems to indicate that Socrates esteems his interlocutors’ cognitive capacities 
and their critical thinking skills; hence he calls for their critical contribution to the 
subject to save himself and others from deception. That is, Socrates cares about truth 
more than persuasion. He encourages Simmias and Cebes to resist his arguments and 
to save everyone from deception.133  
However, one might assert that Socrates, whilst encouraging his interlocutors to be 
critical, does not say what he genuinely aims at. Socrates might be aiming at refuting 
                                                          
130 Phd. 91a6-b1 καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· 
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη 
πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. 
131 In the Prot. 337a7-b3, desiring victory is called eristic so that it is prohibited. In 
the Phaedo, Socrates does not say that he is desiring victory, but that he is in danger 
of desiring not wisdom but victory. To save himself from this danger, he requests, I 
submit, his friends’ assistance and their criticism.  
132 Phd. 91b8-c5 ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ 
ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ 
μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν 
τε ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι. 
133 From a pedagogical perspective, Socrates might wish to underline the significance 
of critical thinking. In a sense, Plato may also want his readers to be critical. 
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his interlocutors so that he encourages them to present new arguments. This 
interpretation is plausible, yet the burden of proof lies with whoever claims that 
Socrates does not genuinely believe that his interlocutors can produce strong 
counterarguments or compelling questions. As I have claimed and will continue to 
claim, Socrates benefits from his interlocutors’ counterarguments and Cebes’ 
question about the soul’s imperishability, which is especially compelling.  
My second claim draws upon the fact that if persuading others is subordinate to 
persuading oneself, Socrates might not be aiming at an agreement. Firstly, Socrates 
is only in danger of desiring not wisdom but victory, as he has not yet become a man 
who desires victory. With the hope of escaping this danger, Socrates, as mentioned 
above, asks for his interlocutors’ assistance and their criticism. Secondly, Socrates 
believes that he cannot deceive others without also deceiving himself. Thus, Socrates 
is still aiming at an agreement and he desires to find an argument which can satisfy, 
or persuade, himself as well as his interlocutors. 
In addition, Socrates stresses that he does not try to convince others at the expense 
of the search for truth. The need of persuading himself, in this respect, ‘motivates’ 
Socrates’ desire to discover the truth.134 Here, another question might arise regarding 
the desire of self-persuasion: why would Socrates talk to others if he just wishes to 
persuade himself? Instead, Socrates could have asked for some peace and quiet, then 
waged an internal battle, so to speak, with himself on this matter and tried to persuade 
himself.  
A plain answer is that Socrates can persuade himself only if he is conversing with 
others. This is unsurprising, not only because we are reading a dialogue written by 
Plato but also because examining with others is supposed to be Socrates’ typical 
practice.135 Besides, I think there is a second-order aim regarding the idea of self-
persuasion: self-persuasion applies not only to Socrates but also to the interlocutors 
and the readers. That is, the interlocutors and the readers, too, are invited to try to 
persuade themselves rather than believing Socrates’ argument without self-
reflection.  
                                                          
134 Phd. 91a8 προθυμήσομαι. 




To reiterate, Socrates makes it clear that he is not going to deceive because of his 
eagerness to show that the soul is immortal. The bee analogy at T9 above would help 
us to understand the relationship between self-persuasion, the truth and deception. 
Imagine that if a bee stings us, it would die, though the person who is stung by a bee 
would survive unless she has an allergy to bee stings. Likewise, Socrates cannot 
deceive his interlocutors without deceiving himself, as though a bee stung but did 
not die at the same time. If so, it seems that deceiving others and deceiving oneself 
are inseparable, and we cannot achieve one without also achieving the other, if we 
care about the truth.  
2.3.3 The First Disagreement  
As suggested above, truly persuading ourselves, for Socrates, depends on our care 
about the truth and our proximity to it. Now, I show that the search for self-
persuasion leads to the expansion of our knowledge. To this end, allow me to briefly 
scrutinize Socrates’ argument against suicide. Socrates maintains that suicide is not 
permissible although it is better for some people, at certain times, to be dead than to 
be alive. This is because, for Socrates, gods take care of us and humans are one of 
the gods’ possessions. If so, we would make gods angry by killing ourselves. For 
Socrates, we should not kill ourselves ‘until god imposes some necessity’. 136  
Socrates, in this respect, believes that the Athenians’ jury posed this necessity when 
they decided to put him to death; hence, Socrates is permitted to kill himself. 
Therefore, since true philosophers are willing to die,137 though Socrates has not yet 
given any reason for this, Socrates is neither resentful of dying nor afraid of acting 
against the will of the gods.   
Cebes, however, opposes Socrates by maintaining that it is unreasonable for the 
wisest people, true philosophers, to kill themselves because these people should 
know that the gods are “the best supervisors”. As we are one of the gods’ 
possessions, and they administer us in the best way, it is unreasonable to escape from 
gods and to be unresentful of leaving them. For Cebes, ‘an unintelligent person, 
                                                          
136 Phd. 62a1-c5. For an analysis of this complex sentence see Gallop 1975:79-83. 
137 Phd. 61c1-9. 
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however, might well think so [i.e. he will take better care of himself after he has 
become free], namely that he should try to escape from his master’.138  
Here, we need notice Socrates’ welcoming attitude towards Cebes’ argument, which 
praises critical thinking. Phaedo relates Socrates’ reaction to Cebes’ argument as 
follows:  
[T10] When Socrates heard this he seemed to me delighted by Cebes’ persistence, 
and he looked at us and said: ‘As you can see, Cebes is always scrutinizing 
arguments, and refuses to be convinced straight away of whatever anyone 
says.’139 
Simmias, too, agrees with Cebes and adds that not only should Socrates be reluctant 
to leave good masters behind but also his friends.140 Socrates acknowledges what 
Simmias and Cebes are saying is fair and decides to defend himself ‘in answer to 
these charges, as if in court’. 141 In the end, Socrates will persuade his interlocutors 
that true philosophers are reasonably willing to die since true wisdom can only be 
found after death.142 
2.3.4 The Expansion of Knowledge 
The interlocutors’ opposition and Socrates’ decision to convince them lead to an 
expansion of knowledge concerning the practice of philosophers and the nature of 
the soul. As I have already stated, the interlocutors’ objections prompted further 
examination. If it were not for their disagreement, Socrates would probably not feel 
obliged to defend himself and to examine true philosophers’ willingness to die.  
Socrates then begins his defence by saying, ‘[I] am optimistic that there is something 
in store for the dead and, as we have long been told, something much better for the 
good than for the bad’.143 Next, Socrates introduces the aim of his defence:  
                                                          
138 Phd. 62c9-e7. 
139 Phd. 62e8-63a3   Ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος 
πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, Ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, [ὁ] Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, 
καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπῃ. 
140 Phd. 63a4-9. 
141 Phd. 63b1-2.  
142 I scrutinize the way in which Socrates persuades his interlocutors in Chapter 3. 
143 Phd. 62e5-7. 
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[T11] I want now to give the account I owe you, of how it seems to me to be 
reasonable for a man who has genuinely spent his life in philosophy to be 
confident about his imminent death, and to be optimistic that he’ll win the greatest 
goods there, after he’s met his end.144  
Socrates subsequently presents some aspects of true philosophers’ willingness to die,  
which are not correctly understood by many people (the ordinary people), namely 
‘the sense in which true philosophers are near death, the sense in which they deserve 
death, and what that death is like’.145 Simmias and Socrates, firstly, agree that being 
dead is the following: ‘the body has been separated from the soul and come to be 
apart, alone by itself, and the soul has been separated from the body and is apart, 
alone by itself’.146 After that, Socrates asks Simmias to consider that ‘if you too turn 
out to think what I do. I believe that the following points will give us a better 
understanding of the things we are looking into’.147 Finally, Socrates argues and 
Simmias approves the following points about the practice of philosophers and the 
nature of reasoning:  
[1] true  philosophers disdain bodily pleasures and adornments except in so far as 
they need; [2] people think those who disdain the body are close to being dead 
and they are not worthy of living; [3] bodily senses are neither clear nor accurate; 
[4] the soul reasons best the less it has contact with the body; [5] there are things 
themselves such as a Just itself, a Beautiful itself, etc. ; [6] these realities can be 
discerned by intellect alone by itself and unsullied; [7] a person who separates 
the soul from the body as much as possible comes closest to each of them, i.e. 
Forms.148  
Simmias agrees with Socrates about the seven points above, through which Socrates 
will try to expand their knowledge (or achieve a better understanding) about the true 
philosophers’ willingness to die.149 After their agreement, Socrates begins to explain 
the reasoning behind his optimism, which is clearly indicated in the text. The 
discussion summarised above takes place between the Phaedo 64d2 and 66a10. Then 
Socrates makes an inference by Οὐκοῦν at 66b1. He says, ‘then given all this [the 
seven points above] is it inevitable for those who are genuinely philosophers to be 
                                                          
144 Phd. 63e7-6a2. 
145 Phd. 64b7-8. 
146 Phd. 64c5-8. 
147 Phd. 64c10-d2 ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι 
ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. 
148 [1] Phd. 64d2-65a2, [2] 65a4-a8, [3] 65a10-b11, [4] 65c2-d1, [5] 65d4-d10, [6] 
65d11-e5 [7] 66a1-10 
149 In a sense, it is also true that the ‘“starting point” of philosophising’ is agreement 
about an ‘opinion’ (Griswold 1988:165). 
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struck by the following sort of belief’, and he introduces a discussion between true 
philosophers directed toward the exploration of knowledge and the truth.150   
The defence of Socrates ends with Cebes’ approval that Socrates had shown ‘rightly 
(καλῶς)’ that true philosophers are willing to die and the reason behind Socrates not 
being resentful. That said, for Cebes, the immortality of the soul is still in need of 
further examination. That is, Socrates should also show that the soul is immortal to 
complete his defence.151 The outline of conversation about true philosophers’ 
willingness to die is as follows: 
(a) the interlocutors’ disagreement about true philosophers’ willingness to die and 
their protest to Socrates’ eagerness to die; (b) the agreement about the seven 
points above through which Socrates offers to resolve the conflict; (c) the 
expansion of knowledge, or the attainment of better understanding; (d) a new 
disagreement about the immortality of the soul.152  
In his defence, Socrates clearly assumes that the soul is immortal, since he portrays 
the soul’s life in Hades, yet he does not say anything about the immortality of the 
soul. In fact, the question about the existence of the soul after death is first mentioned 
by Cebes, and the adjective ‘immortal (ἀθάνατον)’ has not been used prior to line 
73a2 in the Phaedo.  
2.3.5 The Second Disagreement  
Why does not Socrates’ defence speech address the immortality of the soul? Firstly, 
Socrates should be aware of the fact that the immortality of the soul is a key 
component of his defence. It would be odd if Socrates did not realize that true 
philosophers’ willingness to die would be pointless unless the soul is immortal. 
Secondly, Socrates would not simply assume that his interlocutors believe in the 
immortality of the soul, since Socrates agrees with Cebes that the immortality of the 
soul requires ‘no little reassurance and proof’.153 
                                                          
150 Phd. 66b1-3 Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε 
τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις. 
151 Phd. 69e7-70b4. 
152 But note that if we give our consent to a proposition, this means neither that we 
are going to buy the whole argument nor that we share the same philosophical ideas.  
153 Phd. 70b1-7. 
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We can consider the unmentioned argument about the immortality of the soul from 
the perspective of Plato’s portrayal of Socrates’ interlocutors. Plato portrays the 
interlocutors as noticing the missing part in Socrates’ defence speech. Surely, the 
interlocutors do not say that Socrates left the immortality of the soul out. Rather, 
Cebes says that people have strong doubts about the immortality of the soul and the 
soul’s powers during its discarnate existence. Although Cebes does not directly point 
out Socrates' omission, the question about the immortality of the soul troubles Cebes; 
therefore Cebes asks Socrates to examine the topic. 154 At any rate, as I have argued 
above, Socrates produces arguments because the interlocutors come forward in 
noticing a weakness in the argument.155 In this way, Plato stresses that the 
interlocutors also occupy a vital position in the conversation, which is the 
significance of reciprocal support and the necessity of such for philosophical 
argument. 
That said, one might suppose that Socrates and his interlocutors would not be 
participating equally in a philosophical argument if Socrates deliberately leaves a 
key premise out. It can be argued that Socrates has all the answers to give, yet in the 
interests of teaching he does not give all the answers at once. Therefore, Socrates 
and his interlocutors are not epistemic peers, who have equal cognitive capacity. 
This, however, does not imply that Socrates is free from erring or that his 
interlocutors are not as cognitively capable as Socrates. It only implies that Socrates 
might have more knowledge and experience. Nonetheless, we need to notice that 
possessing knowledge and the cognitive capacity to know (as well as to question 
existing knowledge) are different, and that the interlocutors possess the latter, as they 
can wrap their minds around Socrates’ arguments, criticize them and proffer 
counterarguments. 
                                                          
154 Blattberg (2015, 116) argues that ‘given that the intended changes of position go 
in one direction only, from Socrates to his interlocutors, the two-way dynamic 
necessary for any sort of dialogue must be considered absent (author’s italics)’. As 
we shall see, Socrates sincerely listens to his interlocutors, and Plato stresses that the 
interlocutors’ criticisms contribute to Socrates’ arguments about the immortality of 
the soul. 
155 At Phd. 103af., one of those present says that Socrates is contradicting himself 
(about the idea that an opposite thing [something large] comes to be from an opposite 
thing [something small]), though Socrates shows that he actually does not (since the 
opposite by itself [the Beautiful itself] could never come to be its own opposite). It 
seems, then, such interventions are encouraged by Plato. 
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Besides, the above quotation (T9) about caring for truth more than Socrates indicates 
that the Phaedo is not primarily about Socrates but about truth. That is, the dialogue 
is not only a eulogy for Socrates or a praise of his philosophical skills, but also a 
record of the discovery of truth, although the truth and Socrates’ ideas may coincide. 
If we put aside Plato’s admiration of Socrates’ wisdom, we might observe that the 
interlocutors and their arguments have a key role in understanding the nature of the 
soul. From a meta-dialogical perspective, Socrates is an interlocutor as well, as it is 
not possible to know exactly to what extent Plato agrees with Socrates.156 
2.3.6 Cebes and Simmias 
To begin with, Socrates’ interlocutors do not seem to consider Socrates their rival. 
They do not oppose Socrates with the intention of refuting him and winning the 
debate. For instance, Cebes asks for an investigation into the immortality of the soul 
since the issue requires further inquiry and support.157 That said, Cebes’ eagerness 
alone is not sufficient to call him a good interlocutor.  
Besides his eagerness, Cebes seems to have some knowledge about the immortality 
of the soul. For example, it is Cebes who alludes to the theory of recollection, 
according to which ‘our learning is in fact nothing but recollection…we must 
presumably have learned in some previous time what we recollect now. And that 
would be impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before it was born in this 
human form. So in this way too the soul seems to be something immortal’.158 For 
Cebes, this is an excellent theory, which proves that we have knowledge and the true 
account in us and learning is actually remembering. 159   
Cebes’ introduction of the theory of recollection has another implication. In addition 
to the fact that Cebes knows some arguments about the immortality of the soul, its 
introduction by Cebes suggests that he is willing to support Socrates’ argument; 
otherwise, he would not bring the theory of recollection up, which is in favour of the 
immortality of the soul. That said, Cebes does not put all his trust in the theory of 
                                                          
156 For the mimetic aspect of the dialogues that invites the readers to the path of 
philosophy through the characters see McCoy 2016, 54-55. 
157 Phd. 70b2-4 τοϋτο δη ίσως ούκ ολίγης παpαμυθίας δείται καi πίστεως, ώς έστι τε 
ή ψυχη άποθανόντος τοϋ άνθpώπου καί τινα δύναμιν έχει καi φpόνησιν. 
158 Phd. 75c5-76d6. 
159 Phd. 73a6-b1. 
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recollection, as he believes that the theory is not sufficient to show that the soul is 
immortal. 160  
Simmias’ reaction to the theory of recollection deserves some attention. Once Cebes 
has introduced the theory of recollection, Simmias asks for “proofs (αἱ ἀποδείξεις)” 
that would verify it.161 Firstly, Cebes tries to explain the theory of recollection to 
Simmias, then Socrates steps in and asks Simmias: ‘see if you agree when you 
examine the issue along the following lines. For are you in doubt about how so-called 
“learning” can be recollection?’162 Simmias replies as follows:  
[T12] No, I don’t doubt it,’ said Simmias, ‘but I need to undergo the very thing 
that the theory is about: recollecting. And to some extent I already remember and 
am convinced, thanks to what Cebes started to say. None the less, I’d like to hear 
now how you yourself were starting to propound it.163 
For Simmias, Cebes’ attempt to explain the theory of recollection was not successful. 
It was a missed shot.164 Although Simmias is nearly convinced, he desires to hear 
more about the argument. In this respect, Simmias seems to look for a better 
understanding of the theory of recollection. Next, Socrates begins to make a 
demonstration of the theory of recollection, and Simmias agrees that the soul has 
existed before birth and that learning is recollection are ‘adequately proved’.165 For 
Simmias, Cebes is also ‘sufficiently convinced’.166 Nevertheless, Simmias and Cebes 
have not yet been convinced that the soul will exist after death, and thus only half of 
the argument is complete.167 
                                                          
160 Nothing in the text implies that Cebes introduces the theory of recollection for 
opposing it later. That is, Cebes does not remind the interlocutors of the theory of 
recollection to stress its weaknesses.  On the contrary, both interlocutors believe in 
the theory, though they are suspicious as to whether it shows that the soul will exist 
after death. See Phd. 76e8-77a5.  
161 Phd. 73a4-5.  
162 Phd. 73b4-5 σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῄ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ  
δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; 
163 Phd. 73b6-10 Ἀπιστῶ μέν [σοι] ἔγωγε, ἦ δ’ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, 
δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης 
ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ 
σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. 
164 See Rowe 1993, 165; Burnet 1911, 53.  
165 Phd. 77a5 ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. 
166 Phd. 77a10 οὐκ ἐνδεῶς…πεπεῖσθαι. 
167 However, for Socrates if the recollection argument is combined with the cyclical 
argument, then one would attain a complete proof. See Phd. 77c6-e3. 
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Socrates will provide two more arguments (the affinity and the last arguments), along 
with a rebuttal (the soul-harmony argument) about whether the soul will exist after 
we have died. At this point, I would like to remind the reader of a passage that I often 
refer to in this dissertation: once Socrates has completed the last proof of the 
immortality of the soul, Cebes is convinced, but for Simmias there remains some 
reasonable doubt. Socrates also encourages his friends to continue to investigate, 
until they follow the argument as far as humanly possible.168  
In this respect, agreement completes the current conversation, though the 
immortality of the soul is an issue that demands further inquiry.169 As I have claimed 
whilst discussing the Protagoras, agreement is the goal (or completion) of 
philosophical conversation/inquiry. At the end of the Protagoras, Socrates and 
Protagoras cannot find an argument that both can agree on, yet they decide to meet 
at some other time to discuss further. In the Phaedo, Socrates and his interlocutors 
agree on the last argument, though Simmias voiced reservations about the issue and 
Socrates recognizes them. Unfortunately, Socrates cannot meet his friends again to 
philosophise, and he urges them to discuss among themselves. There is no time left 
to follow the argument further, although Socrates might have other opinions in mind 
or wish to discover new arguments.170  
2.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to propose a conceptual framework based on the correct 
norms of successful persuasion, agreement and philosophical argument. To this end, 
I examined the Protagoras from the perspective of philosophical agreement. Then 
these ideas were brought together and applied to the Phaedo. By comparing the 
Protagoras and the Phaedo, however, I did not aim at showing that they adhere to 
the same guidelines for philosophical practice. Rather, I simply suggested that both 
dialogues highlight that the goal of conversation is agreement, although the guideline 
suggested by each dialogue has its own specifics and scope. 
                                                          
168 See Phd. 107b4-10. 
169 Surely, this agreement does not conclude the Phaedo. Socrates is going to 
speculate about the afterlife and the geography earth at Phd. 107c-115a.  
170 It is germane to note that after finishing the description of the regions where the 
soul of the dead dwell except that of those purified adequately by philosophy, 
Socrates at the Phaedo 114c5-6 says ‘explaining these dwellings is not easy, nor is 
there sufficient time in the present circumstances’.  
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In the Protagoras, Plato stresses the significance of following the correct norms of 
conversation. Plato stages an intervention to that effect via the listeners, who aim at 
arbitrating a dispute between Socrates and Protagoras on the style of speech. I submit 
that this intervention underlines the significance of mutual understanding and 
communication, which are essential for making agreement theoretically possible.   
Besides, it is reasonable that Plato did not stage an implicit intervention in the 
Phaedo, as the interlocutors and Socrates have similar views about the practice of 
philosophers.171 That is, the Phaedo narrates a conversation between Socrates and 
his close friends. The Protagoras, however, is taking place in a sophistic atmosphere 
and Socrates talks to Protagoras, who does not seem to share Socrates’ ideas about 
the practice of philosophers. 172  
The most relevant findings to emerge from my analysis are: that [1] the Phaedo and 
the Protagoras emphasize that the goal of conversation is agreement (the former by 
means of the idea of defence and the latter through the conversation between 
Hippocrates and Socrates); that [2] we ought to recognize our interlocutors as 
epistemic peers; that [3] we should not hold fast to an argument without listening to 
counterarguments and conducting further examination. However, I do not argue that 
Socrates in the Phaedo disavows knowledge, which might be regarded as the 
defining character of Socrates in the early dialogues.173 Rather, I suggest that 
                                                          
171 Blattberg (2005, 113-114) points out that no negotiation or negotiators are found 
in the Phaedo since the participants of conversation are after a common cause. For 
Blattberg, the conversation in the Phaedo is between ‘opponents’ rather than 
‘adversaries’ because they are ‘truly listening to the reasons being given for each 
opposing position’.  
172 However, Griswold (1988, 143) claims that if Plato were writing for ‘fellow 
philosophers’, he would not have chosen ‘the dialogue form’, as ‘a precise 
articulation of the subject matter’ cannot be done in this form. Thus, Plato writes for 
‘potential philosophers’. I do not see any clear reason why the pedagogical and 
philosophical aims should be separated. That is, philosophy can be both ‘practiced’ 
and ‘instructed’ in dialogue form. Perl (2014, 19-22) discusses the relationship 
between the dialogue form and Plato’s metaphysics and claims that ‘Plato’s 
ubiquitous use of myths, metaphors, and images, as well as the mimetic nature of the 
dialogue form itself, reflects the mimetic structure of reality, in which one level of 
being is an image of a higher level’. Although I do not advocate such a strong claim, 
the dialogue form and the norms followed by the participants provide insights on 
philosophical argument. 
173 See Ap. 21b-d, 29b; Euthyphro. 5a-c, 15c11-16a4; Charmides 165b-c, 166c-d; 
Laches 186b-187a, 200e1-2; Lysis 212a, 223b; Gorg. 509c. See also Wolfsdorf 
(2004); Politis (2006).  
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Socrates does not abandon philosophical humility, which is a key element of the 























Chapter 3: The Practice of Philosophers  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the way in which Socrates describes the practice of 
philosophers in the Phaedo. I argue that the true philosopher's willingness-to-die 
argument (hereafter the Willingness Argument) stresses that true philosophers are 
aware of the limits of their epistemic access. In this respect, I submit that true 
philosophers’ awareness of the limits (and the fallibility) of human understanding 
provides a basis for the norms governing philosophical humility. 
In explaining philosophical humility, I scrutinize the Phaedo 63-69, which is 
generally entitled Socrates’ defence. In this section, as mentioned in the previous 
chapters, Socrates discusses the philosophers’ desires, hopes and practice to expound 
why philosophers are willing to die. 174 The Willingness Argument states that if we 
desire wisdom and the truth, we ought to care for the soul; hence we ought to remain 
aloof from the body, its desires and bodily perception as much as possible. This is 
because, for Socrates, the soul can reason and approach knowledge best in asmuchas 
it is separated from the body. 
Moreover, I argue that the Willingness Argument is a demarcation criterion which 
distinguishes a philosopher's practice from other sorts of inquiries. Therefore, the 
Willingness Argument partially shapes the ideas presented about correct 
philosophical argument. In a sense, by introducing the Willingness Argument, Plato 
sets the scene for the description of knowledge and of the method of inquiry.175 
With the aim of explaining the relationship between the Willingness Argument and 
the practice of philosophers, I scrutinise Socrates’ surprising question, whether 
Evenus is a philosopher, as Evenus is portrayed as a sophist/poet and an inventor of 
rhetorical methods, namely in the Apology and in the Phaedrus respectively. I 
suggest that Socrates uses the term philosophos in a narrow sense, as opposed to the 
idea that philosophos refers to any lover of wisdom in general. I argue that Plato 
underlines that sophists, whom he usually criticizes and whose practice he considers 
dangerous, can become philosophers by adopting the norms governed by the 
                                                          
174 Hereafter, when I write “the philosopher” or “the philosopher’s practice”, I 
specifically refer to “true philosophers” and “their practice”.  
175 Plato does not explicitly say that knowledge (τὸ εἰδέναι) and wisdom (φρόνησις) 
are different. See Phd. 66e1-e6. That said, they seem to differ in that wisdom can be 
achieved through the knowledge of things themselves. See Phd. 67e4-68a6.  
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Willingness Argument; hence Plato gives a primary role to the Willingness 
Argument for the practice of philosophers. 
In addition, I explore the nature of the embodied and disembodied states of the soul 
and compare their cognitive powers. I suggest that while the disembodied soul attains 
wisdom passively and instantaneously, the embodied soul tries to attain wisdom by 
actively practicing philosophy. I also submit that although the embodied and 
disembodied states of the soul are ontologically the same, their cognitive powers are 
different; hence they are epistemologically different. Their distinctive cognitive 
powers fashion the ways in which each state of the soul attains wisdom.  
3.2 Becoming a Philosopher 
3.2.1 True Philosophers 
I would like to begin by discussing Socrates’ message to Evenus. This message 
introduces the practice of philosophers and the true philosophers’ willingness to die. 
Allow me to quote the passage in which Socrates questions whether Evenus is a 
philosopher:  
[T13] ‘So, Cebes, tell all this to Evenus, give him my best wishes and tell him, 
if he is in his right mind, to come after me as soon as possible. I leave, it seems, 
today: so the Athenians command.’ 
To which Simmias said: ‘Fancy recommending a thing like that to Evenus, 
Socrates! I’ve often encountered him in the past, and from what 
I’ve seen I imagine there’s no way that he will follow your advice willingly.’ 
‘Really?’ said he. ‘Isn’t Evenus a philosopher?’ 
‘I think he is,’ said Simmias. 
‘Then Evenus will be willing, as will everyone who has a worthy claim to this 
activity. Though perhaps he won’t use violence on himself, for they say that it 
isn’t sanctioned.’176 
Socrates is expecting Simmias to reply that Evenus is a philosopher since his 
question begins with ‘the negative of fact and statement’.177 In his reply to this query, 
Simmias says, ‘I think he is’, although he does not strongly confirm that Evenus is a 
philosopher. 178 There are two questions to consider: [1] what does Socrates’ question 
aim at, and [2] is Socrates ironical or serious? I suggest that Socrates tries to stress 
the significance of the Willingness Argument, thus he is serious about the advice that 
                                                          
176 Phd. 61b7-c10. 
177 Phd. 61c6 οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος; See LSJ s.v. II.2.12. 
178 Phd. 62c7 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 
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Evenus can become a philosopher if he follows the norms governed by the 
Willingness Argument.  
Before proceeding to examine the Willingness argument, it is necessary to decide in 
which sense Evenus is called a philosopher; that is, whether Socrates refers to true 
philosophers or wise people in general. To begin with, it is not Socrates who 
remembers Evenus. Rather, it is Cebes who reminds Socrates of Evenus, as Cebes 
tells Socrates a question asked by several people including Evenus:  
[T14] You know those poems you’ve been composing, your versifications of 
Aesop’s tales and the proem to Apollo? Well, some people were already asking 
me about them, and in particular Evenus asked the day before yesterday what on 
earth your idea was in composing them when you came here, given that you had 
never composed poetry before. So if you care at all about my having an answer 
for Evenus when he asks me again –because I’m quite sure that he will ask – tell 
me what to say.179  
Socrates replies that he did not compose these poems to rival Evenus, yet he did so 
because of a certain dream, which visits him every now and then and orders him to 
‘make music and work at it’. Regarding the earlier occurrences of this dream, 
Socrates thought that ‘it [the dream] was encouraging me and cheering me on to do 
what I was doing, like those who cheer runners’.180 What Socrates must have been 
doing then was philosophy, which was ‘the greatest music (Phd. 61a3-4 μεγίστης 
μουσικῆς)’ for Socrates.  
Socrates believed that his recent dream meant ‘music as commonly understood (Phd. 
61a7 τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν)’ rather than philosophy. Therefore, Socrates first 
decided on ‘making a composition dedicated to the god [Apollo] whose festival was 
currently being held’, and then ‘to compose stories, not arguments (ποιεῖν μύθους 
ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγους)’, as a poet ought to do if ‘he was going to be a poet’. However, since 
Socrates is ‘no story-teller (οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός)’, he decided to use Aesop’s stories 
and made compositions out of them.181 
                                                          
179 Phd. 60c8-d7. 
180 Phd. 60e6-7. 
181 Phd. 60d8-61c1. 
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In this section, I think, Socrates is not ironical, as some scholars argue.182 I deny the 
idea that Socrates does not care about story-telling at all. If Socrates were not caring 
about story-telling, it would hardly make sense that Socrates was spending his last 
days dealing with some stories. Nor would it make sense that Socrates concluded his 
final conversation by telling a myth.183 Equally important, it would be senseless to 
advise his interlocutors to ‘sing incantations (ἐπᾴδειν)’ to the child inside them to 
get rid of the fear of death.184  
If myths are ‘spells’ in some way,185 then Socrates would not rule out story-telling 
as a means of communication and persuasion, though he is careful about the 
proximity of the myths to the truth. 186 In this respect, Socrates is serious, though 
modest, when he declares that he is no story-teller, for composing stories is a difficult 
task that we should be careful about.187 
3.2.2 The Meaning of Philosophos 
Some scholars claim that Socrates calls Evenus a philosopher either in the sense that 
[a] Evenus is practicing a specific profession, namely the Socratic/Platonic concept 
of philosophy or that [b] Evenus is just a lover of wisdom. 188 It is argued that if we 
                                                          
182 For instance, Bluck (1955, 40) argues that Socrates’ modesty is ‘almost certainly 
ironical’ by referring to the devaluation of poets for distorting the truth in the 
Republic. Similarly, Hackforth (1955, 33 fn.5) refers to the Apology (20a-b) where 
Socrates discovered that poets are not wise but ignorant. However, if myth-making 
was essentially bad, it would be hard to make sense of the myth in the last section of 
the Phaedo (107c-115a) and Socrates’s offer to ‘both look at different ways and 
speculate about (Phd. 61e1-2 διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν)’ the journey to the 
afterlife. 
183 See Rep. II. 377-382; III. 387-392 for the correct use of myths in education. 
184 Phd. 77e2-8. 
185 See Phd. 114d7 where Socrates advises his interlocutors to repeat the myths about 
the afterlife like a spell.  
186 See Schofield 2009 for the myths as persuasive tools with reference to the Noble 
Lie in the Republic III. See also Rowe (1999) for the relationship between 
philosophical argument and myths. 
187 Consider Socrates’ cautious remarks about the myth he delivered at Phd. 114d1-
d4. The use of myths by Plato is a delicate issue, and I have no claim to propose 
another interpretation. For instance, Tarrant (2012, 50-59) maintains that Plato 
distinguishes “logos” and “muthos”, and in many dialogues muthos comes only after 
logos has been done. Most (2012, 16-19) presents the eight criteria defining the use 
of myth in Plato’s dialogues. Dixsaut (2012, 28-35) argues that muthos reaches 
readers more easily than logos, which demands a certain acquaintance with the 
language used.  
188 Rowe (1995, 123) and Hackforth (1955, 34 fn.3) advocate broad reading. They 
suppose that when οἱ…φιλοσοφοῦντες signifies the lovers of wisdom in the narrower 
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accept [a], we ought to suppose that Socrates ironically calls Evenus a philosopher, 
as Evenus is not portrayed thus in the other dialogues.189 If we assume [b], we would 
consider Socrates as being sincere. In what follows, I first explore and raise 
objections to [b], and I show why we should read [a]. 
Firstly, [b] does not seem to comply with the rest of Socrates’ defence since Socrates 
scrutinizes the practice of true philosophers rather than that of wise people.190 
Secondly, Socrates can hardly expect that Simmias is going to approve that a lover 
of wisdom in general would embrace the Willingness Argument. In fact, Simmias 
observes that most people, including his own countrymen, would find it fitting that 
‘those who pursue philosophy really are near death, and that they themselves have 
realized that death is just what these people deserve’, although most people, as 
Socrates says, do not really understand the Willingness Argument.191 
Here Simmias seems to refer to true philosophers, though perhaps he did not totally 
understand what Socrates has meant. Otherwise, it would be strange that those who 
love wisdom in general, for Simmias, deserve to die according to most people. That 
is, poets and politicians, for instance, are possibly fond of wisdom, yet most people 
would hardly think that they deserve to die.  It therefore seems that the popular image 
of true philosophers develops out of their way of life, for true philosophers remain 
aloof from the pleasures of the body, which are possibly indicative of a worthy life 
for most people.192  
In the narrow reading, we get into some difficulties. Above all, Socrates’ 
interlocutors, and the readers alike, might be perplexed about calling Evenus a 
                                                          
sense, “aright [ὀρθῶς]” is supplied, i.e. those who practise philosophy aright, as is 
the case at Phd. 67e4. For other uses of ‘aright’ see Phd. 64a4, 67b4, 67e4, 69d2, 
69d4, 80e6, 82c3.  However, this only proves that the addition of ‘aright’ entails a 
narrow reading, not necessarily that its absence signifies the philosopher in a broad 
sense. Even if this use is consistent, it can well be a result of Simmias’s confusion 
of true philosophers and any lover of wisdom. Noticing this, Socrates might have 
decided to remove this confusion for Simmias by suppling ‘aright’, not for himself.  
189 Ebert (2001, 428-433) argues that when Socrates confers the title ‘philosopher’ 
on Evenus, he refers to him as a Pythagorean philosopher. However, I do not see any 
strong evidence either in the Phaedo or in the other dialogues that supports this claim 
other than hardly reliable doxographical reports. That said, I show that Evenus offers 
a special example of wise people. Cf. Peterson 2011, 169 fn. 7&8. 
190 See Ebert 2001, 426. 
191 Phd. 64a9-b6. 
192 See Phd. 64c10-65a8; 66b7-d7; 81c8-81e2; 82b10-c7; 83b5-c3. Burnet (1911, 
29) notes that οἱ πολλοί ‘think philosophers ‘as good as dead’, and look upon them 
as ‘living corpses’’.  
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philosopher, as the man is referred to as a sophist, poet and rhetorician by Plato.193 
It would also seem strange that Simmias did not know Evenus’ profession, although 
he often encountered him in the past.194 In this respect, Simmias’ approval that 
Evenus is a philosopher might favour claim [b] above, for Socrates sometimes uses 
the term lover of wisdom in a broad sense.195 
However, if Plato desired to ridicule sophists and poets, he would have preferred a 
stronger figure to that effect, who would easily remind the readers of sophists and 
poets. If Plato had done so, Simmias would hardly think that that person is a 
philosopher and the irony would work better.196 Then the allusion to Evenus, for 
whom Plato shows relative respect, intensifies the perplexity of the reader, who is 
now invited to scrutinize Socrates’ point for calling Evenus a philosopher.197  
3.2.3 The Practice of True Philosophers 
Socrates’ message to Evenus quoted above (T13) has two interrelated components, 
which are indicated by a correlative conjunction (both/and).198 The first part counsels 
Evenus ‘to keep in good health’ while the second part urges him to follow Socrates, 
who is going to die in a little while.199 These two ideas, however, seem inconsistent, 
if not contradictory, as we cannot stay in good health and follow someone who is 
dying. However, Simmias does not seem to have a problem with the inconsistency 
                                                          
193 See Phd.60d9; Phdr.267a3. In the Apology 20a-b, Evenus is said to teach being a 
good citizen for a fee of five minas. 
194 Phd. 61c4-5. 
195 Rowe 1993, 123 and Rep.V.475b8-9.  
196 For instance, Plato could have used a character portrayed in the Euthydemus and 
Gorgias. At any rate, I do not see any strong reason to take Socrates’s message to 
Evenus as historically accurate, therefore Plato could have used another figure if he 
wished to make fun of sophists. However, Burnet (1911, 60) notes that ‘we know 
from the Apology 20a3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of 
Socrates.’ However, this does not rule out the possibility that there are other sophists 
at Athens then. 
197 Vlastos (1991, Ch.1) challenges the view that Socratic irony aims at deception by 
maintaining that the purpose of Socratic irony is to introduce riddles without any 
purpose of deception.  
198 I take “καὶ…καί” at “καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί…ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα” as 
corresponsive. That is, the first καὶ is “preparatory”, the second is “connective”. See 
Denniston 1954, 323. 
199 Rowe (1993, 122) notes that the imperative mood, ἔρρωσω, is ‘a typical formula 
e.g. for ending a letter used in several of the pseudo-Platonic epistles’, thus as we 
might say today “take care of yourself”. 
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of Socrates’ message, but does he have difficulty understanding how Socrates can 
advise Evenus to die as soon as possible. 
In addition, the LSJ Greek Lexicon reports that ‘ἐρρῶσθαι (keeping well)’ may also 
mean ‘to have strength’ and ‘to be eager’, and Plato frequently uses this verb to 
render these senses in different contexts.200 As far as I know, apart from spurious 
epistles, ἐρρῶσθαι is not used, at least by Plato, for saying an ordinary goodbye. 
Even in that case, it is striking that in the Thirteenth Letter (though it is possibly a 
forgery), the author finishes the letter by saying, ‘keep well and practice philosophy 
(363d1 Ἔρρωσο καὶ φιλοσόφει)’. Even though these are not Plato’s own words, it 
suggests that keeping well and practicing philosophy are used as correlatives. In this 
respect, the phrase ‘keeping well’ might have a slightly deeper meaning which 
implies a sort of eagerness. As we shall see below, eagerness (or willingness) is a 
crucial component of the practice of true philosophers.   
3.2.4 The Prohibition of Suicide  
As pointed out above, Simmias looks surprised at these words, but Socrates 
continues by saying that ‘Evenus will be willing, as will everyone who has a worthy 
claim to this activity [philosophy]. Though perhaps he won’t use violence on 
himself, for they say that it isn’t sanctioned’.201 This time, Cebes intervenes: ‘What 
do you mean by this, Socrates – that it isn’t sanctioned to use violence on oneself, 
but that the philosopher would be willing to follow someone who is dying?’202 
Socrates too admits that it would seem “a matter of wonder (θαυμαστὸν)” that even 
if it is better for a person to be dead, they should not kill themselves but await another 
benefactor.203  
Socrates, as was mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, argues that suicide is not 
sanctioned because humans are one of the gods’ possessions and they take care of us 
so that we should not kill ourselves.204 Otherwise, we would have acted against gods’ 
                                                          
200 e.g. Phd.100a4 λόγον…ἐρρωμενέστατον “the strongest logos”; in Ti. 89e8-90a1 
τὸ δ’ ἐν γυμνασίοις ἐρρωμενέστατον “the one [sc. a part of the tripartite soul] 
becomes [sc. γίγνεσθαι] strongest”. Cf. Xen. HG 3.4.29 ἐρρωμένον τὴν ψυχήν 
“having strength in soul”. See Sym. 176b8 for “to be eager”. 
201 Phd. 61c8-10. 
202 Phd. 61d4-5.  
203 Phd. 62a1-8. For an interpretation of these difficult lines see Gallop 1975:79-85. 
204 Note that in this case Socrates is explicitly talking about ‘killing oneself (Phd. 
62c1 ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι)’. 
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will.205 Although Simmias and Cebes agree on this issue, it is still unreasonable, to 
them, to be willing to die, for dying is leaving the gods (and friends) behind.206 In 
reply, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he hopes to enter the presence of other wise 
and good gods, who are very good masters too, so that he is not resentful.207  
Here I am not going to examine Socrates’ argument against suicide, but rather stress 
the idea that suicide is a sort of self-violence.208 It is necessary to note that “βιάζεσθαι 
(to do violence)” has judicial and military connotations, e.g. “to use force on 
someone” or “forcibly make slaves”.209 It is also reported that the absolute use of 
βιάζεσθαι is opposed to δικάζεσθαί, which means “to go to law” or “plead one’s 
cause”.210 In this respect, βιάζεσθαι implies a sort of injustice or overpowering by 
force; hence suicide is also an unjust and violent act.211 
If an act of violence against one’s self is committed without the gods’ permission, 
the gods will punish us. Returning briefly to the subject of the practice of 
philosophers, Socrates states that it is up to god to decide whether he has rightly 
practiced philosophy and whether he deserves to dwell with gods.212 Now, Socrates 
also believes that true philosophers ought to remain aloof from the pleasures of the 
body as much as possible.213 Then gods would reward us if we practice philosophy, 
remain aloof from the bodily pleasures, and take care of our souls.214  
                                                          
205 This is the implication of the statement that ‘supposing one of your possessions 
were to kill itself but you hadn’t given a sign that you wanted it to die, wouldn’t you 
be angry with it, and if you had some way of punishing it, wouldn’t you do so?’ 
(Phd. 62c2-4).  
206 See Phd. 62c9-63a9. 
207 See Phd. 63b4-c7 
208 Phd. 61c9 βιάσεται αὑτόν; 61d4 ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι. Cf. 61e5-6 ἑαυτὸν 
ἀποκτεινύναι. 
209 βεβιασμένοι in Xenophon, Hiero. 2.12. 
210 Euthphr. 4e7. 
211 We should note that Socrates initially uses βιάζεσθαι, and then talks about suicide. 
See fn. 208 above. 
212 See Phd. 65d6 ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ 
213 Phd. 64c10-e6. 
214 In a sense, the body and the soul have a mutually beneficiary life. On the one 
hand, if we remain aloof from excessive pleasures and do not pay heed to the body’s 
unnecessary desires, our souls will become better, as the body and its desires 
contaminate the soul. On the other hand, if we want to keep our body in a healthy 
condition, we should stay away from excessive pleasures, such as the pleasures of 
drinking and eating; hence our soul will be less contaminated by the body and its 
desires. That said, remaining aloof from the pleasures of the body does not 
necessarily make us true philosophers.  
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The body, I submit, is the source of violence since Socrates says that ‘it is nothing 
but the body and its desires that causes wars, uprisings and conflicts. All wars arise 
for the sake of acquiring property, and we are compelled to acquire property on 
account of the body, enslaved as we are to its maintenance’.215 That is, if we listen 
to the body and its desires, violent actions would become inevitable. In a sense, then, 
not only would gods punish those who commit suicide, but they would also punish 
those who act violently because of the bodily desires. In this respect, true 
philosophers would not commit suicide in much the same way they avoid the body 
and its desires. 
To conclude, the argument against suicide is the first step towards understanding the 
practice of philosophers, although Simmias and Cebes could not yet understand why 
true philosophers are willing to die but against suicide. Socrates finds this surprising 
since his interlocutors had some dealings with Philolaus of Croton, the Pythagorean, 
who uttered similar views according to Socrates.216 At any rate, the sanction of 
suicide initiates the discussion on the practice of philosophers and how the 
unphilosophical life might entail violence (both against others and one’s self) due to 
the body’s intrusions, and living thus will be punished by the gods. 
3.3 Purification, Dying and Being Dead  
In this section, I argue that philosophers, according to Socrates, ought to define their 
life and practice through the correct evaluation of bodily pleasures and pains.217 By 
                                                          
215 Phd. 66c5-d2. Socrates later reiterates a similar idea: ‘The bodily desires cause 
wars and conflicts’, and Socrates later speculates that ‘those found [in court for the 
dead] to be incurable because of the gravity of their offences, who have committed 
either many grave sacrilegious acts, or many unjust and unlawful murders, or 
anything else that is of this kind, are flung by the fate they deserve into Tartarus, and 
never step out from there (Phd. 113e1-6)’. Plato often reproaches pleasures, for they 
are deceiving and bewitching us. See Phd. 81b3, Rep. III 413c1-2, Phil. 65c5. 
216 Here, I am not going to discuss Plato’s allusion to Philolaus. Socrates anticipated 
that not only did Philolaus talk to Simmias and Cebes about the sanction of suicide 
but also about other things. This is implied by the use of the plural at Phd. 61d6-7 
(περὶ τῶν τοιούτων). The explanations for the allusion to Philolaus frequently assume 
a historical and dramatic perspective. Traditionally, the reference is considered as a 
literary device by which Plato draws attention to the Pythagorean elements that will 
emerge in the Phaedo. For some valuable analyses of Pythagoreanism in the Phaedo 
see Guthrie 1962, 179; Ebert 2001, 428, Bostock 1986, 11-13; O’Meara 1989, 9-29.  
217 Scholars debate whether the philosopher’s practice amounts to “asceticism” or 
“correct evaluation of pleasures”. By asceticism, it is meant that it is the 
philosopher’s practice to “actively” avoid that which is bodily, such as pleasures, 
money etc. (Ebrey 2015, 2-14). By correct evaluation, scholars mean that the 
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living in philosophical terms, philosophers will promote the goodness of the soul in 
this life and receive valuable rewards from the gods after death. In addition, I 
scrutinize the following questions: [1] in what sort of practice should philosophers 
engage their interest, and [2] what are the limits to the practice of philosophers?  
3.4.1 Dying v. Being Dead 
Socrates defines “being dead (τὸ τεθνάναι)” as follows: ‘the body has been separated 
from the soul and come to be apart, alone by itself, and the soul has been separated 
from the body and is apart, alone by itself’.218 Socrates then explains why this is the 
sole pursuit of philosophers: 
[T16] It [the soul] reasons best when it is being troubled neither by hearing nor 
by sight nor by pain, nor by a certain sort of pleasure either, but when it as much 
as possible comes to be alone by itself, ignoring the body, and, as far as it can, 
doesn’t associate or have contact with the body when reaching out to what is 
real.219  
Later, Socrates links the practice of philosophers with their eagerness to separate the 
soul from the body; he says, ‘according to us it is those who really love wisdom who 
are always particularly eager – or rather, who alone are always eager – to release it 
[the soul], and philosophers’ practice is just that, release and parting of soul from 
body’.220 Here, it is necessary to observe that Socrates is talking about ‘τὸ μελέτημα’ 
of philosophers; he seems to consider their practice as ‘training oneself for an actual 
event or situation’.221 In this respect, the correct philosophical practice consists of 
                                                          
philosopher should evaluate bodily affections correctly, and feeling pleasures and 
pains is not wrong as such. See Woolf 2004, 98, Russell 2005, 87-92.  
218 Phd. 64c4-8. The use of the perfect infinitive, τεθνάναι, might denote either ‘the 
state of being dead’ or ‘the completion of the process of dying’ (Rowe 1993, 127). 
In this passage, “τεθνάναι (being dead)” and “death (Phd. 64c8 ὁ θάνατος)” are used 
interchangeably, and it seems to refer to the state of being dead. See also Gallop 
1975, 226 n.3. 
219 Phd. 65c5-9. A similar thought reiterated at Phd. 66e4-5: ‘it is impossible to have 
pure knowledge (καθαρῶς γνῶναι) of anything when we are in the company of the 
body’. See also Phd. 65d11-e4. 
220 Phd. 67d7-10   Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι 
οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις 
καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· 
221 See also “practice for death (Phd. 81a1-2 μελέτη θανάτου)”; “practise to be ready 
for really being dead (80e6-81a1 τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως)”; ‘they [the 
souls of the bad] are bound, in all likelihood, into whatever sorts of character they 
happen to have practised in their life (81e2-3 μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ)’. 
The LSJ Greek Lexicon reports that μελέτη is used to mean “to go through one's 
exercises in actual war (II.2)” or “rehearsal of orators (II.3)”. See Rowe 1993, 145. 
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preparing ourselves for the state of being dead, i.e. our life in the other world, like 
an athlete who exercises for a championship, where she would be rewarded.222  
For Socrates, ‘the sole pursuit of those who correctly engage in philosophy is dying 
and being dead’.223 Now, I would like to quote a passage where Socrates discusses 
the relationship between the practice of philosophers and the concept of purification: 
[T17] ‘And doesn’t purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently 
talking about in our discussion, namely parting the soul from the body as much 
as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part 
of the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now 
and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters?’ 
‘Certainly,’ he [Simmias] said. 
‘So is it this that is named “death”: release and parting of soul from body?’  
‘Yes, entirely so,’ he said. 224 
Both the process of purification and the practice of philosophers aim to separate the 
soul from the body; hence we train for dying and being dead, no matter whether we 
occupy ourselves with purification or philosophy.225 Moreover, there seems to be a 
distinction between “dying (ἀποθνῄσκειν)” and “being dead (τεθνάναι)”. I suggest 
that by this distinction, Socrates stresses the difference between “the process of 
dying” and “its completion”.226 I argue that dying and being dead correspond to the 
                                                          
222 What Long (2015, 107-110) remarks about the relationship between physical 
training and the practice of philosophers is noticeable: ‘Athletics and physical 
training provided Plato with the most obvious analogy he could find for elaborating 
his own ideal of a life devoted to training and perfecting the mind as distinct from 
the body.’ The soul/body analogy, for Long, goes as far as the idea that ‘a 
philosophical education as therapeutic, in the idea that faults of character are diseases 
of the soul, and in the idea that moral virtues are the manifestation of a soul that is 
stable, robust, and as glistening as the sheen on an athlete’s well- toned body. The 
ideal of mental/moral health promoted the importance of systematic exercise 
(askesis), meaning that living well requires constant practice, self- examination, and 
self- discipline’. 
223 Phd. 64a4-6 τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας…ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ 
ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. 
224 Phd. 67c5-d6. 
225 Socrates later tells his interlocutors that ‘those who truly love wisdom are in 
reality practising dying, and being dead is least fearful to them of all people (Phd. 
66e4-6 Τῷ ὄντι…οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι 
ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν)’. Here, too, there is a distinction between dying 
and being dead.  
226 Burnet 1917, 21; Rowe 1993, 135. ἀποθνῄσκειν (present infinitive active) stresses 
“continuance” while τεθνάναι (perfect infinitive active) emphasizes “completion 
with permanent result”. See Smyth 1920, 417. 
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two concepts related to purification, namely the process of purifying oneself and the 
final state of purity, respectively.227  
In this respect, while we can practice dying and purifying during life, being dead and 
the final state of purity are completions that can only be achieved after actual death. 
On the one hand, I suggest that dying and purifying are contraries to living and 
pollution respectively. 228 Being dead, on the other hand, is contradictory to being 
alive. There is no third option to take that might render both the statements “Socrates 
is dead” and “Socrates is alive” false. That is, Socrates is either dead or alive.229 
That said, it is possible to be neither fully pure nor fully impure. That is, we can be 
partially pure. The state of partial purity is not a completion, and it is not possible to 
be fully pure as long as we are alive due to the body’s influence. In this respect, 
although the state of purity and being dead do not have the same relation to their 
opposites, neither can be attained during life. This impossibility would suffice to 
illustrate my point that the pairs, of dying/purifying and being dead/final state of 
purity, denote different ontological statuses.230  
                                                          
227 Socrates says that ‘as long as we have the body and our soul is fused with bodily 
evil, we’ll never properly acquire what we desire, namely, as we would say, the truth 
(Phd. 66b5-7)’.  
228 Regarding death, at the Phaedo 71d5-7 Socrates asks Cebes, ‘Don’t you say that 
being dead is the opposite of being alive? (οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι 
εἶναι;)’, and Cebes confirms. Regarding purification, although Socrates does not 
clearly say that pollution and purification are opposites, the following propositions 
implies oppositions: [1] thought alone by itself and unalloyed (αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτὴν 
εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ) can acquire wisdom and truth (Phd. 66a1-6), [2] the body 
contaminates the soul (Phd. 66b5-6), [3] thought can become alone by itself and 
unalloyed if it can totally get rid of the body (Phd. 67a1-b1), [4] ‘it is not sanctioned 
for someone impure to grasp something pure (Phd. 67b2 μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ 
ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ)’.  
229 Pakaluk (2003, 91) observes that ‘there are things that are neither dead nor alive,’ 
e.g. stones. However, since Socrates is talking about humans as animated beings, 
they cannot be both dead and alive. 
230 See Williams 1969, 218 for a discussion about contraries and contradictories, 
though he does not distinguish the process of purifying oneself and the final state of 
purity. Bostock (1986, 47-51) notes that the scope of the cyclical argument is 
ambiguous since the relationship between life and death (contradictories) is not the 
same as that between small and large (contraries). Even if Socrates might not be 
aware of the difference between life/death and small/large, his unawareness does not 
harm my current purpose. This is because I focus on the difference between dying 




3.4.2 The Practice of Dying and Being Dead 
As stated above, pursuing dying and being dead are different. I have suggested that 
dying is related to our activities in this world, while being dead, not unexpectedly, is 
related to the soul’s life in the other world. True philosophers are interested in 
pursuing dying and being dead since they both try to be truly virtuous in this world 
and desire to attain pure wisdom in the other world.231 Besides, for Socrates, without 
pursuing true virtues in this world and without purifying ourselves, we cannot attain 
pure wisdom in the other world.232  
I presume that it is possible for a person to pursue dying with a view to understanding 
it, yet being dead cannot be practiced as long as we are alive. That said, Socrates 
talks about the pursuit of both, being dead and dying; hence he seems to believe that 
we can practice being dead while we are still alive. As mentioned above, Socrates is 
talking about τὸ μελέτημα, the rehearsal or preparation, of philosophers to separate 
the soul from the body. In this respect, philosophers’ business in this world is to 
prepare their soul for the afterlife by means of rehearsing being dead and dying, 
rather than achieving them. That is, τὸ μελέτημα of philosophers denotes the ways in 
which they live to purify themselves and try to be worthy of dwelling with gods.  
However, we need to note that Socrates also mentions the pursuit (Phd. 64a6 
ἐπιτηδεύουσιν) of being dead and dying. Unlike μελετάω and its cognates, ἐπιτηδεύω 
does not imply preparation, as Rowe finely remarks.233 To support his point, Rowe 
refers to a passage of the Gorgias, which reads, ‘if a man took care (ἐπετήδευε) to 
grow his hair long, his corpse will have long hair, too (524 c4-5)’. Then ἐπιτηδεύω 
indicates an action that is pursued and is actually done, and its effects continue after 
that action is complete. 
Here, it is fortunate that Socrates uses ἐπιτηδεύω in the context of life and death. 
More fortunately, Socrates, a bit later, says, ‘all that’s in the soul is evident after it 
has been stripped naked of the body, both things that are natural to it and things that 
have happened to it, things that the person came to have in his soul as a result of his 
                                                          
231 Phd. 68b4 καθαρῶς…φρονήσει. 
232 See Phd. 69c2-d3 for the idea of initiation and purification. I will examine this 
topic further below. 
233 Rowe (1993, 135) points out that Socrates uses ἐπιτηδεύω ‘in the sense of ‘making 
it one’s practice’ (cf. Gorg. 524c), not in the sense that one practices on the piano’. 
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pursuit of each objective’.234 In this respect, our pursuits in this life affect our souls. 
Since true philosophers’ pursuit is being dead and dying, each action they do with a 
view to this pursuit brings them closer to the truth and wisdom, for the soul alone by 
itself can acquire them. Then ἐπιτηδεύω denotes that true philosophers’ pursuit is 
being dead and dying (thus they are true philosophers’ business or interest), while 
μελετάω and its cognates refer to their practice and preparation to pursue this 
business successfully.  
Therefore, being dead and dying are the true philosophers’ goals whereas the things 
they do to separate the soul from the body as much as possible are the true 
philosophers’ preparations. That is, true philosophers ought to act from the 
perspective of their pursuit and business. Then, in their pursuit or inquiry of being 
dead, true philosophers scrutinize the immortality of the soul and its afterlife. On the 
one hand, Socrates adopts a cautious position about the soul’s afterlife, probably 
because it is beyond the limits of human experience.235 On the other hand, Socrates 
is firmer and offers more positive results about the immortality of the soul than the 
soul’s afterlife, although Socrates still thinks that his friends should pursue the 
argument about the immortality of the the soul further.236 At any rate, Socrates 
cautiously talks about the immortality of the soul and the soul’s afterlife, though his 
trust in each account differs.  
The pursuit of dying, on the contrary, is within the limits of human experience. That 
is, we can practice dying, which is associated with purifying ourselves. True 
philosophers can articulate what their experience qua philosophers is (as practicing 
dying); hence they can describe the ways in which they separate the body from the 
soul and what they feel during this process. 
 
                                                          
234 Gorg. 524d4-7. ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, 
τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Socrates also says that ‘each of his [the Great King’s] 
actions has stamped upon his soul (Gorg. 525a1-2)’.  
235 See Phd. 114d1-8. 
236 For the necessity of further inquiry about the immortality of soul, see Phd.  107a1-
9 and my comment on this passage in Chapter 1. For the possibility of misgivings, 
see Phd. 84c6-8. 
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3.4.3 The Embodiment of the Soul 
As discussed above, true philosophers try to separate the soul from the body and this 
is their chief occupation. The purpose of this section is to examine the embodiment 
of the soul and its effects on the soul’s cognitive powers.237 I argue that the practice 
of dying, on the one hand, signifies a process in which philosophers try to purify 
their soul from the influence of the body. Being dead, on the other hand, is the final 
state of purity, which can be achieved after death if we have been successful in 
purifying ourselves during life.238  
Firstly, the disembodied soul, if it is purified successfully, would directly and 
instantly attain wisdom in Hades and true philosophers encounter wisdom (or the 
truth) as a consequence of their practice in this world. In other words, true 
philosophers acquire wisdom in Hades automatically.239 Secondly, true philosopher 
attain wisdom (or the truth) in this world as a result of their vigorous search, that is, 
true philosophers actively pursue wisdom in this world.  
During both the embodied and disembodied existences, the soul’s nature is the same. 
That is, both the soul by itself and the embodied soul are invisible and immaterial, 
no matter whether it is in Hades or in this world.240 However, the soul’s cognitive 
                                                          
237 The idea of embodiment seems to be referred to in the recollection argument. 
Cebes says, ‘but it [sc. to be reminded] would be impossible, unless our soul were 
existing somewhere before it was born to this human form (Phd. 72e7-73a2 τοῦτο 
δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι·’. 
See Phd. 70b3-4 ‘It [sc. disembodied soul] has some power and wisdom (τινα 
δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν)’. For Dorter (1972,212), soul’s power is its permanent 
existence, and the disembodied soul’s wisdom is ‘(pre-empirical) disposition for 
knowledge’. 
238 There can surely be degrees of purification. The most purified are philosophers, 
no matter what the purification amounts to. See Pakaluk 2003, 98-102. I agree with 
him that there are degrees of the separation of the soul and body, which indicates 
that the philosopher achieves separation “strictly” but “to some degree”.  
239 By the term ‘automatically’, I do not mean that philosophers attain wisdom in 
Hades without conscious thought or attention. Rather, my point is that they come to 
have wisdom without actively searching for it. 
240 See Phd. 79b4-c1. Cf. 81c1-81d2 where Socrates says that some souls are 
‘drifting, as it is said around monuments and tombs, the very places where certain 
shadowy apparitions of souls (ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα) really have been 
seen’. In this case, however, what is seen is not psychē but phantasma. Moreover, 
Socrates does not commit himself to this view since he attributes it to others by 
saying ‘as it is said (Phd. 81c11 ὥσπερ λέγεται)’. See Hackforth 1955, 89 fn.2; 
Gallop 1975, 143-144. cf. Archer-Hind 1883, 95-96 who claims that soul’s long 
association with the body makes it “ingrained (81c6 σύμφυτον)”. Moreover, in the 
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power varies according to the conditions of the realms in which it exists. That is, 
during the embodied existence, the body hinders the soul’s search for truth and 
wisdom. In this case, philosophy, for Socrates, comes to help the soul. Let me quote 
Socrates’ take on the role of philosophy in the purification of the soul:  
[T18] [T]he lovers of learning are aware that when philosophy takes over their 
soul, the soul really is bound thoroughly in the body and stuck to it, and is forced 
to consider the real things through it as if through a cage, and not on its own 
through itself, and that it drifts in utter ignorance… Philosophy, they are aware, 
persuades the soul to distance itself from the senses, except to the extent that use 
of them is necessary, and encourages the soul to collect and gather itself alone 
into itself, and to trust nothing but itself, concerning whichever real thing, alone 
by itself, the soul has intelligence of, when the soul too is alone by itself.241 
 
As mentioned earlier, Socrates has argued that philosophy is the pursuit of dying and 
being dead and true philosophers’ practice is separating the soul from the body. In 
the quote above, philosophy helps the soul to become by itself as much as possible, 
as the senses are “full of deceit” and they exacerbate the soul’s cognitive 
capacities.242 In this respect, if the soul loses its ability to attain wisdom in this world, 
it would not be due to a change in the soul’s nature, or essence. Rather, the soul is 
restricted by the body so that it cannot attain wisdom. That is, the body is a bad 
companion to accompany the soul on its search for truth; hence the body drives us 
away from the right course while, ‘following philosophy they [those who care at all 
about their own soul] head in the direction in which it leads’.243  
3.4.4 Wisdom in Hades  
 
For Socrates, philosophers are genuinely in love with wisdom, 244 and ‘he [the true 
philosopher] will be quite sure that he will have a pure encounter with wisdom 
                                                          
final argument for the immortality of the soul (See Phd. 105bff), Socrates talks about 
the soul as such, not the embodied or the disembodied soul, as not admitting of death.  
241 Phd. 82d1-83b2. 
242 Phd. 83a4-5 
243 Phd. 82d5-7. 
244 Socrates says ‘they [those who truly love wisdom] hope to attain that with which 
they were in love throughout life (Phd. 68a1-2 οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ 
βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν—ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως). Gallop (1975, 102) states that ‘phronesis 
is a solemn term for the condition of the soul for which the philosopher yearns’. See 
Phd. 66e3, 68a2, 68a7 and 68b4. 
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nowhere else but there’.245 Encountering wisdom in Hades, I argue, is the immediate 
result of the practice of true philosophers in this world. Here I take ἐντυγχάνω to 
mean happening upon, and I believe that philosophers’ acquisition of wisdom in 
Hades happens upon them thanks to their pursuit and practice in this world.246 In 
other words, philosophers hope to encounter wisdom in Hades, thus practicing 
philosophy with the hope of attaining wisdom, and that encounter itself is “worthy 
of logos (ἀξίως λόγου)”. 247  
Furthermore, Socrates also touched on the relationship between the soul and body 
during the embodied state when he was arguing that suicide is not sanctioned. In this 
passage, Socrates tells his interlocutors, ‘what is said in secret accounts about these 
matters [relating to suicide], that we human beings are in a sort of prison [in the 
body] and that one must not release oneself from it or run away, that seems to me a 
weighty saying and one that is not easy to penetrate’.248 Socrates, unfortunately, does 
not explain the body-prison (or ward) analogy, but I think it is plain that [1] “we” 
                                                          
245 Phd. 68b2-3 σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς 
ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκεῖ. Just before this, Socrates asks ‘will someone who 
is genuinely in love with wisdom and has strongly conceived this same hope that 
nowhere but in Hades will he have a worthwhile encounter with it (ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ 
ἀξίως λόγου), resent dying and go there less than cheerfully?’, then answers ‘he will 
not, at least if he is really a lover of wisdom’. 
246 One of my examiners kindly remarked that ‘in context, ἐντυγχάνω refers in quasi-
personal terms to hope of “meeting” one’s beloved in Hades’. Although I agree that 
ἐντυγχάνω could surely mean this, I believe that here Socrates might not be using it 
in that sense. When Socrates talks about the hope of seeing one’s beloved, he says 
that ‘very many people have readily consented to go after them into Hades, led by 
the hope that there they will see the people they longed for and be with them (Phd. 
67a3-7)’. In this particular context, Plato uses συνέσεσθαι at Phd. 67a6, which might 
mean either “to be with”, “to join with” or “to live with”. In other words, these people 
hope to be with their beloved ones, while philosophers hope to encounter wisdom. 
This is because philosophers, including Socrates, are not sure whether they have 
practiced philosophy. My examiner also pointed out ‘Socrates uses [ἐντυγχάνω] at 
the Apology 41b for the prospect of meeting Palamedes et. al. in Hades’. In the 
relevant section, however, Socrates assumes that if the soul is immortal, ‘it would be 
a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met (ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι) 
Palamedes… to compare my experience with [him]’. It seems to me that Socrates 
comments on the life that he assumes to live in Hades and ὁπότε (whenever) seems 
to refer to an action that is often repeated. 
247 Phd. 68b1. cf. Herodotus 6.112.10 ‘worthy of record’; Rep. IV 436b3 ‘the 
standards of our argument’; Phdr. 270c1 ‘a serious understanding’.   
248  Phd. 62b3-6. For my purposes, there is no need to decide what “φρουρά (ward)” 
implies, that is, whether our soul is in guard-duty of its post, i.e. body, or the body is 
a prison where the soul is punished. For the possible renderings and the likely source 
of this idea see Strachan 1970. I prefer to use prison, as for my purposes it does not 
matter whether I use prison or ward. 
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implies that our souls define who we are, and that, [2] from the point of the view of 
the prisoner, the prisoner’s presence in the prison does not alter her nature or essence.  
Socrates seems to assume the first point throughout the Phaedo and I will not discuss 
it here.249 Regarding the second point, it is pertinent to observe that a prisoner’s (or 
ward’s) power of sight does not change, unless of course her eyes are bruised.250 Her 
vision none the less is limited to what she is seeing through the bars, on the one hand, 
and the bars distort her vision, on the other.251 In this respect, the soul’s presence in 
the body made the soul’s cognitive capacity deteriorate and the soul’s epistemic 
access is limited by the body.  
3.4.5 True Philosophers’ Object of Desire  
Let me now consider what Socrates says about true philosophers in Hades and the 
conditions they live in there: 
[T19] Those people who established the rites for us are no ordinary people, but 
in reality have long been setting a riddle when they say that whoever comes to 
Hades without initiation and the rites (ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος) will lie in filth, 
whereas someone who arrives there purified and initiated (κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ 
τετελεσμένος) will dwell with gods. For in fact, as those involved in the rites put 
it, “many carry the fennel-wand, but few are inspired”. The latter, in my opinion, 
are none other than those who have pursued philosophy correctly (οἱ 
πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς).252 
In the quote above, Socrates makes a two-stage distinction: firstly, he distinguishes 
the wicked (those who will lie in filth) from the good, and, secondly, the truly good 
(those who are purified and initiated) and those who appear to be good.253 In other 
words, Socrates initially makes a distinction between the wicked and the virtuous, 
                                                          
249 Phd. 115c3-116a1 for Socrates’s idea that after he drinks poison and dies, he will 
already be gone. At 115c6-8, Socrates says, ‘I’m not convincing Crito that I am 
Socrates here, the one who is now holding a conversation…Instead he supposes that 
I’m that corpse which he’ll shortly be seeing’. See also Long 2015, 54-55 
250 I do not think that the body has the power to alter the soul’s nature or essence, 
although the body is a bad influence for the soul. See also fn. 237 above. 
251 It is not possible to know exactly what Socrates’ prison cell looked like and what 
his conditions were. We are told that Socrates was chained (Phd. 59e6-60a1), there 
is a stool, a bed (89a8-b1) and a bathroom (116a2-3), and it is big enough for 10 or 
more people. No mention of a window is made, but we can conjecture that there was 
one since Phaedo could realize that ‘it was already nearly sunset (116b6)’. 
252 Phd. 69c4-d2. 
253 In Rep. II. 363d5-6, Socrates states that those who are profane and unjust humans 
are buried in filth. See Rowe 1993, 151; Burnet 1911, 45. 
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then between the truly virtuous, i.e. between philosophers and illusorily virtuous 
people, whoever they are.254  
Socrates classifies a non-philosopher as a “body-lover”, who is either a “money-
lover or “honour-lover”, or both.255 Philosophers, as mentioned above, are lovers of 
wisdom, and they hope to have a pure encounter with phronesis in Hades. In 
addition, encountering wisdom in Hades is worthy of logos. Here I take ἀξίως λόγου 
as denoting something “worthy of record” in the sense that encountering wisdom in 
Hades deserves attention and analysis. That is, although philosophers will have a 
pure encounter with wisdom only in Hades, examining and documenting this 
encounter is valuable. I submit that not only is practicing being dead and dying a 
philosopher's prime pursuit (so that they will have a pure encounter with wisdom), 
but philosophers should also attain a serious understanding of wisdom in this world.   
It is now necessary to investigate how philosophers attain a serious understanding of 
a pure encounter with wisdom and how they can actually have that wisdom. To this 
end, I show that by distinguishing catharsis and catharmos, Plato, as it is suggested, 
draws a distinction between ‘the state of purification – if the virtues are states’ and 
‘what brings it [sc. purification] about’. 256 That is, for Socrates, ‘temperance, justice 
and courage are a kind of purification from everything like this [pleasures, fears, 
etc.] and that wisdom itself is a kind of rite to purify us’.257  
3.4.6. Purification, Purificatory Rites and Virtues 
Socrates describes catharsis in terms of the soul-body relationship and their 
separation:  
                                                          
254 See Phd. 69b5-8. I discuss this passage below. 
255 Phd. 68c1-3. For Socrates, non-philosophers live their life from the point of view 
of the body, its pleasures and pains; hence they think that what is bodily, or visible, 
is real (See Phd. 81b2-5). Their world-view, then, determines their ontology. That 
is, both philosophers and non-philosophers feel what is bodily and in the body, 
though the latter lives from the perspective of the soul. Robin 2003, 4-7 argues that 
a philosopher’s ontology is different since she becomes aware that, or is shown that 
at some point, sense-perception does not attain that which is real.  
256 See Rowe 1993, 151. By the state of purification, I simply mean the state of 
complete purity.  
257 Phd. 69b8-c3 τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ 




[T20] Parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to 
assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself, and 
to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from 
the body as if from fetters.258  
Earlier in the Phaedo, 61c8-9, Socrates argued that true philosophers are willing to 
die and he described death as the separation of the body from the soul in the Phaedo 
64c4-7. Then catharsis is the pursuit of true philosophers and it is the result of 
practicing being dead and dying. That is, ‘those who really love wisdom who are 
always particularly eager – or rather, who alone are always eager – to release it [the 
soul] (translators’ italics)’, and catharsis is thus the aim of the practice of 
philosophers.259  
As quoted above, virtues, for Socrates, are some kind of catharsis.  Socrates 
distinguishes fake-virtue from true-virtue. Again, I suggested that Socrates 
distinguishes the wicked from the good people, then the truly virtuous and the 
fraudulently virtuous people. Socrates then relates the fraudulently good people to 
those who possess fake-virtues, as these people exchange pleasures for greater 
pleasures, fears for lesser pains, and pains for lesser pains.260  
These people, for Socrates, appear temperate now ‘because they fear being denied 
other pleasures, which they desire, they abstain from one set of pleasures because 
they are overcome by another set of pleasures’.261 That is, “those who keep their 
composure (hereafter well-ordered people)” are able to overcome some pleasures 
only because they are overcome by other pleasures.262 For example, I might abstain 
from the pleasure of eating now so that my stomach will be empty for drinking wine 
later, which is more pleasant for me.263 
                                                          
258 Phd. 67c6-d2. 
259 Phd. 67d7-10. 
260 The Greek is μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω (Phd. 69a7-8), which is in relation with pains 
and fears. It is probably ‘ἐλάττω πρὸς μείζω in the case of pleasures’ (Rowe 1993, 
149). 
261 Phd. 68e5-7. Socrates calls this kind of temperance “simple-minded”.  
262 Phd. 69a2. See 68e1 οἱ κόσμιοι (well-ordered) = οἱ σώφρoνες (temperate). Cf. 
Burnet 1911:41.  
263 Sedley (2014, 69) gives a more eloquent example: ‘The conventionally brave, for 
example, attach negative value to pain and death in battle, regarding both as fearful, 
but as nevertheless worth risking in order to avert potentially worse suffering, such 
as the enslavement of one’s entire city. What they are thus doing is treating pleasure, 
pain and the like as their currency, and using that currency to calculate the relative 
merits of alternative choices.’ 
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For Socrates, the fraudulently good people exchange ‘pains for pains and fear for 
fear, greater for less, like currencies’.264 However, ‘for the purpose of virtue this [sc. 
becoming temperate because of intemperance] is not the correct exchange’.265 For 
Socrates, ‘just one thing is the correct currency, in return for which one must 
exchange all these [sc. pains, pleasures and fears]: I mean wisdom’.266 Regarding the 
distinction between real and fake virtues, Socrates says:  
[T21] Now when all things are bought and sold for this and with this– with 
wisdom – they really are, I suspect, courage, temperance, justice and in sum true 
virtue, regardless of whether pleasures, fears and everything else like that are 
added or removed. But when they are kept apart from wisdom and exchanged for 
one another, that sort of virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is really fit for 
slaves,267 and contains nothing sound or true.268 
There is need to remark that Socrates first says, “for this (τούτου)”, which is genitive 
of price, then “with this (μετὰ τούτου)”, which is genitive of accompaniment. The 
rendering of this phrase depends on the use of καὶ. [1] If it is copulative, Socrates 
would be saying pleasures and pains should be exchanged for wisdom and with 
wisdom. [2] If καὶ is linking alternatives, Socrates would be amending exchanging 
for wisdom to exchanging with wisdom.  
                                                          
264 Phd. 69a6-9. 
265 Phd. 69a6-7.  
266 Phd. 69a9-10. ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα 
καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις. 
267 “ἀνδραποδώδης (slavish)” is opposed to “ἐλευθέριος (fit for a freeman)”. 
However, I do not think that possessing fraudulent virtues places their possessor into 
the class of wicked people. In the Republic IV 430b6-9, Plato distinguishes ‘this 
power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about 
what is to be feared and what isn’t is what I call courage’ and ‘the correct belief 
about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the 
result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don’t call it courage but 
something else’. That is, the latter is ‘fitting for slaves (b8 ἀνδραποδώδη)’ too; hence 
it is not courage but something else. Note also that Socrates calls the temperance of 
well-ordered people “simple-minded temperance (68e5)”. Therefore, I presume that 
the two-stage distinction mentioned above still holds. There are coward, so not-
virtuous, slaves in comparison with those appearing to be courageous but who are 
actually something else.  
268 Phd. 69b1-8 καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ 
πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην 
ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ 
ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως 
[καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι 
ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ. 
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Some scholars favour [2] since [1] implies that wisdom can be decreased or increased 
through the exchange.269 As it is the case regarding all analogies, there is need to be 
careful when we interpret the currency analogy.270 That said, I submit that both uses, 
i.e. for wisdom and with wisdom, make sense in different contexts. For Socrates, 
true philosophers should give up pleasures and desires in exchange for wisdom. That 
is, philosophers should remain aloof from the body and its desires, and try to gain 
wisdom as much as possible.271 On the other hand, true philosophers should always 
act with wisdom, since by using wisdom they would become truly virtuous and 
accumulate more wisdom.272 
Moreover, since those who truly love wisdom would never buy pleasures and pains, 
they only care for accumulating wisdom. That is, true philosophers always sell 
pleasures and buy wisdom in exchange.273 For instance, one might ask whether it is 
the case that, as it were, drinking costs 4 minas in my own scale of pleasures and 
eating 8 minas. If I am fond of drinking, but not eating, the latter would add more to 
my pleasure. That is, if I do not buy the pleasure of eating, then I can buy the pleasure 
                                                          
269 Rowe 1993, 149-150. 
270 Bluck 1955, 155. Russell (2005, 95) stresses that ‘surely in saying that wisdom 
can be ‘exchanged’ for other things, and that other things can be ‘bought’ with it, 
like a coin, Socrates does not mean to say that by exercising my wisdom I shall come 
to have less wisdom to exercise’. We should also remark that Socrates says, ‘as it 
were (69a9 ὥσπερ)’ a currency, which seems ‘to limit or modify an assertion or 
apologize for a metaphor (LSJ, s.v. II)’. 
271 We, naturally, can voluntarily stay away from pleasures. However, we might not 
be able to avoid pains, either physical (e.g. headache) or pychological (e.g. loss of a 
loved one) that are inflicted on us by external cause. For instance, we might suffer 
severe and frequent headaches, although there is nothing deliberate about it. 
Regarding the exchange analogy, well-ordered people might choose something less 
painful now in exchange for something more painful then, yet they do not to do so 
with wisdom. In this respect, exchanging greater pains for lesser pains has the same 
mechanism that well-ordered people use in case of calculating pleasures.  
272 Sedley (2014, 70) argues that ‘virtues are genuine virtues only in so far as their 
possession or exercise is informed by wisdom, that is, enacted wisely’, since 
‘wisdom inspires the virtues by motivating them, as their ultimate goal’. 
273 Gosling & Taylor (1982, 93) claim that currencies are instruments used for 
exchange so that they do not have any intrinsic value. Then if wisdom is a currency, 
no matter whether it is the right one, wisdom should be an instrument for ruling over 
pleasures and pains rather than being an end. I, however, agree with Russell (2005, 
96): ‘the ‘exchange…for…’ relation is asymmetric: I can exchange 
(καταλλάττεσθαι) my nickel for (ἀντὶ) your piece of candy, but, of course, I cannot 
exchange your candy for my nickel. The exchange Socrates has in mind is not one 
of using wisdom to secure other things, but of trading those other things for 
wisdom—that is, I take it, managing one's dealings with other things so as to become 




of drinking, which is more pleasant for me. Thus, well-ordered people possessing 
fake-virtues are able to calculate how much they save by not buying the pleasure of 
eating and how much they need to pay for the pleasure of drinking. 274 
However, real-temperance, and perhaps other real-virtues too, belong ‘only to those 
who particularly disdain the body and live in philosophy’.275 For Socrates, 
temperance ‘is not being in a flutter about one’s desires, but rather being disdainful 
towards them and staying composed’; hence true philosophers are really temperate. 
For Socrates, if we consider ‘other people’s temperance’, we find their temperance 
to be “absurd”.276 This is because, as mentioned above, other people become 
temperate because of intemperance. That is, we might call someone temperate 
because she is not eating too much now, yet this avoidance is not because she cares 
for her soul, but because she loves drinking more than eating.  
I suggest that the currency analogy should be read in terms of the market value, so 
to speak, rather than coins themselves. That is, while well-ordered people regulate 
the market value of actions from the perspective of the body and its pleasures, true 
philosophers determine the value of actions from the perspective of the soul. True 
philosophers primarily care about the soul, as they aim at ameliorating it as much as 
possible by accumulating wisdom and hope to have a pure encounter with wisdom 
in Hades. Therefore, for philosophers, wisdom is the most valuable and the only true 
currency.  
In addition, it would be helpful to look at the relationship between exchange and 
currency. Fortunately, Plato offers a theory for this in the Republic. When discussing 
the economics of the primitive community and the way in which this community is 
sharing, buying and selling products, Socrates says, ‘[Rep. II. 371b4-7 for sharing 
                                                          
274 See Phd. 68e1-69a4. I agree with Woolf 2004 and Russell (2005, 78-79) that the 
evaluative reading is more informative regarding the practice of philosophy. This is 
because this reading puts emphasis on the use of reason, which is a fundamental 
theme of the Phaedo and the theory of pleasure advanced in it. The behavioural 
avoidance, which is stressed by the ascetic reading, does not need to lead to a 
philosophical life. For instance, I might avoid pleasures of drinking, eating and so 
on and might ignore promoting the soul at the same time. On the other hand, the 
indifference to bodily pleasures, which is emphasized by the evaluative reading, 
demands a certain understanding. That is, for believing that eating and drinking are 
trivial, we need to understand the nature of pleasure and why bodily pleasures are 
deceitful and beguiling. This understanding, I think, is a must for the philosophical 
life. See Butler 2012, 105-106.  
275 Phd. 68c10-12. 
276 Phd. 68d2-3. 
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products by selling and buying], we will have a market-place and a system of coinage 
for the sake of exchange’.277 If so, the need of sharing products comes first, which 
was the reason for establishing a city.278 Secondly, we need a market-place and a 
currency for buying, selling and exchanging. 
Likewise, in the Phaedo, the need of buying, selling and exchanging pleasures, pains 
and desires arises firstly. Then for the sake of fulfilling this need, we form an 
evaluative model. From an individual perspective, it is up to me to price each of the 
pleasures, pains and desires. In this respect, well-ordered people can calculate prices 
correctly according to their own scale of pleasures, yet they still do so for the sake 
of the body and maximise its pleasures.  
To sum up, well-ordered people might sometimes seem temperate, as they are 
abstaining from a set of pleasures to maximize another set of pleasures. However, at 
other times, they would seem intemperate, for they are trying to maximize their 
pleasure. True philosophers, on the contrary, will always be temperate since for them 
only wisdom is worthy of accumulation. Since wisdom is maximized by means of 
separating the soul from the body, they determine the exchange rate with the purpose 
of nourishing the soul, as it were. That is, true philosophers exchange all pleasures 
and desires for wisdom and they act with wisdom in order to accumulate more 
wisdom. In a sense, then, true philosophers use wisdom to obtain more wisdom. 
3.4.7. Shadow-painting and Purification 
Let me now consider another metaphor used in the same section, which aims at 
explaining the difference between true and fake goodness. This examination, I think, 
will help us to have a better understanding of the role of purification. For Socrates, 
“true virtue accompanied by wisdom (b3 ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως)”, e.g. “real 
(b8 τῷ ὄντι) courage, temperance and justice”, is a sort of catharsis.279 However, as 
we have seen earlier, we can only have a pure encounter with wisdom in Hades. If 
so, do true philosophers use another kind of wisdom, say a less pure kind, in this 
world to exchange pleasures, pains and desires, and to become courageous, 
temperate and so on?  
                                                          
277 Rep. II. 371b8-9   Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα 
γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. 
278 Rep. II. 371b4-7.    
279 Phd. 69b3-c1. 
87 
 
Socrates argues that ‘when they [pleasures, pains, etc.] are kept apart from wisdom 
and exchanged for one another, that sort of virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is 
really fit for slaves and contains nothing sound or true’.280 As quoted in the paragraph 
above, the accompaniment of wisdom makes a virtue real in contrast with an illusion 
of it. For instance, if we appear temperate now because we desire to maximize 
another sort of pleasure later, our temperance would not be a token of real virtue.281  
Here, it would be helpful to review briefly what skiagraphia is. According to the LSJ 
Greek Lexicon, it is ‘painting with the shadows (cf. σκιαγραφέω), so as to produce 
an illusion of solidity at a distance’. Skiagraphia had to be viewed from a certain 
distance, since a viewer cannot get what the painting is about with a close-up look.282 
In the Phaedo passage, however, Socrates does not seem to focus on how a 
skiagraphia is viewed best, but how it is produced in the first place.283 Since 
skiagraphia is painted by using various intensification of colours and the use of 
colours in the right amount is necessary for an effective skiagraphia, well-ordered 
people, likewise, are able to calculate the right amount of pain and pleasure which 
make them appear virtuous.284  
Pains and pleasures are like colours through which well-ordered people draw an 
illusory picture of being virtuous. Here, there are two distinctions: the one is between 
the virtuous state (e.g. painting) and how that state is achieved (e.g. painting with 
shadows with right intensification colours), the other between fake virtues (achieved 
through exchanging greater fears and pains for lesser ones, and lesser pleasures with 
greater ones) and real virtue (achieved with wisdom). Now, as discussed above, true 
philosophers’ pursuit is separating the soul from the body as much as possible. They 
then should act from the point of view of the soul and maximizing wisdom because 
                                                          
280 Phd. 69b5-9 χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ 
σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ 
ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ. 
281 See Rowe 1993, 150. 
282 Keuls 1978, 74. 
283 If, surely, we have a closer look at well-ordered people, we realize what they 
really are, that is not truly virtuous. In the Republic II 365c3-4, Adeimantus tells 
Socrates that a person might think that ‘I should create a façade of illusory virtue 
(σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς) around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind 
it the greedy and crafty fox of the wise Archilochus’. Well-ordered people in the 
Phaedo seem to do the same, though Socrates does not tell us whether these people 
wish to deceive others. 
284 Keuls 1978, 81-83. 
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the accompaniment of wisdom would enable them to rule out the body, its desires 
and pleasures.  
Again, as suggested above, catharsis refers to the state of true virtue and catharmos 
denotes that by which we attain that state, i.e. with wisdom. In this respect, I suggest 
that wisdom is a set of principles, or, theologically speaking, “rituals”, by which the 
state of purification, or of true virtue, is attained. These principles guide true 
philosophers in their pursuit and enable them to separate the soul and the body as 
much as possible. If we consider the relationship between knowledge, wisdom and 
virtue, phronesis has epistemological and methodological bearings, as it enables true 
philosophers to attain knowledge in this world. This is just as purificatory rites 
(katharmoi) and initiations (teletai) endow us with “blessedness”, such as “eating 
raw meat” in Bacchic mysteries.285    
To sum up, true philosophers desire wisdom, yet they can have a pure encounter with 
it in Hades. The body hinders us, or more precisely our soul, to have a pure 
knowledge of something since it is not possible to view the things themselves with 
the soul itself as long as the soul is with the body. If true philosophers can only attain 
wisdom in Hades, then how does wisdom help them to become truly virtuous in this 
world?  
Socrates comments on the acquisition of pure knowledge as follows:  
[T22] But we really have shown that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of 
something, we must be separated from the body and view things by themselves 
with the soul by itself. The time when we will have that which we desire and 
whose lovers we claim to be, namely wisdom, will be when we are dead, as the 
argument indicates, and not while we are alive. 286 
If we cannot attain wisdom during life, then should true philosophers look for 
something else during life that will enable them to obtain real virtue? This would, 
nonetheless, be an embarrassment because Socrates frequently underlines that true 
philosophers desire wisdom and they would not content themselves with pursuing 
something else. Thus, I suggest that we do not need to possess pure wisdom to live 
                                                          
285 For these rituals see Burkert & Raffan 2013, 290-293. 
286 Phd. 66d7-e4 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι 
εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ 
τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, 
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. 
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a virtuous life. Rather, if we live in respect of wisdom and for the sake of 
accumulating wisdom, we would separate the soul from the body as much as 
possible; we would thus purify ourselves. That is, a true philosopher's desire to attain 
pure wisdom motivates them to pursue separating the soul from the body and to 
purify themselves. In doing so, true philosophers get ready to have a pure encounter 
with wisdom and view things by themselves in Hades.287   
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to scrutinize Socrates’ defence speech. I have examined the 
Willingness Argument and its role in understanding the correct practice of 
philosophers. According to this argument, true philosophers aim at separating the 
soul from the body, hence the reason they do not get any resentful feeling towards 
death, after which their soul will become alone by itself. I have suggested that to 
point out the connection between the Willingness Argument and the correct practice 
of philosophers, Plato stresses that even a sophist can become a true philosopher by 
pursuing dying and being dead, hence the reason for alluding to Evenus, the poet and 
sophist.  
Moreover, I argued that dying refers to the process of purification while being dead 
denotes the final state of purification. I have suggested that the disembodied soul 
views things by themselves and has a pure encounter with wisdom. I have also 
suggested that encountering wisdom in Hades is an automatic consequence of the 
correct practice of philosophy in this life. The embodied soul, on the contrary, is 
disturbed by the body and its desires; therefore, it must actively engage in philosophy 
and purification.  
By pursuing separating the soul from the body, true philosophers prepare themselves 
for the afterlife and try to come “closest” to the knowledge of the being of things 
themselves.288 That is, true philosophers aim to develop the cognitive powers of the 
soul so that they can attain wisdom and knowledge in Hades. The impossibility of a 
                                                          
287 See Futter 2015, 57.  
288 Phd. 65d11-e4. Sedley (1989, 377-378) points that according to the myth in the 
Republic 10, Er learns the laws of the ‘underlying principles of celestial motions’ in 
a temporary disembodied state although the true astronomy is granted to 
philosophical souls in this life in the Republic 7. But still, Er's disembodiment, for 
Sedley, ‘is used to symbolize the radical break from incarnate perspectives,’ and 
hence it puts us back to the Phaedo. 
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pure encounter with wisdom, of viewing things by themselves and of the final state 
of purity during embodiment, is the source of philosophical humility, which partly 
shapes the practice of true philosophers. In this respect, the findings of this 
investigation complement those of earlier chapters: the Phaedo has a 
metaphilosophical aim, which is to provide insights for the correct method of 
philosophical practice.  
The crux of this chapter is that even though true philosophers are aware that they 
cannot attain the final state of purity, they still pursue it and try to separate the soul 
from the body. That is, true philosophers are aware of the limits of their pursuit and 
cognitive capacity. Plato then tries to establish the epistemic norms which are 
compatible with our epistemic access. I submit that philosophical humility is an 
accurate basis of these norms, as it takes our cognitive fallibilities into account. In 
this respect, I believe that the metaphilosophical dimension of Socrates’ defence 
speech frames the dialogical model and the philosophical method developed in the 
Phaedo. 
In the next chapter, I am going to examine how the limits of our cognitive capacities 
fashion the norms governing our attitude towards philosophical arguments and 
disagreement. This mode of conduct is in line with the course of the Phaedo, as 
Socrates also defines these norms first, then discusses his method of inquiry. In a 
sense, the metaphilosophical component that I discuss in the next chapter (the 
misology argument) precedes the first-order investigation that I examine in the last 
chapter (the theory of Forms and the method of hypothesis). This preference, I 
submit, implies that we need to learn the norms governing the correct practice of 








Chapter 4: Hatred of Arguments 
4.1 Introduction  
Examining the misology argument (hatred of arguments [logos]) at Phaedo 88c-91b 
is vitally important if we are to understand the metaphilosophical component of the 
Phaedo.289 The objective of this chapter is to investigate Plato’s ideas on the right 
method of philosophical argument in the misology argument. To this end, I critically 
examine the views that [1] the misology argument is fundamentally a critique of the 
sophistic method, which is described as arguing for and against the same proposition 
(antilogike), and that [2] Plato targets knowing through sense-perception.290  
I dispute these views not only because Socrates’ interlocutors and friends in the 
Phaedo are not antilogikoi, but also because staying away from antilogike alone 
might not rule out the danger of becoming misologists. The key aim of Plato’s study 
of misology is to show the correct norms governing true philosophers’ attitude 
towards arguments, which are based on epistemic modesty. However, with this 
challenge, I do not wish to suggest that Plato’s discussion of antilogic is just 
incidental to the misology argument, rather antilogic offers a very vivid example of 
how people might become misologists. Understanding antilogic is thus essential to 
wrap our minds around misology, as this understanding can vividly reveal the 
process of becoming misologists.  
In this respect, I suggest that the misology argument primarily offers a 
metaphilosophical model to lovers of wisdom. According to this model, true 
philosophers, who are lovers of wisdom, should follow the norms of epistemic 
humility and critical thinking in their search for knowledge and the truth. This is the 
reason why, I argue, Socrates is wary of claiming that he has already found totally 
firm and sound arguments. 
Moreover, by introducing the misology argument, I submit that Socrates puts 
forward an outlook by which we can recover from epistemic despair. With this term, 
                                                          
289 Woolf (2007, 3) remarks that ‘one would not, strictly, speak of arguments, as 
Socrates does here of λόγοι, as being true or false’. See also Gallop 1975, 154. As 
we shall see, logos has a larger connotation in the Phaedo and it is difficult to find a 
single English word that can account for all uses of logos. Thus, I either leave logos 
untranslated or render it in regard to the context it is used. 
290 See Archer-Hind 1883, 113-114; Hackforth 1955, 110-111, Gallop 1975, 153-
155. Cf. Miller 2015 for a reading bringing Socrates and the misologists closer.   
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I refer to the damaging belief that there is nothing firm and sound either in things 
(the metaphysical problem) or in arguments (the epistemological problem). Socrates 
has already dealt with the metaphysical problem and his interlocutors consented to 
the idea that there are stable things, i.e. Forms, through which we can attain 
knowledge and the truth.291  
The misology argument largely deals with the difficulty of establishing whether there 
are firm and sound arguments which can be attained. This difficulty is related to the 
content of Socrates’ defence speech, according to which the body’s influence on the 
soul hinders us from having a pure encounter with wisdom and from viewing things 
by themselves as long as we are alive.292 Therefore, Socrates tries to find a cure for 
epistemic pessimism, which might arise out of the idea that our cognitive powers are 
imperfect and the truth is beyond our epistemic access. That is, the misology 
argument aims at soothing the fear of making mistakes and encourages us to continue 
searching for knowledge and the truth. 
Moreover, I stress the use of the adverbs of degree (e.g. very much, at all), which 
Socrates uses to qualify both trust in humans and trust in arguments; hence it 
underlines the significance of philosophical humility. I argue that the misology 
argument highlights that those who lack skill in arguments (hereafter the unskilled) 
should not put all their trust in arguments. Rather, Socrates favours epistemic caution 
(i.e. recognizing the fallibility/limits of our methods and cognitive powers) and 
critical thinking (i.e. looking for further evidence in support of or against an 
argument).  
Finally, I propose that Socrates does not present himself as an epistemic authority, 
who claims to own knowledge and the truth. Socrates only says that bad arguments 
are in the majority, though this does not imply that he is certain that he has discovered 
firm and sound arguments. For instance, Socrates might have encountered ten 
arguments and observed that nine out of ten are bad. This nonetheless does not mean 
that the not bad one should be totally firm and sound. That is, Socrates does not claim 
authority, but rather, by using conditionals, he emphasizes that if the firm and sound 
arguments exist, then those who hate and abuse arguments will be deprived of them, 
and hence of the truth and knowledge too.  
                                                          
291 See Phd.  65d11-e4, 66d7-67a2, 75c11-d5, 76d6-e7, 80b1-6. 
292 See Phd. 66d4-7, 67b7-c3. 
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In sum, I argue that the misology argument aims at comparing the epistemic (or 
intellectual) norms of epistemic authority and those of philosophical humility. Then 
not only does Socrates encourage his interlocutors to adopt the latter, but he also 
follows these norms in his conversation with Simmias and Cebes. That said, I will 
not discard the possibility that a character might be more knowledgeable since they, 
for instance, have intellectual experience. However, since an epistemic authority 
claims to have acquired knowledge and the truth, such authority does not occur in 
the Phaedo.  
4.2 The Origin of Misology 
Misologists, for Socrates, hate and abuse arguments, thus they would be deprived of 
knowledge and the truth.293 If the hatred of arguments entails truth-deprivation, then 
knowledge and truth, for Socrates, must only be attained through arguments. That is, 
if there were another way other than arguments, which allows us to succeed in 
finding knowledge and truth, the misologists might not have been deprived of 
knowledge and truth. For instance, if divine revelation were also a method of 
attaining knowledge and the truth, we might have acquired them through revelation. 
As mentioned above, it is often thought that the target of the misology argument is 
those taking the sensible world as true and real. According to this interpretation, 
since misologists do not believe that the intelligible world is really real, they would 
never study intelligibles; therefore, they could not obtain, or be deprived of, 
knowledge and the truth.294 Be that as it may, the misology argument, I presume, 
also provides the correct norms of philosophical argument, in which true 
philosophers deal with logoi.  
In this respect, Socrates tries to show how we search for the true logoi, besides 
offering a true logos, for instance, the theory of Forms.295 That said, there is need to 
observe that Socrates has some reservations about the theory of Forms. As suggested 
in Chapter 1, after showing that the soul is immortal, Socrates advises his 
                                                          
293 Phd. 90d1ff. 
294 E.g. Gallop 1975, 154-55.  
295 Miller (2015, 153) suggest that hating logos and loving the sensible world are 
different manifestations of the same attitude. See Phd. 83c2–9; Baima 2015, 265. 
Although I do reject this point, we should pay heed to the fact that Socrates is not 
talking to ‘sight-lovers’ or ‘contradiction-mongers’, but to his closest followers. In 
this context, I submit that Socrates should aim at showing the correct norms 
governing philosophical argument, which the former two hardly care about.  
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interlocutors to examine further the immortality of the soul and the theory of 
Forms.296 In a sense, although the theory of Forms contributes to the elimination of 
epistemic fear (fearing that there is no firm and sound argument), Socrates does not 
claim that the theory of Forms is totally firm and sound so that there is no need to 
investigate it further.  
Here we need to distinguish Socrates' elimination of his own epistemic despair from 
that of his interlocutors. To begin with, Socrates does not rule out his interlocutors’ 
epistemic fear by offering them firm and sound arguments, as the immortality of the 
soul and the theory of Forms are still in need of further inquiry. Rather, Socrates 
persuades them that if his interlocutors are going to find firm and sound arguments 
they should continue to inquire. To this end, Socrates endows his interlocutors with 
the ability to control their epistemic fear and with a special mindset that allows them 
to deal with arguments.  
Moreover, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he is ambitious to demonstrate that the 
soul is immortal. If what Socrates is saying about the soul (i.e. the soul is immortal) 
is true, then ‘it is quite right to be convinced’, however, if the soul is not immortal, 
then Socrates will at least be ‘less of a mournful burden’ for his friends. 297 This is 
because, I presume, his friends will spend the last hours by doing philosophy, not 
lamenting the imminent death of Socrates.298 Besides, it is also a good thing for 
Socrates that if the soul is not immortal, he will perish on dying; hence Socrates 
                                                          
296 Phd. 107b4-9. Note also that in the Parmenides, young Socrates’s theory of Forms 
is criticized by Parmenides. From a philosophical perspective, the Phaedo, I 
presume, looks forward to the criticism of Parmenides. With respect to the dramatic 
setting, old Socrates seems to have learnt from young Socrates’ mistakes. Even in 
the second part of the Parmenides, Socrates undergoes philosophical training, 
perhaps with a view to gaining skill to defend the theory of Forms. For the purpose 
of the Parmenides’s critique, among others, see especially Zuckert (1998); 
Runciman (1959). 
297 Phd. 91b1-5. 
298 I would like remind the readers of what Phaedo says early in the dialogue: ‘hardly 
any feeling of pity entered me [although he was witnessing the death of a friend], as 
you would expect of someone at a scene of misfortune; nor did I feel any pleasure 
that we were caught up in philosophy, as our custom had been – for in fact our 
conversation was a philosophical one. Instead I had a quite peculiar experience, an 
unusual mixture blended together from both the pleasure and the pain, as I took in 
the fact that his life was just about to end’ (Phd. 59a1-7). If Socrates’ friends are 




thinks that ‘this folly [to believe that the soul is immortal] won’t stay with [me] – 
that would have been an evil – but will perish shortly’.299  
Finally, I believe that by introducing the last proof of the immortality of the soul, not 
only does Socrates rule out his own epistemic fear, but he also guides his 
interlocutors through the research and improvement process; hence the defeat of their 
epistemic fear. Socrates provides his friends with the correct method of philosophical 
argument, by which they could study and develop the theory of Forms and the proofs 
of the immortality of the soul. In the end, Socrates is satisfied by his argument, 
although his friends should conduct further inquiry to discover a firmer and sounder 
argument. That is, following the argument to the furthest point that humans can 
achieve is the duty of Socrates’ friends, perhaps including Plato, since Socrates is 
going to die soon.  
4.2.1 Epistemic Fear 
Socrates thinks that arguments, like humans, are multifarious, e.g. some of them are 
firm and sound while others are not, although there are not extremely bad humans as 
there are extremely bad arguments. Apart from this difference in extreme ends of the 
spectrum, if the unskilled people put all their trust in arguments or humans, they are 
likely to become misologists and misanthropists respectively. As a solution to 
misology, I argue that Socrates’ cure for misology and epistemic fear is based on 
critical thinking, carefulness and epistemic modesty; especially should we lack 
expertise in arguments, we need to follow the norms governing them.  
The misology argument aims at defeating the mistrust of arguments. In the relevant 
section, once Socrates has concluded the affinity argument, his friends, save 
Simmias and Cebes, thought that the affinity argument adequately proved that the 
soul is immortal. In simple terms, the affinity argument is that the soul is more like 
forms, which are unvarying and divine, while the body resembles what is changing 
and visible. Since, for Socrates, what is unvarying is superior to what is changing, 
the soul should be superior to the body. Therefore, the soul is ‘the sort to be 
altogether incapable of being disintegrated, or nearly so’; hence it must outlive the 
body.300 
                                                          
299 Phd. 91b5-7. 
300 Phd. 78b4-80d4. 
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Whether the affinity argument is really strong or weak is not relevant for my current 
purposes.301 What is of significance is that the listeners think that it is a good 
argument; as a result, they are alarmed once they have heard the challenges posed 
by Simmias and Cebes. Cebes scrutinizes whether the soul is completely immortal 
and imperishable, or whether it perishes after many birth-death cycles, and Simmias 
offers that the soul might be an attunement.302 These questions arouse feelings of 
suspicion and fear among Socrates' friends, and Phaedo portrays those feelings:  
[T23] Now when we all heard them [Simmias and Cebes] say this our mood took 
an unpleasant turn, as we later told each other, because we had been firmly 
persuaded by the earlier argument, but then they seemed to have disturbed us all 
over again and sent us plummeting into doubt, not just about the arguments given 
before, but also about what would be said later. We were worried that we might 
be worthless as judges, or even that the very facts of the matter might merit 
doubt.303 
Firstly, the singular noun logos in ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου at the Phaedo 88c3 
should refer to the affinity argument; otherwise we would have a plural noun if 
Phaedo refers to all the preceding arguments.304 Secondly, ‘the arguments given 
                                                          
301 For some explanations about the weakness of the affinity argument, see Apolloni 
(1996); Dorter (1976); Elton (1997). The first of these claims that the affinity 
argument’s underlying principle is mind/body dualism, which emphasizes the 
simplicity of soul; the second argues that Socrates tries to explain an abstract and 
philosophically difficult argument by a religious metaphor, which focuses on an 
inherent feeling about the existence of divinity; the third points out that Socrates 
aims at soothing his interlocutors’ fear of dying rather than giving a proper argument 
as well as illustrating the problem of “analogical reasoning”.  
302 Simmias’ challenge is the so-called soul-attunement view. According to this view, 
once the strings of a lyre are broken, there remains no attunement. Then if the soul 
is a kind of attunement and blending in due proportion of hot and cold, dry and wet, 
and the like, the soul should perish in case of the lack of proportion of these elements. 
For instance, if one relaxes or tightens the strings too much, the attunement would 
disappear. Even worse, if the strings are cut, there would be no attunement although 
the strings would continue to exist until they rot down. See Phd.85e3-86d4. Cebes’ 
argument simply is: to say that the soul has existed before embodiment does not 
show that the soul will not perish after one dies. That is, a soul might live in many 
bodies and be reborn many times, but its present incarnation might be the last. See 
Phd. 87c6-88b8. 
303 Phd. 88c1-c7 Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς 
ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα 
πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον 
τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ 
οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ. 
304 Whilst talking about Socrates’ attitude towards his interlocutors, Phaedo uses a 
plural noun to refer to the interlocutors’ “arguments (τῶν λόγων)” at Phd. 89a5. 
Here, however, Phaedo does not refer to the affinity argument but to ‘the young 
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before (88c4-5 τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις)’ should either refer to the arguments 
advanced in the Phaedo so far or more generally to arguments that Phaedo and others 
have encountered until now, or both. In any case, Phaedo and others have doubts 
about arguments, their own cognitive skills, and the very facts of the matter. Thirdly, 
‘what would be said later (88c5-6 τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι)’ designates the 
things that would be said either about the immortality of the soul or about any other 
issue.305 At any rate, Phaedo and others worry that future talks might fail to establish 
an undoubted account about the immortality of the soul, as well as about other 
questions. 
Let me now ask why Plato brings the epistemic fear of Phaedo and others to our 
attention. The reason for this is that Plato wishes to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the affinity argument at the same time.306 While the argument seems 
strong to Phaedo and others, Simmias and Cebes are able to detect weaknesses and 
to find counterarguments. Therefore, the readers, in a sense, are left to pick a side. 
Besides, the interlocutors’ opposition to Socrates implies that the affinity argument 
might seem strong on the face of it, yet it is not immune to objections.  
Therefore, I presume that Phaedo’s portrayal of their feelings of suspicion and fear 
emphasises that putting all our trust in an argument might lead to the state of 
epistemic despair: it might lead to doubting and fearing that the truth exists. The 
scope of this state of despair, as mentioned above, is not limited to the arguments 
about the immortality of the soul, though it is more likely that people should have 
epistemic fears about the immortality of the soul. This is probably because the 
immortality of the soul is an issue about which ‘knowing the clear truth…in our 
present life is either impossible or something extremely difficult’, as Simmias said 
earlier.307  
                                                          
men’s argument (Phd. 89a3 τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον)’, that is, the arguments of 
Cebes and Simmias. 
305 Rowe 1993, 210. 
306 Gordon (2007, 219) finely observes that ‘despite the occasional failure of 
argument, we ought not to let that deter us from the life of philosophy. Socrates’ cure 
for anxiety, while assuring us that we ought to remain faithful to philosophy, at the 
same time warns us of our limitations’.  
307 Phd. 85c2-3. Woolf (2007, 12) notes that ‘trying to know too vigorously 
everything’ might result in a sort of “epistemic nihilism”. Be that as it may, once we 
determine the limits of human cognition and things that we can know, our inquiries 
should continue until we find something adequate, firm and sound. Indeed, as 
Simmias states, ‘not testing from every angle what is said about them [things like 
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4.2.2 The Role of the Misology Argument 
Having discussed how to construct the relationship between epistemic fear and the 
misology argument, I will now move on to investigate the role of the misology 
argument. Here, it is important to ask why Socrates scrutinized misology at length 
rather than immediately demonstrating the immortality (and imperishability) of the 
soul. Socrates, I submit, could have presented an argument that might persuade his 
interlocutors and alleviate the epistemic fear of his friends.  
In fact, as we will see later, Socrates has that sort of argument up his sleeve, namely 
the last proof.308 If Socrates had introduced the last proof (as well as the theories and 
methods used in this proof) at this stage, he could have said that “this is a good 
argument that you would agree to, and so don’t lose your faith in arguments”. This 
would be the best of both worlds, not to mention that it is shorter and easier: Socrates’ 
friends would regain their trust in arguments and Socrates would accomplish a goal 
of the Phaedo, which is to persuade his interlocutors about the immortality of the 
soul.309   
As mentioned above, an explanation of the purpose of the misology passage is as 
follows: Plato wishes to criticize those who have spent their time dealing with the 
arguments used in disputation (antilogike) and to show why their practice is 
dangerous, should they desire to acquire knowledge and the truth.310 Plato’s criticism 
                                                          
the immortality of the soul], refusing to give up until one is exhausted from 
considering it in every way, is the mark of an extremely feeble sort of man (Phd. 
85c4-6)’.  
308 Phd. 102ff.  
309  Arieti (1986, 129-131) claims that the Phaedo is not about the immortality of 
soul, but about “the heroic death of Socrates” and ‘only the philosopher – as 
epitomized in the person of Socrates – can meet death heroically’. This is because, 
for Arieti, ‘only the philosopher knows that he cannot know about the afterlife and 
the soul, and he is thus the only one who can die courageously’. Then Arieti 
concludes that the weakness of the proofs for the immortality of the soul implies that 
‘Socrates is the most heroic when his arguments are weakest’. However, even if we 
accept that his arguments are weak, I do not think that this weakness aims at 
highlighting Socrates’ heroism and courage. As I claim throughout this thesis, 
Socrates does not think that his arguments are weak, yet he believes that they might 
not be totally firm and sound; hence in need of further inquiry.  




of the practice of sophists and rhetoricians is not unexpected, and I do not reject the 
idea that Plato criticises these people.311 
Besides this, the misology argument makes a positive contribution to the practice of 
philosophy.312 If Socrates’ only aim were to prove the immortality of the soul, it 
would seem irrelevant to show how we should deal with arguments.313 Thus, I think 
that not only does Socrates try to convince his interlocutors about the immortality of 
the soul, but he also aims at furnishing his interlocutors with the correct epistemic 
norms and intellectual virtues. In this respect, Socrates is looking forward to the time 
when he has long gone yet his friends remain in the business of philosophy.314  
4.2.3 Phaedo’s Fear  
Phaedo is anxious about finding knowledge and the truth, probably because of the 
death of Socrates, who is ‘the wisest man alive’.315 Simmias, in fact, comments on 
Socrates’ expertise in arguments; he says ‘I’m far more afraid that this time 
tomorrow there will no longer be a single human being who can do this properly [sc. 
76b8-9 giving an account (διδόναι λόγον) of the beautiful, the good etc.]’.316 Only 
Socrates can then give an account of things themselves (i.e. Forms) properly, or 
worthily (ἀξίως). Simmias, therefore, are not afraid of being deprived of the truth as 
long as Socrates helps him find it.  
As a result of the impending departure of Socrates, his friends find themselves in a 
state of epistemic despair, stemming from the anticipation of failing to find that 
                                                          
311 See McCoy 2007, 2-7. 
312 From a metaphilosophical perspective, I think the misology argument is neither 
an ‘interlude (Bluck 1955, 92-93; Rowe 1993, 210)’ nor a ‘digression’ (Hackforth 
1955, 109). Through the misology argument, Plato continues to examine some the 
epistemic norms governing the practice of philosophers. 
313 See Jacquette 2014, 5. Some argue that we should not separate the metaphysical 
theory from the proofs for the immortality of the soul. That is, the arguments that are 
advanced to prove the immortality of the soul play some role in advancing the theory 
of Forms. See Lee 2012, 3. Metaphilosophy, I take it, is another component and it is 
also connected to the metaphysical (and epistemological) theory. I discuss this 
relationship in Chapter 5. 
314 A famous quote is fitting: ‘if you give a man a fish he is hungry again in an hour. 
If you teach him to catch a fish you do him a good turn (Ritchie, Anne Thackeray 
Mrs. Dymond 1885)’. Sedley (2004: 8-13) finely observes that ‘Socrates’s dialectical 
questioning’ acted as a midwife to Platonic philosophy, which Plato has continued 
to exercise long after Socrates departed this life. 
315 See Phd. 118a15-17. 
316 Phd. 76b10-12. 
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which is not doubtful. Socrates notices their fear and encourages his listeners to 
continue searching for the truth. To this end, Socrates introduces the misology 
argument and maintains that it is not unusual to encounter bad arguments, though 
this does not mean that good arguments do not exist.317  
Let me now consider the epistemic status of the affinity argument. As mentioned 
above, even though we assume that the affinity argument is weak, this does not mean 
that it is bad. In addition, although Simmias’ objection is relatively easy for Socrates 
to refute, it can still be questioned whether Socrates deals with Simmias’ argument 
charitably.318 At any rate, the soul-attunement theory is rejected for good in the 
Phaedo.  
Cebes’ objection, however, is to the point. Above all, we need to observe that Phaedo 
tells Echecrates that ‘Socrates paused for quite some time and considered something 
by himself’ before answering Cebes’ question. Then Socrates says, ‘What you’re 
seeking is no small matter, Cebes; we must study thoroughly and as a whole the 
cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be’.319 As I will discuss in Chapter 5, not only 
does this study result in the last proof of the immortality of the soul, but also Socrates, 
as a response to Cebes’ objection, introduces the method of hypothesis and expounds 
the role of Forms for explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
In this respect, even if we can overlook the strength of Simmias’ argument, Cebes’ 
argument is compelling.320 Then Phaedo’s state of epistemic fear is understandable, 
as at least one of the arguments has merits that are undeniably vital. Now, I submit 
                                                          
317 McCoy (2016, 50-51) observes that ‘to practice philosophy, then, always requires 
that I seek with the virtues of courage and humility: where humility is an awareness 
of both what I know and what I do not know, and where courage leads me to continue 
the pursuit without fear despite my own limits of knowledge.’ 
318 Guthrie (1962, 316-319), for instance, argues that for Pythagoreans, the soul-body 
composite is not an attunement, but the soul itself is a harmonia, which is like the 
tripartite depiction of the soul in the Republic. See also Corrigan 2010, 148-151 and 
Hicken 1954 for a defence of Socrates’s criticism of the soul-attunement doctrine. 
319 Phd. 95e7-96a1. 
320 Regarding Simmias’ argument, although Socrates copes with it more easily than 
Cebes’ point, there is need to observe Echecrates’ reaction to the soul-attunement 
theory: ‘this theory that our soul is a kind of attunement has an extraordinary hold 
on me, both at this moment and at all times, and now that it has been mentioned it 
has reminded me, as it were, that I myself too had already come to believe this. I 
really need some other argument, a brand-new one, that will persuade me that when 
someone has died his soul does not die with him (Phd. 88d3-8)’. In a sense, the soul-
attunement theory has a strong hold on people, and thus it deserves a serious analysis 
and strong refutation. 
101 
 
that Phaedo’s fear probably results from firmly trusting the affinity argument. That 
is, even though neither the interlocutors’ arguments nor Socrates’ argument is bad 
as such, Phaedo takes the first step forward to becoming a misologist.321 Thus, the 
general principle is that inexperience, together with encountering bad arguments, 
makes us hate arguments, and that those who lack expertise in arguments would 
become misologists as a result of trusting an argument too much.322  
4.2.4 Socrates’ Attitude towards his Friends and Interlocutors 
After Phaedo has described their feelings, Echecrates asks [1] whether Socrates was 
also “upset” or ‘came calmly to the argument’s rescue’, and [2] whether his help was 
“adequate” or “insufficient”.323 Phaedo answers by describing Socrates’ attitude as 
follows:   
[T24] Well, Echecrates, I’d often admired Socrates, but I never respected him 
more than when I was with him then. Now perhaps there is nothing surprising in 
his having something to say. But I particularly admired in him first (1) how 
pleasantly, genially and respectfully he took in the young men’s argument, then 
(2) how discerningly he noticed the effect the arguments had had on us, and (3) 
next how well he cured us and rallied us when we’d taken to our heels in defeat, 
so to speak, and spurred us on to follow at his side and consider the argument 
with him.324  
It is germane to observe Phaedo’s stress on Socrates’ way of talking to his 
interlocutors and his understanding of others’ state of despair. Phaedo does not think 
                                                          
321 I say the first step because Phaedo, as quoted above, says that ‘we were worried 
that we might be worthless as judges, or even (ἢ καὶ) that the very facts of the matter 
might merit doubt (Phd. 88c6-7)’. Simply, blaming oneself is not bad, but blaming 
things and arguments leads to the deprivation of the truth and knowledge, as Socrates 
states at Phd. 90d3-4. 
322 It is of significance to observe, with Sedley (1995, 14-15), that Socrates addresses 
his remarks on misology to Phaedo rather than Cebes or Simmias. For Sedley, this 
is because Socrates ‘is covertly talking about Simmias and Cebes’, and especially 
‘Simmias' doubts are symptomatic of incipient misology’. That said, we need to 
observe that they are neither misologists nor deal with arguments used in 
disputations. See below for antilogike. 
323 Phd. 88e1-3. 
324 Phd. 88e4-89a6 Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε 
μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως 
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως 
καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς 
ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ ’πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ 
πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε 
καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον. 
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that having answers is unusual (a1 ἄτοπον) for Socrates. Rather, Phaedo particularly 
admires Socrates’ attitude toward his interlocutors, their arguments and his 
awareness of the effect of interlocutors’ arguments on the listeners. The stress on the 
dialogical aspect invites us to look at Socrates’ manner of argument, besides the 
arguments themselves. That is, we are supposed to attend carefully to the epistemic 
(or intellectual) norms that Socrates embraces to deal with the interlocutors’ 
counterarguments.  
A cure for the state of epistemic despair is essential, since it may give way to 
misology. There are three components of Socrates’ attitude: (1) receiving his 
interlocutors’ arguments with respect and kindliness, (2) recognizing the listeners’ 
reaction to arguments and counterarguments, (3) curing epistemic despair and 
encouraging the listeners to pursue argumentation further. I believe that (1) does not 
need further comment since I have already argued in Chapter 1 that Socrates 
seriously and carefully receives the arguments of Simmias and Cebes, then he 
develops new arguments accordingly. The second component (2) is clear from the 
fact that Socrates, by introducing the argument against misology, tries to cope with 
the state of epistemic despair so that he provides a mindset for dealing with 
arguments. 
Regarding (3), I suggest that Socrates is urging his friends to defeat their epistemic 
despair. To this end, Socrates aims at motivating his friends to trust arguments by 
observing how Socrates copes with the arguments of Simmias and Cebes. In a sense, 
Socrates does not invite Phaedo and others to help him to find a way to confront the 
interlocutors’ counterarguments. Rather, Socrates asks Phaedo and others to adhere 
to his belief about the possibility of finding knowledge and the truth.  
Then Phaedo asks how they are going to deal with the interlocutors’ arguments. 
Socrates replies by referring to the story of Heracles by which Socrates makes 
metaphorical allusions to the process of philosophical inquiry: 
[T25] [Socrates]: ‘So tomorrow, Phaedo, I expect you’ll cut off these beautiful 
locks.’  
‘I suppose so, Socrates,’ I said. 
‘You won’t, if you follow my advice.’ 
‘What then?’ 
‘I’ll cut off my locks,’ he said, ‘and you’ll cut off these ones today – if our 
argument dies and we can’t revive it. As for me, if I were you and the argument 
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escaped me, I’d swear an oath like the Argive not to grow my hair long until I 
return to combat and defeat the argument of Simmias and Cebes.’325 
‘But,’ I said, ‘even Heracles, as the story goes, couldn’t fight against two.’ 
‘Well, call for me,’ he said, ‘as your Iolaus, while it’s still light.’ 
‘Then I call for you,’ I said, ‘not as Heracles, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.’ 
‘It won’t make any difference,’ he said. ‘But first let’s make sure that a certain 
thing doesn’t happen to us.’ 326 
The story referred to above goes like this: when Heracles was fighting the Lernaean 
Hydra, he was attacked by a giant crab, and his nephew, Iolaus, came to help him 
hearing Heracles’s summoning.327 Some scholars suggest that since Iolaus has only 
a supporting role in this fight, Socrates is ironical in calling himself Iolaus.328 That 
is, it is actually Socrates himself, like Heracles, who fights back against Simmias 
and Cebes, and Phaedo assumes the supporting role; hence like Iolaus.  
However, Phaedo does not seem to assume even the role of Iolaus, let alone Heracles, 
when Socrates fights back against the interlocutors’ arguments. In other words, 
Phaedo has neither a leading nor supporting role. Now, if I presume that Socrates is 
not ironical but serious, then there is a need to ask whether the meaning of the 
metaphor is to accomplish something other than defeating the current 
counterarguments presented by Simmias and Cebes.  
Although Socrates is the only one who fights back, and eventually defeats his 
interlocutors’ arguments, the final goal might not be defeating the Lernaean hydra, 
as it were. To this end, the story told about Heracles should be considered. According 
                                                          
325 Rowe (1993, 212) notes that according to Heredotus (1. 82. 7), ‘the 
Argives…swore that none of them would grow hair long [again]…until they 
recovered Thyreae’. 
326 Phd. 89b4-c12 [Socrates] Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας 
κόμας ἀποκερῇ.  
  Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
  Οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. 
  Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. 
  Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ 
μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.  καὶ ἔγωγ’ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ 
λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν 
νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.   
Ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι.  
Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν.  
Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ’ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν 
διοίσει, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. 
327 Cf. Euthd. 297c, Apollodorus, Bibliotheca. 2.77-80. 
328 Rowe 1993, 212. 
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to Apollodorus, Heracles fought against the Lernaean Hydra to accomplish one of 
the Ten Labours imposed on him by Eurystheus. As Heracles was told by the 
Delphian priestess Pythia, once he accomplishes them, ‘he would come to be 
immortal’.329 
Defeating the Lernaean Hydra enables Heracles to achieve a higher goal, i.e. to 
become immortal, and there are other labours that Heracles needs to accomplish. 
Here, it is pertinent to note that Socrates’ aim is to show that the soul is immortal 
and to persuade his interlocutors. That is, Heracles fought the Lernaean Hydra to 
become immortal and Socrates fought back against the interlocutors’ argument to 
demonstrate that the soul is immortal. Besides the connection stemming from the 
idea of the immortality of the soul, the idea of a higher goal is telling. I presume that 
defeating the current counterarguments is just a step further to completing the 
demonstration of the immortality of the soul, just as Heracles is accomplishing one 
labour by killing the Lernaean Hydra.  
According to the story, if Iolaus had not used a torch-flame to stop the heads cut by 
Heracles from re-growing, Heracles would fail to defeat the Lernaean Hydra. 
Besides, the Lernaean Hydra had an immortal head, and Heracles buried it and 
covered it with a heavy rock. In a sense, then, a part of the Hydra is still alive.330 On 
the one hand, re-growing the heads seems to emphasize that even if Socrates defeats 
the current counter-arguments, new objections might emerge unless someone seals 
the source completely. On the other hand, the immortal head implies that even if 
Socrates and Phaedo were able to fight back against all counter-arguments now, there 
might remain at least an argument which they could not eliminate but only control 
and pacify, so to speak. 
The connection between Heracles’ story and the current situation in the Phaedo 
might explain why Socrates makes little use of the role he assumes. If Socrates and 
his friends achieve the higher goal, it would not make any difference who turns out 
to be Heracles or Iolaus. In fact, as often referred to, Socrates seems to assign the 
task of completing the argument on the immortality of the soul to his friends.331 
There, in this respect, is a dis-analogy in the analogy: becoming immortal surely 
                                                          
329 Bibliotheca. 2.73 ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. 
330 I would like to thank to Niels Christensen and Taichi Miura for bringing this to 
my attention. 
331 Phd. 107af. 
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carries some weight for Heracles himself. However, showing that the soul is 
immortal is not only necessary for Socrates himself but it is a task that ought to be 
pursued by all his friends. In a sense, there is an impersonal Heracles, so to speak, 
whose role can be assumed by anyone trying to show that the soul is immortal. 332 
In summation, Socrates does not claim that he has ruled out every possible 
counterargument and has discovered every proposition that verifies the immortality 
of the soul. In a sense, the reader is invited to assume the role of impersonal Heracles 
to make a stronger case for the immortality of the soul. After all, Plato, too, assumes 
this task, which emerges in other dialogues, such as the Republic and the Timaeus. 
4.2.5 The Cure of Misology 
If the hatred of arguments hinders his friends to attain knowledge and the truth, then 
Socrates should eliminate this impediment to philosophical progress. As argued 
above, if Socrates’ friends become misologists at some point, if not at the present 
moment, the practice of philosophers would seem so purposeless to his friends that 
they might abandon it. In this respect, Socrates’ aim is not only to encourage his 
friends to pursue the current argument but also to embolden them to believe the 
possibility of a meaningful philosophical pursuit, which is not beyond their reach. 
Socrates analyses the resemblance between misanthropy and misology by exploring 
how people become misanthropists and misologists as follows:  
[T26] ‘Becoming haters of arguments,’ he [Socrates] said, ‘like those who come 
to hate people. Because there’s no greater evil that could happen to one than 
hating arguments. Hating arguments and hating people come about in the same 
way. For misanthropy sets in as a result of putting all one’s trust in someone and 
doing so without expertise, and taking the person to be entirely truthful, sound 
and trustworthy, and then a little later finding him to be wicked and untrustworthy 
– and then again with someone else. When this happens to someone many times, 
particularly with those whom he would take to be his very closest friends, and he 
has been falling out with people again and again, he ends up hating everyone and 
                                                          
332 By emphasizing impersonality, I do not mean that Socrates does not care to 
persuade himself about the immortality of the soul. For sure, this would be at odds 
with the passage (Phd. 91a2ff.) where Socrates tells his interlocutors how ambitious 
he is about showing that the soul is immortal and about persuading himself. This, 
however, does not cancel out Socrates’ request: his friends should follow the 
argument to the furthest point that can be achieved by humans.  
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thinking that there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Haven’t you ever seen this 
happen?’333  
For Socrates, we become misanthropists and misologists in the same way. Therefore, 
if we understand the underlying mechanism of misanthropy, we would have a better 
grasp of the concept of misology. One of the most significant aspects of that 
mechanism, I argue, is Socrates’ qualification of trusting in humans by using certain 
adverbs. For one thing, Socrates does not just say that putting our trust in people, 
and doing so without expertise, and then finding them to be untrustworthy might 
make us misanthropists. Rather, Socrates emphasizes that putting all (or exceedingly 
[σφόδρα] putting) our trust in people and believing that they are entirely (τὸ 
παράπαν) truthful, sound and trustworthy is dangerous, and if we experience the 
trust-betrayal cycle many times, especially (μάλιστα) with our closest friends, we 
would become misanthropists eventually. The underlying mechanism of 
misanthropy is simply that [1] we lack expertise in human affairs but trust in people 
exceedingly and take them to be entirely trustworthy; [2] we find them to be 
untrustworthy; [3] this happens to us many times, and especially with our closest 
friends, and [4] we become misanthropists. 
Let me now remind the reader of the opening of the misology passage. Whilst 
describing how they were feeling, Phaedo said that they were ‘firmly (or 
exceedingly) convinced (Phd. 88c2 σφόδρα πεπεισμένους)’ by the affinity argument. 
However, once Simmias and Cebes produced counterarguments, Phaedo and others 
have fallen into a state of epistemic despair, becoming doubtful about “the arguments 
given before” and “what would be said later”. A cause of their current condition is 
to have been exceedingly trusting of Socrates’ argument.  Socrates, then, wished to 
encourage his friends, and on that account he introduced the argument against 
misology to eliminate his friends’ fear.  
                                                          
333 Phd. 89d1-e3 Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι 
γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους 
μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ 
μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι 
παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον 
εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις 
πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, 
τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι 
τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; 
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4.3 The Meaning of Techne  
For Socrates, expertise in human qualities endows us with the sort of ability thanks 
to which we are entitled to put all our trust in someone without the danger of 
becoming misanthropists. Socrates’ point, I submit, is that expertise - both in human 
affairs and in arguments – enables us to discern the structure of a category (humanity 
and arguments) by discovering bad, good, and neither good nor bad constituents. 
This discovery, for Socrates, is to recognize ‘matters as they really are’.334 For 
instance, if someone with expertise in human qualities were to deal with humans, 
they would be able to discern the structure of humanity, that is, ‘both the very good 
and the very wicked are few in number, and that those in between are the most 
numerous’.335  
If only with expertise do we view matters as they really are, what would we do 
without expertise? In this case, how do we deal with arguments and advance our 
expertise? I argue that Socrates suggests to those who lack expertise in arguments 
that they should follow the epistemic norms of carefulness (not putting all our trust 
in an argument) and of modesty (being wary of making bold claims about 
knowledge). By following these norms, we would improve our expertise by 
expanding our grasp and familiarity with any subject. Thus, we can save ourselves 
from becoming misanthropists and misologists.  
4.3.1. The Mischief of Antilogicians 
One cause for becoming a misologist is spending time dealing with arguments used 
in disputations, i.e. antilogic.336 Those who are practicing antilogike, for Socrates, 
exemplify a sort of epistemic vice: not only would they themselves be deprived of 
knowledge and the truth but also those who interact with them. This is because 
antilogicians would demolish the belief that there are firm and sound arguments. 
Rather, as I shall discuss below, antilogicians persuade themselves and others that 
‘all things turn back and forth…and do not stay put for any time’.337 
Another vice of antilogicians, for Socrates, is intellectual pride. This is implied by 
the following: Antilogicians think that [1] they are ‘very wise (σοφώτατοι)’ and that 
                                                          
334 Phd. 89e7-90a1 ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο. 
335 Phd. 90a7-9. 
336 Phd. 90b5ff. 
337 Phd. 90c3-6. 
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[2] ‘they alone have understood that there is nothing sound or firm in any thing or in 
any argument’.338 By alluding to the intellectual pride of antilogicians, Socrates aims 
at showing why putting all our trust in arguments and cognitive abilities might hinder 
philosophical progress.339   
In this respect, one of Socrates’ purposes is to distinguish intellectual vices from 
intellectual virtues, hence the reason for introducing antilogicians.340 To this end, 
Socrates compares antilogicians’ intellectual pride with philosophers’ epistemic 
modesty and indicates that the latter would enable us to develop expertise in 
arguments and to attain knowledge. In this respect, not only does the misology 
argument target antilogicians themselves, but it also implies that we all might 
become misologists, if we do not follow the correct epistemic norms. 
4.3.2 Antilogic in Plato’s Republic 
In this subsection, I will explore antilogic and the dangers involved in it. The most 
promising passage on antilogic is found in the Republic VII, where Socrates and 
Glaucon are discussing the education of the guardians in an ideal state. In the relevant 
passage, Socrates examines how and when these guardians should begin dealing with 
‘arguments (538c5 τῶν λόγων)’.  
Socrates begins by explaining why engaging with arguments too early is dangerous: 
if future guardians are asked what the fine is when they are young and do not know 
the truth, they will initially answer according to what they have heard from ‘the 
traditional lawgiver (τοῦ νομοθέτου)’. However, if arguments refute them ‘often and 
in many places’, and shake their convictions, they will end up thinking that ‘the fine 
is no more fine than shameful (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν)’. This sort of belief, 
then, will negatively influence their attitude towards the things that they particularly 
respect such as justice and goodness. Finally, not only would a future guardian 
                                                          
338 Phd.  90c1-4. See Cassam 2014:19 for the idea of intellectual pride. 
339 Griswold (1988, 157) claims that ‘the fundamental question of metaphilosophy 
concerns the “quarrel” between the proponents of philosophy and its various critics’ 
and that ‘the defence of philosophy requires conversation with the critics of 
philosophy (and not just with abstract formulations of their “positions”)’. In the 
Phaedo, although nobody criticizes philosophy and Socrates does not need to 
directly defend it, the correct practice of philosophers is discussed at length, 
especially in Socrates’ defence speech.  
340 For a brief discussion on intellectual virtues and vices see Cassam 2016. 
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dishonor and disobey their earlier convictions, but ‘he can’t discover the true ones 
[true convictions about justice, goodness, etc.] (τά τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ)’.341 
After that, Socrates advises Glaucon, ‘if you don’t want your thirty-year-olds to be 
objects of such pity, you’ll have to be extremely careful about how you introduce 
them’.342 This ‘precaution (εὐλάβεια)’ is ‘not to let them taste arguments while they 
are young’. For Socrates, this is because young people are not ready to deal with 
arguments and can be deceived and manipulated by antilogicians: 
[T27] When young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by 
treating it as a kind of game of contradiction. They imitate those who’ve refuted 
them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and 
tearing those around them with their arguments…Then, when they’ve refuted 
many and been refuted by them in turn, they forcefully and quickly fall into 
disbelieving what they believed before. And, as a result, they themselves and the 
whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of others.343   
In contrast with the young lads, an older person, as Socrates describes, would not 
wish to participate in such madness (mania), i.e. the game of contradiction. Unlike 
young lads, who ‘imitate those who’ve refuted them’, an older person ‘will imitate 
someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather 
than someone who plays at contradiction for sport. He’ll be more sensible himself 
and will bring honour rather than discredit to the philosophical way of life’.344 
Socrates concludes his argument by giving another version of the precaution above: 
‘those allowed to take part in arguments should be orderly and steady by nature, not 
as nowadays, when even the unfit are allowed to engage in them’.345  
We can thus glean at least two approaches from the Republic, namely a kind of game 
of contradiction, i.e. antilogike, and an attempt to attain the truth by means of 
dialectic, i.e. dialegesthai.346 The former approach hinders not only the formation of 
                                                          
341 Rep. VII 538d7-e6. 
342 Rep. VII 539a8-9 ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, 
εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον; 
343 Rep. VII 539a11-c3. 
344 Rep. VII 539c5-d1. 
345 Rep. VII 539d2-6.  
346 What dialectic amounts to is a vital question, but it is not relevant to my current 
purposes. My aim is to explore the correct epistemic norms to gain expertise in 
arguments and attain knowledge.  Besides, the dialectic of the Republic cannot be 
brought into play to interpret the Phaedo without running into philosophical troubles. 
See Sayre 2016, 82-83; Rose 1966, 466. 
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new beliefs but also a reliance upon previous beliefs.347 Through the latter, on the 
contrary, we can dismiss both our old beliefs, if they are shown to be false, and form 
new beliefs. 348  
4.3.3 The Young Lads of the Phaedo 
Turning to the Phaedo, it is necessary to observe that Socrates is talking to his young 
friends.349 His advice against misology should thus apply to the young particularly, 
as they are more likely to lack expertise in arguments. 350 In the Phaedo, however, 
Socrates does not say that the young should not deal with arguments. In fact, Socrates 
encourages Cebes and Simmias to advance arguments.351 This is probably because it 
is not dangerous to talk to and imitate Socrates. Unlike the bad examples discussed 
in the Republic, Socrates is not an antilogician, but desires to discover the truth and 
urges his interlocutors to care about the truth.352  
One might think that antilogic poses a risk for the young alone, although it is a major 
risk factor for misology for all. That is, dealing with arguments used in disputation, 
i.e. practicing antilogic, is a danger that we all should try to avoid, no matter whether 
we are young or old.353 It must be asked whether someone like Socrates, who has 
expertise in dealing with arguments and is not an antilogician, is immune to the 
lamentable fate of misology. In other words, if we have expertise in arguments, as 
one might suppose, it might not be a problem for us to put all our trust in an argument.  
                                                          
347 Socrates relates his similar experience a bit later at the Phaedo 96-100, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 5.    
348 The significance of abandoning false beliefs and the role of rejecting them in 
forming new beliefs are widely discussed by scholars working on the philosophy of 
Socrates. For instance, see Vlastos 1991, 119-124; Tarrant 2000, 14-16; Politis 2006; 
88-89, Kahn 1996, 99; 2006, 121. 
349 Simmias and Cebes are ‘labelled neaniskos’ at Phd. 89a3 (Nails 2002, 261). 
350 See also Rep. II. 378d5-8 for the exclusion of Homer and Hesiod from the 
education of the young since they cannot distinguish ‘what the deeper sense 
(ὑπόνοια) is and is not.’ If this is so, especially the young should keep in mind that 
they might lack expertise, hence be much more cautious. See also Desjardins 1988, 
112-113. 
351 Phd. 91a7-c5. 
352 Phd. 91b8-c4. Zuckert (2009, 494-501) argues that Socrates differs from sophists 
in his modesty, his openness to criticisms and his encouragement of the young. 
353 Probably, if we do not put our trust in arguments used in disputations, then 
antilogic might pose no danger to us. That is, if we have expertise in arguments, we 
would be able to discern arguments pertaining to antilogic. For the use of sophistry 
and antilogic by Socrates see Klosko (1987); McCabe (2015). 
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We nonetheless observe that Socrates is sometimes reluctant to put all his trust in (or 
prefers not to insist on) an argument or a statement in the Phaedo. For instance, 
Socrates does not insist whether he, as a true philosopher, is going to enjoy the 
company of good men in Hades, and by what exact mechanism Forms and particulars 
are associated with each other.354 Besides, as discussed in Chapter 1, Socrates 
assumes that the last proof for the immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms 
need further examination and justification.355 Finally, Socrates, earlier, told his 
interlocutors that ‘do you think that there is something missing in what was said [the 
affinity argument]? Because of course it still contains many grounds for suspicion 
and counter-attack, at least if one is to go right through it properly.’356  
Then should we think that Socrates lacks expertise in arguments, as he does not 
always put all his trust in his arguments, not even in the last proof of the immortality 
of the soul? Saying that would be an embarrassment for Plato, as Socrates is 
portrayed as a wise man and an expert in arguments.357 For instance, as mentioned 
before, Simmias says that once Socrates dies, he is afraid that ‘there will no longer 
be a single human being who can do this properly [give an account of things 
themselves such as the Good itself, the Beautiful itself]’.358 In this respect, not only 
can Socrates give an account of things themselves but he might be the only person 
who can do this properly. Besides, Phaedo concludes his account of the last day of 
Socrates by telling Evenus that Socrates was ‘a man who was, as we would say, the 
best of those whom we came to know in those days, and also the wisest and most 
just’.359  
Here we need to observe that Socrates is the best, wisest and most just only among 
his contemporaries, whom Phaedo and others came to know. In this respect, we are 
left with three possibilities for understanding the meaning of Socrates’ wisdom: 
either [1] some of Socrates’ contemporaries, whom Phaedo and others did not know; 
[2] some of Socrates’ predecessors; [3] some of his successors might be better, wiser 
and more just. Concerning the evidence Phaedo had, however, there was no one 
wiser than Socrates. Socrates’ wisdom is not the all-time best and his arguments 
might be surpassed. Socrates’ arguments are not the all-time best, in the sense that 
                                                          
354 Phd. 62c1-2 and 100d7 respectively.  
355 Phd. 107a8-b3.  
356 Phd. 85c5-7. 
357 For Plato’s admiration of Socrates see Kahn 1996, 15 & 193. 
358 Phd. 76b10-12. 
359 Phd. 118a15-17. 
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they cannot be surpassed.  Rather, Socrates’ arguments in the Phaedo can either be 
rightfully challenged or be properly and correctly developed by someone else. 
That said, one might still allege that Socrates is a wise man, if not the all-time wisest; 
he thus should have the right to put all his trust in arguments. It is surely possible 
that someone wiser than Socrates might live in the future, yet for Phaedo, and 
perhaps for Plato too, he is among those expected to have expertise in arguments. In 
fact, it is plain to see Socrates’ expertise in argument, as there are many examples of 
firm and sound arguments (or at least propositions) in the Phaedo.360 Be that as it 
may, we also need to observe that, Socrates, an expert in arguments and a wise man, 
is careful about putting trust in his arguments.  
My point is that carefulness and epistemic modesty should not be abandoned, even 
if we come to have expertise in arguments or become really wise. On the one hand, 
Socrates has expertise, as his arguments are evidence of this. On the other hand, he 
still acknowledges the fallibility of his cognitive faculties and arguments, as well as 
admitting this openly. In this respect, Socrates demonstrates a fine line between 
overconfidence and reasonable trust, no matter the proper expertise in arguments. 
Socrates is not overconfident about his intellectual capacities, nor does he belittle 
others. Rather, Socrates knows better arguments and counterarguments might 
emerge. Socrates therefore encourages carefulness and modesty.361  
4.3.4 The Notion of Expertise  
For Socrates, a person who has expertise would come to the following conclusion 
about human qualities: ‘For surely if he had been doing so with expertise he’d have 
viewed matters as they really are: he would have recognized that both the very good 
                                                          
360 For instance, the recollection argument, the theory of Forms and the last proof for 
the immortality of the soul reflect Socrates’ expertise, although they might possess 
various degrees of epistemic certainty.  
361 By claiming this, I do not mean that Socrates lacks self-trust. Rather, I think that 
Socrates follows the norms of ‘epistemic conscientiousness’, which is ‘the quality of 
using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get the truth’ (Zagzebski 2012, 
48). ‘A self-respective person’, as Zagzebski (ibid., 55-56) describes, forms her 
beliefs in an epistemically conscientious way, and she would also believe that ‘other 
normal, mature humans have the same natural desire for truth and the same general 
powers and capacities that I have’. In this respect, I think that Socrates trusts both 
his own cognitive faculties and those of his interlocutors; Socrates thus takes their 
disagreement seriously and attempts to find further reasons/proofs to support his 
belief that the soul is immortal. 
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and the very wicked are few in number and that those in between are the most 
numerous’.362 Then Socrates elaborates on what he meant:  
[T28] ‘It’s just like the very small and large,’ he said. ‘Do you think there is 
anything rarer than discovering a very large or very small person, or dog, or 
anything else? Or similarly one that is swift or slow, ugly or beautiful, light or 
dark? Haven’t you observed that in all such cases the far extremities are rare and 
few, while those in between are plentiful and numerous?’  
‘Certainly,’ I said. 
‘So do you think,’ he said, ‘that if a competition in wickedness were set up, here 
too very few would come to the fore?’ 
‘That’s likely enough,’ I said. 363 
Expertise in human qualities enables us to answer two questions: [1] who are the 
very wicked, the very good and those in between? [2] which of these three groups is 
in the majority? The first point refers to expertise in understanding human qualities; 
the second point necessitates experience in dealing with humans, as we need to 
encounter many humans to know extreme ends of the spectrum. In the case of 
humans, Socrates says, those in between are the most numerous and the far 
extremities are rare and few. In this respect, if we have expertise in human qualities, 
we understand whether an individual is very good or very wicked or in between, and 
we attain a set of statistical data that informs us about the nature of humanity.  
Nevertheless, if we lack expertise in human qualities, how could we understand the 
qualities of an individual and how do we obtain the correct set of statistical data by 
gathering our knowledge together? Regarding the goodness of an individual, we 
must have expertise in human qualities, otherwise, Socrates states, we are likely to 
judge humans incorrectly. Now, if we lack expertise we have to choose between two 
alternatives: either those with expertise would inform us about every individual we 
meet or those experts would teach us their expertise in human qualities so that we 
can judge for ourselves.  
Let us now consider the current situation about arguments, epistemic fear and 
Socrates’ role. Socrates will no longer be in a position to tell his friends whether an 
argument is good or bad since he is going to die very soon. Nor can Socrates teach 
them expertise in arguments – on the assumption that they lack such expertise but 
                                                          
362 Phd. 89e7-90a1. 
363 Phd. 90a4-b3. 
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are not totally untrained – since there is no time for it. How, then, can Socrates help 
his friends and save them from becoming misologists?  
I suggest that Socrates can help his friends by giving the statistical data about 
arguments and by telling them how they ought to act in terms of this statistical 
knowledge. As quoted above, Socrates says that very few humans would come to the 
fore in a competition in wickedness. However, for Socrates, regarding arguments, 
the case is somewhat different than humans:  
[T29] All the same, arguments do not resemble people in that way (I was 
following your lead just now), but in the following way: when someone without 
expertise in arguments trusts an argument to be true, and then a little later thinks 
that it is false, sometimes when it is, sometimes when it isn’t, and when he does 
the same again with one argument after another. This applies particularly to those 
who have spent time dealing with the arguments used in disputation. As you 
know, they end up thinking that they have become very wise, and that they alone 
have understood that there is nothing sound or firm in any thing or in any 
argument, but that all things turn back and forth, exactly as if in the Euripus, and 
do not stay put for any time.364 
Socrates points out that the first-class arguments in a competition of badness are not 
very few, unlike the case of human qualities. We are therefore more likely to 
encounter first-class bad arguments, and hence we are more liable to make 
mistakes.365 If we lack expertise in arguments, then the odds for judging arguments 
incorrectly are higher than the odds for judging humans incorrectly.  
Therefore, since Socrates can neither improve his friends’ expertise in arguments nor 
tell them whether an argument is really bad, he can only help his friends by informing 
them about the realm of arguments. The statistical data states that many arguments 
are bad; hence we are more likely to fall for bad arguments than bad humans. If many 
arguments are bad, then we should be prepared only to trust few arguments. Socrates 
                                                          
364 Phd. 90b3-c6 Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 
ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ 
λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον 
αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ’ οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ 
ἕτερος· —καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ’ ὅτι 
τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν 
πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα 
ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. 
365 Rowe 1993, 212. 
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thus advises his friends to be careful and modest whilst making a judgment about the 
validity of an argument.366 
4.3.5 The Intellectual Vice of Antilogicians 
Let me now consider the qualities of bad arguments. Although Socrates does not 
make a detailed assessment of this issue, he seems to imply that bad arguments are 
not ‘sound and firm’.367 Now, the antilogicians think that there is no firm and sound 
argument; hence they become misologists. That is, antilogicians come to hate 
arguments, like a misanthropist who hates all humans by maintaining that there is 
nothing sound in anyone.368 
Antilogic is generally understood as ‘causing the same thing to be seen by the same 
people now as possessing one predicate and now possessing the opposite or 
contradictory predicate’.369 As claimed above, if we practice antilogic and believe its 
results, eventually we will become misologists. That said, practicing antilogic alone 
might not be an intellectual vice. Besides practicing antilogic, we need to assume 
that we are very wise, as we have discovered that there is no sound and firm 
argument. The problem arises out of dealing with arguments used in disputation and 
putting all our trust in such arguments.  
With regards to the passage in the Republic discussed above, antilogicians pursue 
the following procedure, which is an example of intellectual (or epistemic) vice: [1] 
convincing A by showing that P is true, [2] convincing A by showing that P is false, 
and [3] then convincing A there is no true and secure argument by repeated practicing 
of the first two steps.  
For Socrates, in the Republic, antilogicians seem to maintain a sort of moral 
scepticism, namely that we can never know whether a moral belief is true or false. 
By doing so, antilogicians make young guardians suspicious about what is right and 
                                                          
366 Sedley (1995, 17) notes that ‘in cooperative dialectic the main danger is not hasty 
disagreement, but hasty agreement’, and this sort of dialectic is described at Phd. 
101d.  
367 Phd. 90c3-4 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον. 
368 Phd. 89e2 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς. 
369 Kerferd 1961, 61. In the Phaedrus, ‘to speak on opposite sides (262c5 
ἀντιλέγουσιν)’ is defined with an example: ‘Whoever does this [sc. ἀντιλέγειν) 
artfully makes the same thing appear to the same people sometimes just and 
sometimes, when he prefers, unjust? (Phdr. 261c4-6).’  
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wrong regarding goodness and justice, according to the Republic argument. In the 
Phaedo, too, antilogicians make sound and firm arguments obsolete; therefore, not 
only does their attitude deprive themselves of truth and knowledge, but those who 
believe them also suffer from this deprivation.  
It is necessary to underline that antilogicians are “particularly (μάλιστα)” at risk, 
which indicates that antilogicians are not the only people vulnerable to misology. 
Those who are not antilogicians might also become misologists, though perhaps they 
are in less danger of misology. That is, some become antilogicians first, then thereby 
haters of argument. Others might become haters of arguments even if they do not 
frequently encounter antilogical arguments. The non-antilogicians might still 
become misologists, as the bad arguments – including antilogical arguments, but also 
those not limited to them – are in the majority, because one has to possess expertise 
in arguments to discern bad arguments.  
Now, I would like to note that antilogicians do not care about the truth; hence they 
would not think that the deprivation of truth and knowledge is a great misfortune. 
That is, antilogicians do not care about truth because they do not believe that there 
are good arguments and disregard looking for good arguments. Socrates and his 
friends, on the contrary, care about the truth, and this is the reason why Phaedo and 
others have fallen into a state of epistemic despair once they have heard the 
interlocutors’ objections to Socrates’ argument.370 Socrates thus aims to encourage 
those who care for truth and who are neither antilogicians nor practicing antilogic.  
4.3.6 Epistemic Blame, Arrogance and Modesty 
Socrates lastly explores the outcome of misology and the attitude of misologists 
towards argument, truth and knowledge:  
[T30] ‘Now, Phaedo,’ he said, ‘it would be a lamentable fate if there really were 
some true and firm argument that could be understood, and (a) yet from 
associating with arguments of another sort – the very same ones seeming true at 
some times but not at others – someone were to blame not himself or his own 
lack of expertise, (b) but instead because of his agitation were to end up gratefully 
transferring the blame from himself to the arguments, and from that point to spend 
                                                          
370 Perhaps except Aeschines of Sphettus. Nails (2002, 5-6) reports that Aeschines is 
traditionally supposed to be a rhetorician and ‘dubbed as a sophist in Lysias’ speech’.   
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the rest of his life hating and belittling arguments, deprived of both truth and 
knowledge about things.’371 
Let me begin by making a distinction between antilogicians and quasi-antilogicians, 
a distinction which, I submit, is implied above. I think that antilogicians, not 
unexpectedly, practice antilogic, they do not care about discovering the truth, and 
they convince others that sound and firm arguments do not exist. Quasi-antilogicians, 
I argue, desire to attain knowledge and the truth, yet they are deprived of them 
because of their lack of expertise, or deal with arguments used in disputations, and 
put their trust in antilogicians and their arguments. I thus suggest that the one (section 
(a) above) experiencing agitation is a quasi-antilogician while the other (section (b) 
above) who hates and belittles arguments is an antilogician, and thus already a 
misologist. 
How can we intercept the transition from the quasi-antilogician stage to the 
antilogician stage? Firstly, we ought to blame ourselves (or hold ourselves 
responsible) and our lack of expertise in arguments, if we fail to find a sound and 
firm argument. Secondly, we must stop spending time with antilogicians themselves 
or with their arguments. Next, we should start dealing with some other sort of 
argument and follow a different method. Taking these steps would reduce the 
likelihood of becoming a misologist, which is due to engaging in antilogic without 
being an antilogician as such. Socrates’ friends, I submit, have already taken these 
two steps. However, antilogic is not the only route to misology. 
As mentioned above, antilogicians consider themselves very wise. However, this is 
a false impression, for antilogicians should blame their lack of expertise instead of 
their arguments. That is, antilogicians misjudge the object of epistemic blame. 
Antilogicians incorrectly assume that only they understand that there is no sound and 
firm argument; hence they incorrectly consider themselves very wise.  
Socrates diverges from antilogicians regarding his position towards self-wisdom and 
self-trust. Unlike antilogicians, Socrates does not claim to be very wise in the 
                                                          
371  Phd. 90c8-d7 Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος 
ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι 
τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ 
ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος 
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε 




Phaedo.372 Nor is Socrates totally sure whether he has practiced philosophy 
correctly.373 Then antilogicians are egotistical, as they think that they are very wise 
and have discovered the truth about both things and arguments. However, 
antilogicians, for Socrates, are neither wise nor experts.  
The reader should be inclined to see Socrates as an expert thanks to his arguments. 
Socrates himself does not voice his expertise in arguments, although Socrates comes 
across as having better arguments. Moreover, Socrates is silent about his expertise 
in arguments and wisdom. Besides, Socrates is modest regarding the epistemic status 
of his arguments. As I have often stressed, once Socrates has completed the last proof 
of the immortality of the soul at the Phaedo 107b-c, Simmias decides to keep some 
doubt in his mind. Socrates, too, encourages Simmias and advises all his friends to 
consider the arguments more clearly and to analyse them well enough.  
4.4 Conclusion  
Let me remind the readers of my interpretative framework of Plato’s Phaedo. I argue 
that the dialogue has two levels. One consists of Socrates’ arguments and 
demonstrations (first order investigations), while the other contains his reflections 
on the method of philosophical argument (the metaphilosophical component). This 
dissertation focuses on the latter component and this chapter explores the 
contribution of the argument against misology and antilogic to offer new aspects of 
the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical component.  
One of the most significant results to emerge from my analysis of the misology 
argument is that Plato offers some epistemic norms for dealing with arguments. I 
suggest that the misology argument is neither a digression nor an interlude, but the 
argument plays an indispensable part in the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical aim, 
namely providing the correct norms of philosophical argument. As I have stressed 
earlier, in addition to exploring the proofs of the immortality of the soul, a theory of 
causation and the method of inquiry etc., Socrates aims at bestowing on his friends 
the correct epistemic norms governing philosophical inquiry/conversation.  
                                                          
372 It is tempting to recall Socrates’ disawoval of knowledge (or wisdom) in the 
Apology 20d-23b. See also Euthphr. 5a3-c8, 15c11-16a4; Charmides 165b5-c1, 
166c7-d6; Laches 186b8-187a8, 200e1-2; Lysias 212a4-7, 223b4-8; Gorg. 509c4-7. 
373 Phd. 69d4-6.  
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To this end, I investigate the reason for the state of epistemic despair that Socrates’ 
friends have fallen into. The results of my investigation show that one of the aims of 
the misology argument is to eliminate the fear that there is no sound and steady 
argument. I argue that the lack of expertise leads to this epistemic fear, yet once we 
come to possess expertise in arguments, we would realize that our fears are quite 
groundless. Next, by examining the relationship between misanthropy and misology, 
I suggest that without possessing expertise we ought not to put all our trust in humans 
or in arguments.  Rather, if we are to escape from becoming misologists and to attain 
expertise in arguments, we should follow the norms governed by epistemic modesty. 
It is now possible to state that epistemic modesty and carefulness are two epistemic 
norms that would help us to conduct successful philosophical conversation/inquiry. 
This analysis has also provided a deeper insight into the relationship between 
antilogic and misology. Although antilogic increases the risk of becoming 
misologists, ruling it out alone might not be sufficient to escape from misology. If 
we lack expertise in arguments, not only should we stay away from antilogic 
(because we might be deceived into believing the results of antilogic), but we also 
should not put all our trust in argument (because we might be mistaken due to our 
lack of expertise). 
Now, I would like to conclude this chapter by considering a possible objection to my 
reading. Socrates has a right to put all his trust in an argument, such as the 
immortality of the soul, even though he has not been able to prove it completely. 
This is because Socrates is an epistemic authority and his epistemic modesty is only 
a pedagogical tool by which he encourages his interlocutors to search for themselves.  
I submit that Socrates’ epistemic modesty is a pedagogical tool. Besides, I argue that 
epistemic modesty plays a key role in the correct practice of philosophers. In the rest 
of my conclusion, I review a recent article written by Baima (2015), who argues that 
the Socrates of the Phaedo is an epistemic authority and is speaking from the 
perspective of a philosopher ruler of Plato’s Republic. By criticizing Baima’s 
reading, I will try to support my own reading.  
Let me begin with explaining Baima’s reading briefly. Baima suggests that ‘Socrates 
is a fully accomplished philosopher’, he can thus rightly judge whether he should 
pursue the truth about the immortality of the soul or he should prefer living well at 
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the expense of the pursuit of knowledge.374 His interlocutors, on the contrary, are not 
“epistemic authorities”, as they both lack “the philosophical expertise” of Socrates 
and their epistemic dispositions are not stable.375  
Drawing on the philosopher of the Republic, who is the only person allowed to lie 
for the benefit of non-philosophers, Baima claims that the Socrates of the Phaedo is 
a similar epistemic authority; hence he can follow a probable falsehood (or an 
incomplete argument), namely, the soul is immortal.376 However, Simmias and 
Cebes, as they lack the philosophical skill, should not believe in an incomplete 
argument, because it is so risky for them that they might become “self-deceivers” or 
“wishful thinkers”.377 The interlocutors thus should follow the philosophical path, 
i.e. they should not put all their trust in a probable falsehood. Simmias and Cebes 
should believe in the immortality of the soul, as this belief makes them value the soul 
over the body. They nonetheless should try to find better arguments in support of the 
soul’s immortality. 
In addition, by drawing on the education of guardians in the Republic, Baima argues 
that ‘developing skill in arguments before loving the truth is dangerous’ and that the 
misology argument, too, emphasizes that we need to love the truth first.378 Although 
Baima’s stress on the role played by loving the truth is accurate and fitting, the 
misology argument’s target, as suggested above, is to eliminate the epistemic fear of 
those who love the truth. As I have also argued, antilogicians would not be agitated 
if they fail to find sound and firm arguments, for they have already stopped caring 
about knowledge and the truth. However, quasi-antilogicians, who love the truth, are 
agitated by their fear of the absence of sound and firm argument; hence they are 
afraid of failing to discover what they long for, namely truth and knowledge. 379 
Baima next draws our attention to the practical value of the belief that the soul is 
immortal. For Baima, this belief would motivate us to separate the soul from the 
body as much as possible and it would convince us to live a philosophical life. This 
                                                          
374 Baima 2015, 273. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid., 275-278.  
377 Ibid., 274. 
378 Ibid., 266-267. 
379 Phaedo does not say that we do not love the truth. Rather, he tells Echecrates that 
‘we were worried that we might be worthless as judges, or even that the very facts 
of the matter might merit doubt (Phd. 88c6-7)’. In this respect, it would be strange 
if they were worried about losing something that they neither care about nor love. 
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practical aspect, Baima suggests, is valuable for both Socrates and his friends.  
However, unlike Socrates, his friends should continue to look for a better exposition. 
Since Socrates’ interlocutors are not epistemic authorities, as Baima argues, they 
ought not to believe in an incomplete argument and depart from the way of 
philosophy (which is to care for truth). That is, instead of firmly believing a probable 
falsehood, Socrates’ friends must discover a complete demonstration about the 
immortality of the soul.380  
In support of this interpretation, Baima provides in-depth analysis of the philosopher 
ruler and the noble lie discussed in the Republic 382-389, showing their relevance to 
the Socrates of the Phaedo and his belief about the immortality of the soul. For 
Baima, the Socrates of the Phaedo is allowed to believe that the soul is immortal 
even if he cannot show it properly, and believing in a falsehood is a right given to 
epistemic authorities only. Then Baima labels Socrates’ attitude as an example of 
epistemic vice.381 However, I think that Baima’s argument lacks support. Above all, 
Baima does not provide sufficient philosophical evidence to prove that the Socrates 
of the Phaedo is similar to the philosopher ruler of the Republic, apart from the 
argument that he aims to prove.382  
Now, let us accept Baima’s point about the similarity between the philosopher ruler 
of the Republic and the true philosopher of the Phaedo, namely Socrates. I do not 
think that the concept of epistemic authority is the best way to explain Socrates’ final 
comments on the immortality of the soul at the Phaedo 107b-c. Epistemic modesty, 
as I have been arguing up to this point, is a better way to explain Socrates’ final 
comments.  
In general, it seems problematic that epistemic authorities would say that they are 
believing in falsehoods. In other words, epistemic authorities, as defined by Baima, 
                                                          
380 Baima 2015, 274. 
381 ‘By “epistemically vicious”, I mean a process that commonly or likely results in 
falsehood such as believing on the basis of little evidence’ (ibid., 267 fn. 11)’. 
382 Interestingly, Baima (ibid., 277) himself seems to accept this, as he states that 
these examples [of the Republic and of the Phaedo] are not perfectly analogous. The 
other similarity according to Baima (ibid., 278) is as follows: ‘Plato’s conception of 
philosophers in the Republic is similar to his conception of philosophers in the 
Phaedo in the important respect that in both dialogues philosophers love truth, 
knowledge, and wisdom, and despise falsehood, wealth, and the things of the body 
(Republic III.416e–417a, V.474b–475c, VI.485c–d, VI.490a–c)’. Be that as it may, 




should be aware of their lie and persuade others that it is not a lie (or a falsehood) 
but the truth. Epistemic authorities would not really believe a lie because I cannot 
believe that X is F when I take X not to be F. In fact, the philosopher rulers of the 
Republic know that they are using a lie, though a noble one, yet Socrates really 
believes in the immortality of the soul and has no purpose to deceive his 
interlocutors. 
In the Phaedo, after the last proof for the immortality of the soul (Phd. 107b-c), 
Socrates neither says that his proofs are complete nor urges his friends to believe it 
without further ado. Socrates is pleased that his friends, particularly Simmias, are 
still wondering whether the argument they discussed really works. Rather, Socrates 
highlights the need of conducting further inquiry.383  
Although Socrates’ comment on the epistemic status of the last proof of the 
immortality of the soul might not say much about Socrates’ ability to pronounce on 
the soundness of the argument, it shows the reader that it is not our place to say that 
the argument works or does not work. In addition, Socrates’ comment indicates that 
Socrates considers his interlocutors/friends epistemic peers and believes that they 
are capable of finding more support for the argument. In this respect, Socrates does 
not regard himself as an epistemic authority, who firmly trusts his arguments on the 
basis of little evidence and strays away from the philosophical path.  
From a metaphilosophical and meta-dialogical perspective, moreover, Plato 
emphasizes the importance of epistemic modesty in philosophical 
inquiry/conversation. He thus portrays Socrates as embracing the norms governed 
by epistemic modesty. To this end, Plato furnishes Socrates with strong arguments 
(at least his interlocutors are eventually persuaded to a certain degree), and at the 
same time presents Socrates to the reader as being careful and modest regarding the 
                                                          
383 One of my examiners noted that Socrates does not obviously say that he himself 
shares Simmias’ doubts. If I take it right, my examiner’s point is that Socrates 
believes that his demonstration for the immortality of the soul is complete, but 
Simmias (who shows some symptoms of misology) and others should enquire 
further. In a sense, Socrates is not an epistemic tyrant or dictator, as it were, who 
would bar others from philosophical inquiry. However, we need to observe that 
neither does Socrates tell Simmias that he has discovered the most sound and firm 
argument. In this respect, we might also think that Socrates is sharing Simmias’ 
doubts, though perhaps to a lesser degree. I examined the relevant passage (Phd. 
107b-d) in Chapter 1. 
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truth of his arguments. This portrayal is presumably a prescription for readers about 



















Chapter 5: Socrates’ Second-Sailing 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have suggested that metaphilosophy is a key component 
of the Phaedo, in addition to first order investigations, as with the nature of the soul 
and causation, for instance. I argue that philosophical humility is of great value to 
Plato’s metaphilosophy in the Phaedo. In Chapter 4, I have pointed out that if we do 
not have expertise in arguments, we should not put all our trust in arguments and that 
Plato portrays Socrates, who has expertise in arguments, as following the epistemic 
norms governed by epistemic modesty. Plato’s portrayal of Socrates thus emphasizes 
the importance of epistemic modesty and carefulness, even though we might have 
expertise in arguments.  
In this chapter, I explore the autobiography of Socrates. I basically divide Socrates’ 
autobiography into two parts, namely the pre-second-sailing phase and the second-
sailing phase. In his autobiography, Socrates begins with mentioning his desire to 
find an explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. In the pre-second-sailing 
phase, Socrates engages with natural science and Anaxagoras’ philosophy. Socrates 
then goes for the second-sailing once he failed to discover teleological cause. As his 
attempt to find teleological cause was unsuccessful, he tries again in a different way, 
namely the second-sailing, to find another explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-
to-be.  
Firstly, the second-sailing is generally taken as inferior to the first-sailing. Most 
scholars assume that the second-sailing analogy refers to taking to the oars in the 
absence of a wind while the so-called first-sailing refers to sailing with wind. 
Although I do not categorically reject the difference between the first and the second-
sailing, I also suggest that we need to take purpose-relativeness of Socrates’ choice 
into account. That is, sailing with the wind, even with the favourable wind, does not 
need to be the best in every respect, for taking the oars can sometimes be the better 
and more feasible option. Then purpose-relativeness should be a concern to better 
understand the nature of second-sailing. 
Secondly, I subscribe to the view that Socrates does not change his philosophical 
goal in his second-sailing, but adopts a new method to attain the same goal, namely 
a theory of causation. As we shall see, Socrates needs a theory of causation to prove 
the immortality and imperishability of the soul. By examining the relevant section 
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on the Anaxagorean notion of intelligence (nous), I show that there are philosophical 
reasons to maintain that Socrates is not only attracted to the notion nous, as it explains 
in terms of what is best (the teleological aitia). 384  Besides, Socrates is attracted to 
the mind’s power of explaining causation universally.  
In this respect, I argue that Socrates’ second-sailing was partially successful as he 
discovered a universal theory of causation, namely the theory of Forms. This theory 
fulfils the notion of universality, as it can explain all natural and mental phenomena, 
although Socrates is still willing to learn or discover the teleological aitia. For now, 
however, Socrates is partly satisfied with the theory of Forms, for by using this 
theory he was able to persuade his friends that the soul is immortal. 
Thirdly, I offer that second-sailing is not inferior to the first-sailing in every respect. 
Although the second-sailing refers to a second attempt and might be worse in some 
respects, its association with the first-sailing should be read from the perspective of 
its purpose. That is, a ship which sets its destination in the second-sailing is not 
aiming at something worse or different than the primary preference. Rather, I argue 
that the second-sailing involves a different set of skills. 
Fourthly, I argue that the method of the second-sailing is the hypothetical method 
and its goal is to discover a theory of causation. I also show that the second-sailing 
is not a mere transitional phase from the immature to mature practice of philosophy. 
That is, whatever metaphilosophy comes with the second-sailing automatically 
transfers to the mature stage. The tentativeness implied by the hypothetical method, 
I conclude, is in line with philosophical humility, which invites us to be careful 
whilst putting trust in arguments. This tentativeness also allows us to take a more 
flexible, cautious and open-minded stance before disagreements 
                                                          
384 Throughout this chapter, I will either leave aitia, aition and aitiai as untranslated 
or render them freely, such as reason, explanation or cause. It is a great difficulty to 
pin down a conclusive rendering. For my purposes, I need not to be precise, as 
nothing I argue hangs on what aitia means. Rather, I scrutinize the way in which 
Socrates searched for aitia. For seminal works on this issue see Vlastos 1969 (aitia 
has both a logical and metaphysical function); Sedley 1998 (τό αἴτιον is the thing 
responsible for X, which has logical or quasi-logical relation to the effect); Annas 
1982 (forms as aitiai are explanations, though Plato’s original puzzlement is about 
causal explanation); Frede 1987 (Plato consciously uses aition for referring to cause 
and is an entity, while he refers to aitia as an account of aition, hence it is the reason 
or the explanation).  
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All in all, the nature of second-sailing confirms that Socrates has not abandoned 
philosophical humility, even during his philosophical maturity, although he has the 
proper expertise. Besides, it is possible that Socrates’ expertise in its current form 
does not allow him to claim certainty about the theory of Forms and the immortality 
of the soul; hence he encourages his friends to develop his philosophical method and 
attain certainty in these matters.  
5.2 The Meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς  
To understand Plato’s ideas on philosophical method, we may begin by examining 
the meaning of the second-sailing (δεύτερος πλοῦς). Scholars have defended two 
different readings until now. The first of these, the ironical reading, does not offer 
much regarding the epistemology of the second-sailing, for no informative role is 
given to the analogy. For adherents of this view, Socrates does not think that his 
method, which is the theory of Forms, is a ‘makeshift’ or ‘a last resort’, but Socrates 
intentionally aims to downgrade the strength of the second-sailing by comparing it 
ironically with natural science. Nothing hangs on what the meaning of the second-
sailing analogy is, as Socrates is not serious and its meaning does not positively 
contribute to understanding the nature of Socrates’ method.385   
The serious reading, on the contrary, offers a variety of interpretations regarding the 
meaning of the second-sailing and its influence on understanding the strength of 
Socrates’ method. Scholars have proposed three alternatives on the subject of the 
second-sailing. It is either the method of hypothesis, or the theory of Forms (or 
explanations in terms of formal causes), or indirect knowledge. The first alternative 
claims that Socrates’ second-sailing is the second-best since it lacks an 
unhypothetical principle, ‘the unconditioned supremacy of ‘the Good’’ of the 
dialectic in the Republic VI.386 That is, the hypothetical method is the second-best, 
                                                          
385 Burnet 1911, 108. 
386 Rowe (1992, 95) argues that ‘the Phaedo does not accord any special place to the 
Form of the Good; where it is mentioned, it is simply listed along with others (100b5-
7, 75c9-d3, 76d8-9; cf. 78d3-4)’. However, Archer-Hind (1883, 36) remarks that ‘τὸ 
βέλτιστον [the highest Good] is postulated as the ultimate αἰτία [cause], to which all 
other causes are merely subsidiary’. I am inclined to agree with the former view by 
assuming that if Plato had already in mind the highest Good, we would expect him 
to make a less ambiguous mentioning of the highest Good. I also think that it is much 
safer to assume that Plato might have a glimpse of the highest Good in the Phaedo, 




as it is tentative and falls short of giving an explanation in terms of an unhypothetical 
principle.387  
Those who interpret the second-sailing as the theory of Forms (or the explanation of 
things in terms of formal causes) claim that it is inferior to teleological explanation. 
According to this view, since Socrates was deprived of an explanation in terms of 
what is best, he has resorted to ‘the realm of Forms’.388 The reading of indirect 
knowledge points out that Socrates’ method is the second-best since it refers to the 
indirect grasp of Forms (or things themselves). In other words, having failed to 
apprehend Forms directly, Socrates has had recourse to ‘concepts’, which are either 
formed through ‘the observation of phenomena’ or used ‘in place of forms 
themselves’.389 
Here, I am not going to challenge each of these interpretations about the second-
sailing, rather I focus on their common feature, notwithstanding the divergence of 
details in the explanations. As we have seen, most of the rival interpretations read 
δεύτερος πλοῦς as the second-best in comparison with the method or explanation that 
they are offering as πρῶτος πλοῦς, i.e. the best. However, the relationship between 
the literal and metaphorical sense of δεύτερος πλοῦς has not attracted much attention. 
I therefore submit that most scholars have adopted the inferiority thesis without 
sufficient justification, save for Martinelli Tempesta (2003).  
5.2.1 Some Ancient Testimonies on δεύτερος πλοῦς 
The LSJ Greek Lexicon refers to Menander the Comic Poet for a definition of 
δεύτερος πλοῦς and most scholars have hitherto adopted this definition. As a nautical 
metaphor, πρῶτος πλοῦς is considered as the best navigation, which is using sails in 
a favourable wind. δεύτερος πλοῦς is regarded as the second-best option, which is 
taking the oars, and is used when the wind fails. As the second-sailing seems to refer 
                                                          
387 Goodrich 1903,382-383. See also Scott 2005, 204; Murphy 1936, 46. 
388 Rose 1966, 466-467.  
389 Gaye 1901, 249 and Bluck 1957, 24-25 respectively. See also Hackforth 1955, 
138-139. More recently, Benson (2015, 110-111) argues that since a philosopher 
cannot completely separate the soul from the body during life, he cannot directly 
view Forms. Therefore, grasping Forms indirectly in the embodied state is the 
second-best to the direct view of Forms. As we cannot view Forms directly, Socrates 
needs to find another approach through which we can understand them. I am thus 
inclined to accept that Socrates’ study of things in logoi implies indirectness, yet the 




to the second-best option, it is assumed that the second-sailing implies inferiority.390 
Allow me to quote the two versions of  a fragment of Menander:  
[T31] The second-sailing perhaps means if someone fails [to sail] with a fair 
wind, he sails by taking to the oars.391 
[T32] The second-sailing perhaps means if someone fails [to sail] at first, he sails 
by taking to the oars.392 
A significant analysis on the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς was conducted by Martinelli 
Tempesta (2003). In his study, Martinelli Tempesta reviews the ancient literature 
and finds an overwhelming evidence for the second-best reading. Martinelli 
Tempesta reported that:  
(a) Accepting some ancient testimonies, (1) δεύτερος πλοῦς must be understood, 
as the use of rowing in navigation in case the wind fails; it is therefore a slower 
and more tiring navigation to which we must turn as a last resort in the absence 
of better alternative, (2) others regarded δεύτερος πλοῦς as an alternative route, 
long and difficult, which nevertheless reaches its aim. 
(b) Regarding the testimony of other ancient sources, the proverb refers to a safer 
and less risky navigation; the metaphorical expression second-sailing thus would 
have been connected to the image of the raft (σχεδία) proposed by Simmias to 
Phd. 85c-d, and particularly would allude to the λόγος θεῖος of Phd. 85d4. 393 
                                                          
390 Sedley (2004, 10) suggests that we need to take δεύτερος πλοῦς simply as second 
voyage, though he does not argue for this in detail.  
391 Fragmenta Fragment 241 δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστι δήπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις 
οὐρίου, κώπαισι πλεῖν. 
392 Thrasyleon Fragment 2 ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστι δήπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις 
πρῶτον, ἐν κώπαισι πλεῖν. 
393 According to Schol. in Phd. 99c and Schol. in Plt. 300c, the proverb δεύτερος 
πλοῦς means a “safer (ἀσφαλῶς)” course.  Burnet (1911, 108) claims that the second 
sailing refers to ‘a less adventurous course’. Damascius (Ph. I. 416) argues that ‘it is 
easier and simpler to assume and posit prototypes as the causes of sensible 
things…than it is to understand the final cause’. In the previous section (Ph. I. 415), 
Damascius suggests that ‘the ‘alternative course [the second sailing]’ is after the final 
cause the exemplary cause’. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 107) argues that Damascius 
relates the image of the raft to that of the second navigation, inextricably as a second-
best in the scope of an axiological scale, not as a safe and successive navigation to a 
first, that is, Damascius does not refer to a chronological scale. As Martinelli 
Tempesta suggests, for Damascius the risky navigation is the second sailing, not the 
first sailing. This is because Damascius says that ‘it [the dialectical argument] is 
‘human’ and therefore ‘risky’ and comparable to a ‘raft’, inasmuch as it does not 
offer the best crossing possible (In. Ph. 391)’. Damascius thus does not think that 




(c) The expression would allude to a drastic change in the route or navigation, 
and someone, without considering the ancient tradition, understood it as a 
passage indicating a change from the coastal navigation (the method of 
physiologists) to that of deep-sea (Platonic-Socratic method), which is more 
audacious.394 
Martinelli Tempesta’s comprehensive philological analysis concluded that it is not 
possible to accept those interpretations that consider the second-sailing safer than the 
first one since the meaning of the proverb δεύτερος πλοῦς cannot be this. The 
conceptual structure that the proverb implies, for Martinelli Tempesta, is the 
following: there must be a “first” method to reach a goal (the discovery of the cause 
of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be), which would be the optimum, but because we 
run into insurmountable limitations, we must be satisfied with a fall-back solution to 
try to reach the goal, as far as possible.395 
Here, I am not going to delve into a further philological analysis of δεύτερος πλοῦς. 
The study by Martinelli Tempesta (2003) offers the most comprehensive analysis of 
δεύτερος πλοῦς, and its results should be welcomed. I generally agree with his 
observation: 
The proverb is always used to denote a second-best. It is always a fall-back 
solution, which is used in the absence of a better one; even when the second-best 
is an expedient chronologically 'second' to a previous action, which proved to be 
a failure, it is still something that the subject considers axiologically inferior. The 
pattern is constant: the first-sailing is optimum, it would be nice to get it, but since 
it is impossible, or it happens rarely, we must be satisfied with a second-best. The 
                                                          
394 Martinelli Tempesta 2003, 92-93. See also ibid., 102. 
395 Ibid., 112. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 99-100) stresses that in the scholia on 
Plato, it is not explicitly mentioned that ‘the first voyage is clearly a voyage helped 
by a fair wind, while the second is voyage in which sailors rely on rowing’, in 
contrast to the Menander fragments. Martinelli Tempesta points out that the scholia 
on Plato only say that after the failure of the first sailing, one starts the second sailing, 
which can mean many things, for instance, a route better studied, a voyage better 
prepared, using better equipment, etc. There can be several possible reasons for 
failure, and entrusting with a favourable wind in the first time is only one of the 
several reasons. Therefore, in the absence of a precise indication of this in the text, 
the hypothesis above in bold seems rather risky. Besides, Martinelli Tempesta (ibid.) 
observes that the editor, who is well-informed on the passage of Menander in which 
the proverb occurs, omits precisely the section that implies the second-best reading. 
An operation of this kind, for Martinelli Tempesta, seems to presuppose a precise 
interpretative aim and it is very probable that the editor of the scholium considers 
the explanation of Menander incompatible with his own. 
130 
 
idea of security can also exist, but it is always secondary to the second-best and 
it is never conveyed by the proverbial tradition...396  
Although one has little choice other than accepting the results of Martinelli 
Tempesta’s philological analysis, I scrutinize whether the axiological relationship 
between the first and second-sailing is based on only a single value. In other words, 
I mostly agree with Martinelli Tempesta’s hypothesis, albeit with an important 
qualification, namely purpose-relativeness. In this respect, it is puzzling that many 
commentators seem to assume that preferring one course of action over another one 
makes the former option better in every respect. Goodness or efficiency, I submit, 
may be the ultimate purpose of our choices, yet we also need to ask which things are 
good (or make something good) and how good they are (or how they make 
something good). 
To illustrate, we might prefer to take a cab to go to dinner not because it is the better 
option without any qualification, but because it, for instance, is faster than using 
public transport. If we were to call this the best option, we should have been 
assuming that speed is the value (hence it makes our choice better by enabling us to 
arrive quickly). Under different conditions, however, taking a cab might be a safer 
option, if, for instance, we are returning home late. In this case, the safety is our 
value (hence it makes our choice better by saving us from the dangers of the night).  
Imagine now that if we do not find a cab or do not have enough money to afford it, 
we have no other choice than using public transport, or perhaps walking. However, 
the reason why we prefer to take a cab at first depends on our initial purpose (and 
value-judgement) and the reasons of our failure of not taking a cab depend on the 
circumstances (e.g. we have no money, no cab is available, etc.). Let me call this sort 
of axiology “the multi-dimensional second-best reading”, in contrast to “the one-
dimensional second-best reading”, which assumes that the first-sailing is better 
without considering purpose-relativeness. 
Before proceeding to examine the second-sailing, I would like to review an earlier 
passage which some commentators relate to the second-sailing passage.397 In the 
relevant section, Socrates encourages his interlocutors to voice their objections to 
the affinity argument, as his interlocutors seem reluctant to Socrates. Before 
                                                          
396 Martinelli Tempesta 2003, 108.  
397 E.g. Kuperus 2007,9; Huby 1959.  
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presenting his counterargument, Simmias comments on the nature of human 
knowledge as follows: 398   
[T33] Well, I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that knowing the clear truth 
about things like this in our present life is either impossible or something 
extremely difficult, but that all the same not testing from every angle what is said 
about them, refusing to give up until one is exhausted from considering it in every 
way, is the mark of an extremely feeble sort of man. Because concerning them 
one ought surely to achieve one of the following: either to learn or discover how 
things are, or, if it is impossible to do that, at least to take the best human 
proposition – the hardest one to disprove – and to ride on that as if one were 
taking one’s chances on a raft, and to sail through life in that way, unless one 
could get through the journey with more safety and less precariousness on a more 
solid vehicle, some divine proposition. 399 
These scholars thus associate Simmias’ thoughts above, about learning and 
discovering, with Socrates’ following words: ‘I was denied it [the truth is about that 
sort of cause that is good and binding] and haven’t been able either to find it myself 
or to learn it from someone else’.400 It is then suggested that Socrates’ second-sailing 
is to take hold of the option mentioned by Simmias above, i.e. adopting the best 
logos. 401  I think, however, that although Socrates states that his answer to the aitia-
question is safer (e.g. it is because of the Beautiful that all beautiful things are 
beautiful), he does not explicitly state whether the second-sailing itself is safer or 
more dangerous.402   
                                                          
398 Socrates tells Simmias that ‘maybe you’re right (Phd. 85e1-2)’. 
399 Phd. 85c1-d9 ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ  
σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι  ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι 
αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι 
πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός·δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ 
ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν 
γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου 
ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο 
ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, [ἢ] λόγου θείου τινός, 
διαπορευθῆναι. 
400 Phd. 99c8-9 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου 
μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην. 
401 Huby 1959, 13. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 100) states that the editor of the 
scholia seems to have the above quoted passage in mind when he explains the second 
sailing. For this reason, Martinelli Tempesta argues that the editor does not look at 
the immediate context for explaining the second journey, it thus seems to be derived 
from the wider context of the Phaedo, where Socrates repeatedly refers to the safest 
logos. 
402 See Phd. 100c9-d3, especially d8 ἀσφαλέστατον, safest.  The argument against 
argument aims at showing us a way to defy the risks of hating arguments. If the 
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That said, we need to notice that Socrates was afraid of suffering an intellectual 
blindness, as it were, and preventing this was a reason for the second-sailing. 403  That 
is, Socrates was afraid of becoming blind due to looking at the sun during the solar 
eclipse, and he suggested looking at ‘its [the sun’s] image in water or something of 
the kind’ in order to escape this dangerous and undesired effect, to become 
completely blinded.404  
In this respect, a reason for Socrates’ second-sailing is to save himself from 
blindness. There is a sense of safety stemming from the visual metaphor and this 
safety is integrated into the second-sailing analogy. That said, we cannot still say 
that the second-sailing is better without qualification just because it is safer. It is 
obvious that the second-sailing has some redeeming factor, as we go for the second-
sailing when the first one did not work out. The second is thus better at least insofar 
as it brings us to, or nearer to, the goal we wanted to attain.  
The second similarity of the words of Socrates and Simmias is that both allude to 
divinity. As quoted above, for Simmias, finding “some divine proposition”, which 
he calls “a more solid vehicle” than “the best human proposition”, and embarking on 
that divine proposition would allow us ‘to get through the journey with more safety 
and less precariousness’. Socrates, too, implies that he was looking for ‘divine 
might’,405 and he would be glad if he had succeeded to discover by himself or to 
learn from others. That is, nous as a principle ordering everything has pleased 
Socrates, which seems to possess divine might, and thus ‘it is good that intelligence 
should be cause of everything’.406  
As matters stand, Simmias thinks that a divine proposition endows us with more 
safety and less precariousness while Socrates’ second-sailing implies safety and 
                                                          
second sailing refers to the way in which Socrates deals with arguments, it might be 
thus considered as a safer journey, as Huby (1959, 12) also suggests.  
403 Sallis (1996, 41-42) emphasizes the significance of ‘an awareness of danger’, and 
adds that the second sailing indicates ‘an awakening to an ignorance intrinsic to 
oneself’. This ignorance is about the way in which one should inquire into things 
rather than ‘an ignorance with regards to this or that’.    
404 Phd. 99d4-e1. 
405 Phd. 99c2-3 δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν. As mentioned above, both Simmias and Socrates 
are talking about divinity. While Simmias refers to a divine logos, Socrates refers to 
nous. Sedley (1995, 19) remarks that the lack of divine account drives Simmias away 
from the search for certainty, and hence he is satisfied with probabilities. Socrates’ 
method, however, does not seem to make the compromises necessary to maintain its 
course.  
406 Phd. 97c2-4. 
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escaping danger of becoming blind.407  From the purpose-relative perspective, the 
second-sailing can be better with respect to a certain value (or purpose) while the 
first-sailing can be better with respect to another.408 While the first-sailing provides 
stability and more explanatory power, it is not feasible and poses the danger of 
intellectual blindness. The second-sailing offers safety but it is provisional and more 
laborious. 409 
5.2.2 A Possible Origin of the Strong (Traditional) Second-Best Reading 
A possible origin of the strong second-best reading (which I call the traditional 
reading) of δεύτερος πλοῦς might be Plato’s Statesman.410 By maintaining that the 
Statesman clearly implies the second-best course, one might argue that the use of 
δεύτερος πλοῦς in the Phaedo should indicate the same meaning. Concerning this 
                                                          
407 Another use of δεύτερος πλοῦς seems to underline the idea of danger and purpose-
relativeness too. In the Philebus, one of Socrates’ interlocutors, Protarchus, says ‘I 
am afraid that this is so. But while it is a great thing for the wise man to know 
everything, the second best (δεύτερος…πλοῦς) is not to be mistaken about oneself 
(19c1-c3)’. Note that “knowing oneself” is “the second-best” in the sense it will 
prevent one from falling into “universal confusion (20a3-4 τῶν…τὴν 
πάντων…ἀπορίαν)”. It seems, then, that there is a purpose-relative choice here, 
which results from the fear of universal confusion. Similarly, in his analysis of 
another occurrence of δεύτερος πλοῦς outside the Phaedo, Martinelli Tempesta 
(2003, 100-101) maintains that Aristotle (E.N. 1109a34), in fact, is not saying that 
the safest way to reach the middle (Aristotle’s so-called doctrine of the mean at 
Nicomachean Ethics 1106a26-b28 argues that each ethical virtue is a state 
intermediate between the state of excess and the state of deficiency) is to stay away 
from what is the opposite, but that it is difficult to fully reach the middle. One must 
be thus content to keep away from what is the most opposite, an action which 
Aristotle calls δεύτερος πλοῦς. In a sense, for Martinelli Tempesta (ibid.), as it is 
difficult to fully reach the middle, the second-best option is to stay away from the 
extremities, if we would like to become as virtuous as possible. Our purpose (or 
value) is to achieve the state of virtue, hence we act from the perspective of this 
purpose (or value). 
408 ‘The notion that the acquisition of truth can never be regarded as something 
absolute or definitive does not imply that there is no truth at all; rather, it suggests 
that truth manifests itself to man – at any rate to the degree that he is confined to the 
temporal dimension – as the “least refutable [Phaedo, 85c9-d1]” conclusion reached 
by the enquiry so far, and not as an irrefutable outcome beyond which there is 
nothing more to seek’ (Trabattoni 2016, 217). Trabattoni’s point is compatible with 
my claim that epistemic modesty suggests that we recognize the fallibilities of our 
cognitive abilities, rather than putting all our trust in an argument or suspending 
judgement. 
409 Freydberg 2013, 200. As suggested above, the idea of safety does not directly 
stem from the second sailing analogy, but from Socrates’ fear of becoming blinded.  
410 For instance, Hackforth 1955, 137. Rowe (1992, 90) also claims that ‘the phrase 




reading, I must admit that the Stateman passage seems to favour the strong second-
best reading, at least it is more explicit than the Phaedo, as the former refers to “the 
first choice (τὸ πρῶτόν)” and “the next rightest and finest (ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστ’ 
ἔχον ὡς δεύτερον)” of government.411 On the face of it, alluding to the Statesman is 
quite reasonable, for a Greek reader would easily notice the strong second-best 
connotation if its use in the Statesman is well-attested at that time. 
Now, in the relevant section of the Statesman, it is argued that the kingly man 
possesses wisdom and expert knowledge; hence he can amend the laws for the better. 
The kingly man is thus the best-choice for government, the next-best is to govern 
strictly with respect to the intelligent laws devised by the kingly man. The 
government of the kingly man is the best because ‘law could never accurately 
embrace what is best and most just (τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον)412 for all and 
always, and so prescribe what is best (τὸ βέλτιστον) always for everyone’.413  
Then it seems that good ruling comes from intelligence. If a city has a kingly man, 
it would be best as he can react to changing circumstances. In case of the absence of 
a kingly man, the city needs to rely on the intelligence embodied in the law. The 
intelligence encapsulated in the law, however, would only govern finely and justly 
inasmuch as the circumstances stand still. In this respect, the intelligent law is the 
second-best as it might fail to react to new situations: the intelligent law is limited 
time-wise and in scope. 
Therefore, there is need to pay heed to the possible connotation that the second-
sailing can be as good as the first-sailing inasmuch as the conditions do not change. 
The Statesman also mentions ‘for all’ and ‘for everyone’. This is not about a change 
of general conditions, but about special circumstances. Moreover, as noted above, 
Socrates has resorted to the second-sailing as he was not able to either learn ‘an 
explanation in terms of intelligence (nous) and according to what is best’ from 
someone else, or to find it by himself. Now, consider the difference between the 
intelligent king and the intelligent law concerning governing: it is possible that 
Socrates’ second-sailing can fail under new circumstances, for he cannot function as 
                                                          
411 Pol. 300e1-6. cf. 300c2 where δεύτερος πλοῦς is referring to the section discussed 
at present.  
412 Considering that ἄριστος can mean that best in any way, it can be taken, for 
instance, as the most useful. LSJ s.v. I.1. e.g. ἄριστον πόλει Euripides Fragment 194. 
413 Pol. 294a10-b3. 
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a man ‘making use of his intelligence’.414 That said, as far as it can explain corruption 
and generation, Socrates’ method is as good as the first choice, though he cannot be 
sure that it would work always and for all cases. 415   
The relationship between the Statesman and the Phaedo might be problematic, 
because it presumes that the meaning of the second-sailing can be lifted from the 
Statesman and simply transferred to the Phaedo. My aim, however, is not to bring 
material outside the Phaedo and support my reading. Rather, my point is that even 
if the material from the Statesman is used to understand the meaning of the second-
sailing in the Phaedo, as some scholars do, it can support both the one-dimensional 
and the multi-dimensional reading. 
In this respect (if I am right in stressing that there is no explicit evidence for the one-
dimensional second-best reading), some scholars must, on the one hand, have begun 
examining the second-sailing with the assumption that teleological explanation is 
superior to formal explanation.416 On the other hand, others must have believed that 
an explanation based on an unhypothetical principle is better than that which is based 
on a hypothesis.417 Then scholars seem to presuppose, before interpreting the second-
sailing passage, that either an explanation based on the unhypothetical principle or 
teleological explanation is superior to the sort of explanation discovered in the 
second-sailing.418  
                                                          
414 Phd. 98b8-9 ‘I was swept away from my marvellous expectations, for as I went 
on reading it [Anaxagoras’ book] I saw the man [Anaxagoras] making no use of his 
intelligence’. Here, Socrates seems to use ‘intelligence’ in two senses: “Anaxagoras’ 
intelligence” and “cosmic intelligence”. See Rowe 1993, 236. 
415 As frequently mentioned in this dissertation, the proofs for the immortality of soul 
and the theory of Forms need further analysis. For Socrates, his friends need to 
consider the hypotheses more clearly even if they find them trustworthy now. In a 
sense, then, the hypotheses are working well for now but they are not so good that 
we can stop searching for anything further. Besides, allow me to remind the readers 
of the criticism made in the Parmenides (which I will briefly discuss in my epilogue) 
against Socrates’ answer to the explanation of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, 
namely the theory of Forms. Like the city governed by the intelligent laws rather 
than the intelligent king, the theory of Forms will eventually fail to answer some 
questions, if it would not be amended, say, by an intelligent king. 
416 See e.g. Rose 1966. 
417 See e.g. Bluck 1955, App. VI. 
418 Benson (2015, 105-106) argues that the distinction is not between two methods 
of inquiry into the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, but the answers given 
to that question. That is, explaining in terms of formal causes is the second-best in 
comparison with teleological explanation.  
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As mentioned above, the fragments on which the traditional reading is based do not 
plainly imply that taking to the oars is completely inferior than sailing with the 
favourable wind. I also think that scholars generally overlook the concept of purpose-
relativeness: the method of δεύτερος πλοῦς, for Socrates, should be compatible with 
human cognitive abilities, and this method should endow us with the technique for 
discovering knowledge and the truth.419 Although the first-sailing provides a 
particular philosophical technique, it is not compatible with our abilities to know; 
hence it fails to grant a teleological explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
5.3 Δεύτερος πλοῦς in the Phaedo 
I argue that the multi-dimensional reading takes the various factors into account 
while the one-dimensional one only focuses on the axiological relationship without 
considering the possibility of various purposes inherent to Socrates’ goal. Since 
Socrates was afraid of becoming blind, he has preferred to follow a different course 
of action, namely his second-sailing. I have also suggested that it is not safe to 
assume that the second-sailing is worse in every respect, but that the second-sailing 
offers something more positive than the traditional reading of the second-sailing.  
To understand the more positive connotations of the second-sailing, I have also 
emphasized that we need to consider the idea of purpose-relativeness. In what 
follows, I show that the second-sailing is an inevitable reaction to those confusions 
and absurdities caused by the Anaxagorean philosophy and natural science. I will 
then argue that the method of the second-sailing signifies how Socrates practices 
philosophy (i.e. both the method of hypothesis and Socrates’ reflection on the right 
method of philosophical argument), rather than the outcome of this practice (i.e. the 
theory of Forms).420   
5.3.1 The pre-Second-sailing Period 
One of the most interesting passages of the Phaedo is the so-called autobiography 
section. In this section, Socrates relates to his interlocutors a part of his intellectual 
journey, which is about his study of the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 
                                                          
419 McCabe (1994, 29-30) notes that ‘our capacity and the structure of the world 
should coincide’. Since we cannot change how the world really is, we should 
discover the accurate and ‘real’ aspect in the world’s structure to which we have 
epistemic access. 
420 Benson 2015, 106.  
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Socrates’ studies had begun with the examination of ‘the sort of wisdom that they 
call research into nature’, and he concluded the first phase of his studies (the pre-
second-sailing phase) once he had finished his investigation of Anaxagoras’ 
philosophy.421 After that, Socrates has started his second-sailing in search of the 
cause.422  
During his studies on research into nature (or natural science), Socrates came to feel 
that he was ‘uniquely unqualified for this inquiry’. As evidence for his 
incompetence, Socrates says, ‘I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry with regard to 
the very things that, at least as I and others supposed, I had previously known clearly 
that I unlearned those very things that earlier I had thought I knew’.423 Next, Socrates 
tells his interlocutors why he stopped studying natural science:  
[T35] I can no longer persuade myself that by using this approach [of research 
into nature] I know why one comes to be, nor, in short, why anything else comes 
to be, or perishes, or is. Instead I throw together on impulse my own different 
kind of approach, and I don’t adopt this one at all.424 
After this, Socrates tells his interlocutors that he heard someone reading from 
Anaxagoras’ book and what he heard attracted his attention.425 Now, it is important 
to observe that when Socrates heard Anaxagoras, Socrates had already discovered a 
Socratic approach post-natural-scientists.426 I think that the present tense [throw 
                                                          
421 This story starts at Phd. 96c2 and ends at 99c6. 
422 Phd. 99c6ff. 
423 Phd. 96c3-6 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε   
ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι. The blindness metaphor re-emerges in 
the second sailing passage. On that occasion, Socrates was afraid of becoming 
‘wholly (Phd. 99e2 παντάπασι) blinded’.  
424 Phd. 97b3-7 οὐδέ γε δι’ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ’ 
ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι’ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον 
τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν’ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ 
προσίεμαι. 
425 Phd. 97b8. 
426 Rowe (1993, 234) argues that Ἀλλ’ ἀκούσας at Phd. 97b8 suggests that ‘we return 
to the past’. At the time of conversation presented in the Phaedo, Socrates is no 
longer interested in Anaxagoras’ philosophy, although Socrates might still be glad 
to learn explanations in terms of nous and what is best. Besides, at Phd. 96e5-7 Cebes 
asks Socrates ‘now what do you think about them [to become more numerous, to 
seem to be larger]?’, and Socrates replies to him ‘I’m no doubt a long way indeed 
from thinking that I know the cause of any of these’. Socrates cannot explain coming-
to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of natural science, yet he has a theory of his own 
(the theory of Forms), as we shall see later at Phd. 100-107, which Socrates 
discovered through his own approach. 
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together (φύρω) and adopt (προσίεμαι)] that Socrates uses whilst mentioning his own 
approach implies that Socrates is still following that approach.427 Socrates might 
have developed this approach since then, though in these early periods he may not 
have yet achieved a wholly systematic approach.428   
In this respect, Anaxagoras should have attracted Socrates partly because 
Anaxagoras seemed to offer a more systematic and comprehensive answer to the 
question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, unlike Socrates’ impulsively thrown 
together approach. Socrates’ expectation for a more comprehensive answer, I think, 
is one of the reasons Socrates thought that ‘I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of 
the cause of things who fitted my own intelligence’. 429 
Turning now to the second-sailing analogy, it seems that Socrates prefers to count 
on another method. Firstly, Socrates does not seem to have been able to learn that 
sort of cause from someone else or to find it by himself. 430 Secondly, Socrates still 
wishes to learn this particular sort of cause, hence he might prefer such a cause over 
what he discovered in his second-sailing; or perhaps he might combine his own 
theory of causation with the sort he expected to find in Anaxagoras’ philosophy.  
If Socrates still prefers to learn what is good and binding, that sort of theory of 
causation should offer some additional content and explanation to his own discovery. 
In brief, Socrates gave up searching for the teleological ideal, as neither Anaxagoras 
nor he himself could work out that ideal. Socrates therefore decided to follow a 
different kind of approach to the question of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
 
                                                          
427 Burnet (1911, 103) claims that Socrates’ words are ironical. However, Archer-
Hind (1883, 129) supports a mitigated reading: although Socrates does not think that 
his method is inferior to natural science, it is still incomplete and less comprehensive. 
428 Phd. 97b6-7. See εἰκῇ φύρω at b7. Gower (2008, 342) finely points out that 
calling it a jumble is an incentive for Socrates’s interlocutors ‘to reveal a systematic 
philosophical position’. This idea is stressed at Phd. 107b5-9, where Socrates 
encourages his interlocutors to follow the argument ‘as far as a human being can 
follow’, and ‘should this itself become clear, then you won’t seek anything further’.  
429 Phd. 97d6-7. 
430 Socrates says, ‘I would gladly become anyone’s pupil to learn just what the truth 
is about that sort of cause [what is good and binding] (Phd. 99c6-7 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς 
τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ’ ἂν γενοίμην)’. 
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5.3.2 Anaxagoras’ Nous 
I would like to begin by reviewing Anaxagoras’ philosophy, as presented in the 
Phaedo.431 Most of all, Anaxagoras, for Socrates, was peculiar because of his 
introduction of intelligence (nous), which orders everything and is the reason for 
everything.432 Although Socrates would later notice that Anaxagoras was no 
different than natural scientists in explaining things,433 in the beginning nous as the 
cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be seemed good to Socrates.434 But in what 
sense did nous seem good? Did the initial attraction stem from the fact that nous 
explained coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of what is best, or was it from the 
fact that nous could explain everything at once and universally, or was it both?435 
It is generally assumed that Socrates became fascinated by Anaxagoras’ idea of nous 
because it seemed to offer an explanation for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, in 
terms of what is best (teleological explanation).436 I do not oppose the idea that to 
explain a phenomenon by means of nous is teleological, since nous, for Socrates, is 
                                                          
431 It is hard to say whether Plato does justice to Anaxagoras’s philosophy. At any 
rate, whether Plato makes a charitable reading is not relevant for my purposes.  See 
Sedley 2008, 21-24 & 89-92. 
432 Phd. 97c1-2 νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος. 
433 Phd. 98b7-c2. 
434 Phd. 97c3. 
435 Here, I refer to a universal theory of explanation, such as Newton’s theory of 
gravitation which would explain ‘the phenomena of the heavens and of our seas by 
the force of gravity (Newton, Principia, General Scholium)’. However, Newton 
refuses to explain what it is that operates gravity in this way, yet he only expounds 
the laws by which gravity operates. On the contrary, we might imagine that Socrates 
would expect to learn why gravity operates in that way, and an explanation in terms 
of nous should tell us why it is best for gravity to operate in that way. 
436 For instance, Sedley (2007, 24) argues that ‘Anaxagoras is a creationist in a much 
stronger sense than Plato was prepared to recognize’ and that ‘Nous, like human 
farmers, makes the earth grow all kinds of things, but we may infer that it does so 
for the sake of the best things to emerge from it’. Sedley’s claim about creationism 
thus goes even beyond teleology. It is about whether a divine force plays a role in 
the becoming or maintaining of the universe. Graham (2009) suggests this is not the 
case, whether or not Anaxagoras goes in for teleology. In his review of Sedley’s 
work, Graham (2009, 426) states: ‘Anaxagoras is never explicit about a creator god; 
what he says is the nous started a vortex motion (B12). He hints that there was 
method in his action, and asserts that nous exercises control, but he also says that the 
revolution causes all the separations, as if the results were automatic.’ Caston (2017, 
28-29) suggests that ‘although nous does not, at least explicitly, provide the sort of 
specific, good-directed explanation that Socrates wished, Anaxagoras has not 
eliminated teleology even as he utilizes physical explanations.’ Here, my claim is 
not that we cannot discover the idea of teleology if we scrutinize Anaxagoras’ 
fragments. Rather, my point is that Socrates might be attracted to the idea of nous as 
it also explains phenomena universally, besides explaining them teleologically. 
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supposed to order ‘in whatever way is best’.437 Rather, my point is that Socrates was 
also attracted by the way in which nous can explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-
be, namely universally and systematically, in addition to how mind should explain, 
teleologically and in terms of what is best.438  
Here, I quote the passage where Socrates explains his attraction to Anaxagoras and 
why he was pleased with Anaxagoras’ idea of intelligence: 
[T36] However, one day I heard somebody reading from what he said was a book 
by Anaxagoras, and saying that it turns out to be intelligence that both orders 
things and is cause of everything. I was pleased with this cause, and it struck me 
that in a way it is good that intelligence should be cause of everything, and I 
supposed that, if this is the case, when intelligence is doing the ordering it orders 
everything and assigns each thing in whatever way is best.439 
As I suggested above, Socrates had already adopted his own method of inquiry and 
decided not to follow the approach of natural science before he heard someone 
reading from a book by Anaxagoras. Socrates should have initially thought that 
Anaxagoras would not follow the approach of natural science, as Socrates tells his 
interlocutors that ‘I don’t adopt this one [the approach of natural science] at all’.440  
Now, I believe that Socrates could not have heard from someone reading 
Anaxagoras’ book as to how nous is used to explain the ordering of everything and 
how each thing is assigned in terms of what is best. That is, Socrates did not know 
what Anaxagoras’ teleological explanations are at that point, and this is implied by 
the use of an indefinite clause, ‘in whatever way is best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ)’, since 
Socrates did not yet know the operations of intelligence.  
Socrates thus heard (1) that Anaxagoras uses nous to explain all coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be and (2) he thought that nous should explain everything in teleological 
terms. (2) is the result of Socrates’ own reflection, and he expects from Anaxagoras 
                                                          
437 Phd. 97c5-6. 
438 McCabe (2015, 88-89) finely remarks that ‘what Socrates hoped for was an 
entirely systematic and exhaustive account of the universe…Anaxagoras’ theory 
failed where Socrates’ answer succeeds,’ which is ‘its simplicity, its economy’.   
439 Phd. 97b7-c6 Ἀλλ’ ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου 
ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων 
αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν 
εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα 
πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· 
440 Phd. 96b3f. 
141 
 
an account in terms of (2). In fact, Socrates says ‘if this [(1)] is the case (εἰ τοῦθ’ 
οὕτως ἔχει)’, then intelligence should order in terms of what is best. Simply, Socrates 
first accepted the proposition that intelligence should order things and be the cause 
of everything, then he supposed that intelligence should order according to what is 
best.441  
If Socrates heard neither about a detailed reflection on the idea of teleology nor about 
particular teleological explanations, teleology could not be the only source of 
attraction. Otherwise, we need to assume that Socrates was interested in teleology, 
then he heard about a cause (i.e. nous), which Socrates thinks could teleologically 
explain things. Although it is not totally implausible that Socrates was interested in 
teleology before Anaxagoras, nothing in the relevant passage indicates that this is 
the case. We only know that Socrates adopted a method of his own and it is different 
than that of natural science.  
By saying this, I do not mean that an explanation according to nous, for Socrates, is 
not linked with an explanation in terms of what is best. For Socrates, nous should 
give teleological explanations. In fact, after reading the book itself, Socrates saw ‘the 
man [Anaxagoras] making no use of his intelligence and not laying any causes at its 
door with regard to ordering things’.442 Therefore, Socrates could not have heard 
about particular teleological explanations from Anaxagoras, since Anaxagoras, for 
Socrates, did not have any, but Socrates is fascinated by the simple fact that 
Anaxagoras offers intelligence to explain all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and in 
doing so Anaxagoras would consider what is best for each. 443  
5.3.3 The Search for Universal Explanation 
If I am right about the conditional relationship between nous and particular 
teleological explanations, we should look at another aspect of the idea of nous to 
                                                          
441 Mason (2013, 205) notes that Plato’s idea of nous in the Phaedo is more 
comprehensive than that of Anaxagoras. For Mason, Plato’s idea of nous is ‘the 
demand of a fundamentally moral universe that may serve as a model and basis for 
human morality and moral betterment’. 
442 Phd. 98b7-c1. 
443 It is also probable that Anaxagoras, for Socrates, gave a wrong account about 
nous. Desjardins (1988, 118) claims that the true account should take nous as a 
principle which orders everything in terms of what is best. In any case, this does not 
undermine my reading since Socrates could not have known the details of 
Anaxagoras’ nous before reading the whole book. 
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understand why it seemed good to Socrates that nous should be the cause of 
everything, besides nous being teleological. My answer is that an explanation in 
terms of nous is a universally applicable theory. What I mean by universal is that 
Anaxagoras’ idea of nous pertains to a single theory that is supposed to explain each 
and every coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
Consider now the following statements: [a] ‘when he [Anaxagoras] assigned the 
cause [intelligence] to each of them and in common to them all, he would also 
explain what was best for each, and the good common to them all (Phd. 98b1-3)’. 
[b] ‘It is because of intelligence that Socrates does everything that he does (Phd. 
98c3-4)’. The idea of explaining everything is in both quotations, and this, I think, 
implies that Socrates expects Anaxagoras to offer a universal theory of explanation 
that can account for each and every coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
As I shall discuss in detail further below, Socrates offers the Form-Cause Hypothesis 
to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.444 I submit that the Form-Cause 
Hypothesis satisfies the epistemological requirement that Socrates discovered during 
his study of Anaxagoras’ idea of nous. The theory of Forms can account for how 
each thing (e.g. a flower) comes to have a particular attribute (e.g. being beautiful): 
‘it is because of a Beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful (100d7-8)’.445  
It is true that the form of Beautiful does not explain why a large thing is large. 
However, the generic Form-Cause Hypothesis fulfils the epistemological 
                                                          
444 Scholars offer two alternative readings for Socrates’ initial hypothesis which he 
appeals to later in the dialogue: [1] the Form-Hypothesis, and [2] the Form-Reason 
Hypothesis. The latter is defended by Gallop (1975, 179-182): (i) ‘hypothesizing that 
beautiful, good, large, and other Forms exist [100b5-7]’ and (ii) ‘particular things 
are beautiful, large, etc. because they participate in corresponding Forms’ is ‘the 
Form-Reason Hypothesis’ as a whole, and this is Socrates’ initial hypothesis. The 
former is adopted by Benson (2015, 195): ‘the answer to the original question—that 
is, the aitia thesis— is obtained from the Form-Hypothesis, or the being of Forms. 
That is, for Benson, Socrates’ aitia thesis ‘(the F itself is the aitia of x’s being F)’ 
agrees with his Form-Hypothesis, and hence…the Form-Hypothesis has already 
been used at least twice, namely in Socrates’ defence speech (Phd. 65d3-66e4) and 
in the recollection argument (Phd. 72e3-78b3)’. However, neither of these cases can 
be considered as a proper application of the method of hypothesis. In this respect, I 
presume that the search of aitia of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is the first proper 
application of the Form-hypothesis. Then I think that the Form-Cause hypothesis 
(the conjunction of ‘Forms exist, which are objects of knowledge’ and ‘Forms are 
causes of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be’) is a new hypothesis, through which 
Socrates aims at explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
445 Phd. 100d7-8. 
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commitment: it is because of the Form of F that all F-things are F (the safe-
answer).446 This is a single principle that explains everything. Even though Socrates 
later replaces the safe-answer with the safe-and-subtler answer, this second answer 
also offers a universally applicable explanation: ‘x is [odd] because, being G [trio], 
it must participate in Γ [the Form of three]; and since Γ entails Φ [oddness], x must 
also participate in Φ, and hence x must be F’.447 
To sum up, Socrates was attracted by the idea of nous both as a teleological cause 
and as a universally applicable theory. The idea of universality is another source of 
appeal, besides Socrates’ attraction to the teleology in Anaxagoras’ idea of nous.448 
Although Socrates did not learn or discover how teleology works exactly, he is 
attracted by the teleological ideal. That is, Socrates did not exactly know how a 
teleological cause should operate before reflecting on Anaxagoras’s philosophy in 
detail, and even after reading the book Socrates failed to find a theory of causation 
based on the teleological ideal.  
As suggested above, the idea of nous was attractive because it provides both a 
teleological ideal and a universally applicable theory that can explain each and every 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Then Socrates expected that Anaxagoras would use 
nous in this way to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.449 Nevertheless, like 
natural scientists, Anaxagoras eventually credited ‘airs, aethers, waters and many 
other absurdities’ as causes; thus Socrates was disappointed again.450  
Now, if the universal explanatory power of nous pulled Socrates towards 
Anaxagoras’ philosophy, besides its teleological aspect, Socrates’ aim in the second-
                                                          
446 Phd. 100c8-e3. 
447 Phd. 105b5-c7. The formulation is taken from Vlastos (1969, 317).  
448 Sedley (1989, 260) observes that for Plato explaining in terms of ‘why it is better’ 
and explaining ‘in terms of nous’ refer to the same type of explanation. Then if an 
explanation in terms of nous does not involve good-directedness, I presume that such 
an explanation cannot be properly called teleological; hence the reason of its failure.  
449 Socrates also says that ‘I beheld a man who did not use his mind (ἄνδρα τῷ…νῷ 
οὐδὲν χρώμενον Phd. 98b8-9).’ It seems that not only does Anaxagoras fail to use 
nous (as cosmic mind), but the way in which he argues for this theory lacks the use 
of nous (as the intelligence of an individual). However, the idea is not that 
Anaxagoras is not intelligent enough to use nous in his theory, for it would mean that 
neither is Socrates, as he also fails to find. Rather, the point is that Socrates is aware 
of the limits of his own intelligence and of his inability to use nous (as cosmic mind) 
properly. See Rowe 1993, 235-236; Sedley 2008, 90. 




sailing could also be in discovering a theory that explains coming-to-be and ceasing-
to-be universally. He can thus satisfy himself partially, as he was not able to learn or 
discover an explanation in terms of what is best.451 In what follows, I explore what 
Socrates did to satisfy himself; what Socrates’ refuge in logoi was; whether the 
second-sailing was worse than the first-sailing in every respect; and to what extent 
Socrates is satisfied with his discovery. 
5.3.4 Socrates’ Refuge 
I would like to begin by remarking that Socrates’ second-sailing is something 
involuntary, which is the reasonable connotation of the phrase taking refuge.452 
Taking refuge is to escape something undesirable, like refugees running out of their 
countries to seek asylum in a safe country, and we would not escape unless we are 
forced to do so, say, because of war, persecution or hunger. Now, in like manner, 
Socrates took refuge in logoi for he was afraid of becoming ‘totally blind’.453  
                                                          
451 Sedley (1998, 126-127) notes that the Platonic idea of causation rests on the 
principle that ‘like causes like’. Then teleological causation, for Sedley, is ‘a special 
application’ of formal causation, according to which, for instance, ‘the beautiful 
itself is the cause of all beautiful things.’ If so, the teleological idea is ‘good bringing 
about the good’.  
452 At Phd. 99e2, Socrates described his feelings as he went on reading Anaxagoras’ 
book: ‘I was swept away from my marvellous expectations (Ἀπὸ…θαυμαστῆς 
ἐλπίδος…ᾠχόμην φερόμενος). φερόμενος in the passive means (LSJ II.1.), among 
other senses, to be carried away “involuntarily”. Gower (2008, 338-340) argues that 
Socrates’ disappointment emphasizes the problem of believing in authorities. 
Socrates, as Gower suggests, “disproportionately” hopes to find an answer from “an 
authoritative thinker”. For Gower, the idea of disproportionate hope is related to the 
misology argument, where Socrates emphasizes the danger of putting all our trust in 
argument, if we lack expertise in arguments. However, Socrates does not seem to 
put all his trust in Anaxagoras. On the contrary, once Socrates has finished reading 
Anaxagoras’ book, he immediately stopped trusting him. The point, I think, is that 
Socrates does not make hasty judgements before studying closely, though he is 
willing to learn at the same time. Completely trusting authorities and being optimistic 
about someone’s proposal are different. The latter is positive since it urges us to 
listen and to inquire. The former is negative because extreme trust either hinders us 
to do further inquiry or results in hating arguments. The Phaedo, as I argue, 
exemplifies the latter. 
453 ‘I might be wholly blinded in my soul (Phd. 992-3 παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν 
τυφλωθείην)’. As we have seen, as a result of natural science, Socrates said ‘I was 
utterly blinded ‘(Phd. 96c5 σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην)’. In the latter case, Socrates actually 
suffered from blindness but was cured of it, as the aorist ἐτυφλώθην suggests. In the 
former case, however, Socrates has not suffered from blindness, but he worried that 
he might be wholly blinded, as the optative (of secondary sequence) τυφλωθείην 
suggests. Moreover, the first occurence of the blindness analogy is qualified by 
σφόδρα, which implies an utter or severe case, while the second is παντάπασι; hence 
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Once Socrates had finished discussing his criticism of Anaxagoras’ philosophy, he 
offered Cebes a display of his own second-sailing to find an aition of coming-to-be 
and ceasing-to-be as follows: 
[T37] But since I was denied it [what is good and binding] and haven’t been able 
either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else, would you like me to give 
you a demonstration, Cebes, of how I’ve pursued my second voyage in search of 
the cause?454 
Although I agree that ταύτης at Phaedo 99c8 is the teleological cause,455 I do not 
think that τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν is contrasted with ταύτης, in the sense that the second-
sailing has its own cause inferior to the teleological cause.456 As suggested above, I 
think that the second-sailing refers to the method of hypothesis and its outcome is 
the theory of Forms. As the method of hypothesis operates with provisional 
arguments, its current result, namely the theory of Forms, is provisional and lacks 
stability; hence Socrates urges his friends to inquire into it further.457 This, however, 
does not necessarily imply that the theory of Forms is worse than a more stable 
theory (which is probably a theory using teleological explanations) in every respect, 
inasmuch as the theory of Forms enables us to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-
be. 
Now, Socrates decided to ‘take refuge in logoi’ (a phrase which refers to theoretical 
investigations) and hypothesizes (a) ‘that there are such things as a Beautiful alone 
                                                          
the case of absolute or total blindness. It is thus understandable why Socrates decided 
to begin his second sailing when he was faced with the prospect of total blindness, 
rather than just after its onset. 
454 Phd. 99c8-d2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης [99c5 sc. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον] ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ’ 
αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν 
τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ 
Κέβης; 
455 ταύτης at Phd. 99c8 refers to τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας (that sort of cause) at Phd. 99c6, 
and then goes back to τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον (what is good and binding) at Phd. 99c5. 
In addition, ταύτης is the object of ἐστερήθην (I was denied), and ‘with the implied 
change of case, of the infinitives εὑρεῖν, μαθεῖν’ (Vlastos 1969, 296-297 & fn.15).  
456 Wiggins (1986, 3) claims that Socrates “was denied” by stressing the aorist so 
that it does not mean that Socrates has given up the search for teleological 
explanations. For Wiggins, such interpretation needs the perfect tense.  
457 Not unexpectedly, I again allude to Phd. 107a-c. Martinelli Tempesta (2003, 122) 
finely points out that the possibility of a sceptical drift is excluded for Plato, because, 
at least, there can be no doubt about the real existence of the supersensible world, 
i.e. the realm of Forms. This is the region for which, despite the fragility and the 
structural weakness that the logos carries, it is worthwhile to venture into the streets 
to deal with research, as Socrates later says, ‘for fair is the risk (Phd. 114d6)’. 
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by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest’, (b)‘it is because of the beautiful that 
all beautiful things are beautiful’, (c) ‘what…makes the thing hot…is fire’, (d) ‘it 
will never have the nerve to admit the coldness and continue to be just what it was, 
fire, as well as cold’. Here, I think that each of the four components is a logos 
(proposition) that Socrates hypothesizes, and, through them, Socrates offers the 
logos (theory) of Forms (or the Form-Cause Hypothesis), by which Socrates explains 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.458 
Now, as suggested above, the second-sailing and the first-sailing aim at the same 
destination, namely finding aitia; the former is more demanding, yet safer, as 
Socrates aims to escape intellectual blindness through the second-sailing. I also 
presume that Anaxagoras’ nous is not an object of inquiry as such, but it is a higher 
principle in terms of which the objects of inquiry (e.g. the earth and its position) are 
explained. 459  
In what follows, I suggest that Socrates’ second-sailing does not have new objects 
of inquiry. Rather, it has a different set of rules which are used to explain phenomena 
(the method of hypothesis), as well as new principles in terms of which phenomena 
are explained (the theory of Forms). That is, Socrates offers a new approach to 
examine things, and so to speak sailing with a different method, while the aim of 
second-sailing is to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in terms of another 
universal theory of explanation, which will be the theory of Forms.  
5.4 The Meaning of Socrates’ Logoi 
5.4.1 Inquiry in the Second-sailing  
I would like to begin by quoting the section about Socrates’ refuge in logoi to 
understand Socrates’ aim and method in the second-sailing:  
[T39] ‘Well then,’ said Socrates, ‘I decided after that, when I’d given up looking 
into things, that I must make sure I didn’t suffer the fate of those who view and 
study the sun in an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes, I believe, if they 
don’t study its image in water or something of the kind. I too had that sort of 
                                                          
458 Here, I clearly take the liberty of translating logos. As most of the commentators 
(e.g. Hackforth 1955, 138; Gallop 1976, 177-178) note, it is hard to find an English 
word which would suit the different meanings of logos.  
459 See Phd. 97d7-98a6. Sedley (1989, 361-62) suggests that the myth of the Phaedo 
(107ff.) tries to explain the shape of the earth and its position in the cosmos that 
Socrates expected to find in Anaxagoras’ book.  
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thought, and I started to worry that I might be utterly blinded in my soul through 
observing things with my eyes and seeking to get hold of them with each of my 
senses. So I decided that I should take refuge in theories and arguments and look 
into the truth of things in them. Now maybe in a way it does not resemble what 
I’m comparing it to. For I don’t at all accept that someone who, when studying 
things, does so in theories and arguments, is looking into them in images any 
more than someone who does so in facts’.460  
A significant question arises regarding the reading of the phrases τὰ ὄντα (99d5 and 
100a2) and τὰ πράγματα (99e3): do they refer to things themselves (Forms) or things 
in general? Regarding this question, I agree with those who suggest that the phrases 
τὰ ὄντα and τὰ πράγματα refer to things in general rather than things themselves 
(Forms).461 Regarding τὰ ὄντα at d5, Forms have not yet been introduced since 
Socrates was commenting on his study of natural science and Anaxagoras. 
Regarding τὰ ὄντα at a2, Socrates was talking about “studying things in facts”, yet it 
is hardly plausible that we can study things themselves (or Forms) in facts.  τὰ ὄντα 
at a2 thus refers to the things in general too. 
Then what does τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν (the truth of things) at the Phaedo 99e6 
refer to? Some scholars argue that this phrase introduces Forms for the first time in 
the autobiography section.462 However, I presume the phrase τῶν ὄντων, too, should 
be read as things in general: at this point of his philosophical journey, Socrates had 
not yet discovered the relationship between knowledge, the truth and forms. Taking 
τῶν ὄντων as Forms would thus imply that Socrates had discovered the theory of 
                                                          
460 Phd. 99d4-100a3 Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ’ ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα 
σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ 
σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ 
τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα 
μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ 
ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς 
λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ 
εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] λόγοις 
σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] ἔργοις. 
461 E.g. Burnet 1911, 109; Hackforth 1955, 136; Gallop 1975, 177-178. Gaye 1901, 
249 claims that πράγματα=ἥλιος=ὄντως ὄντα, i.e. things themselves (Forms)=the 
sun=the things as they really are. However, Goodrich (1904, 5) argues that τὰ 
πράγματα alone cannot signify Forms. For Goodrich, we should have had αὐτὰ τὰ 
πράγματα if Plato were refering to Forms since αὐτὰ is essential for Plato’s 
designation of Forms. See, for instance, Phd. 66e1-2: ‘we must view the things 
themselves with the soul itself (αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα)’. 
462 E.g. Gallop 1975, 177-178. 
148 
 
Forms immediately after he had begun his study in logoi, an idea which seems to be 
extraordinary as Socrates had not yet conducted any research in logoi. 
To put it differently, Socrates’ refuge in logoi (or the second-sailing) marks the 
introduction of a new sort of approach rather than the results attained by following 
that approach. This different kind of approach is the one that Socrates has thrown 
together on impulse and adopted after his failure in discovering the cause of coming-
to-be and ceasing-to-be in natural science. As I shall argue below, Socrates 
developed this approach thanks to what he had learnt from Anaxagoras and formed 
a more systematic methodology, namely the method of hypothesis. Through this 
method, then, Socrates had discovered the theory of Forms, and then he came to 
realize that knowing the truth of things is actually knowing Forms.  
5.4.2 The Nature of Socrates’ Logos 
Until now, commentators have offered various translations of logos. The main 
problem of these translations is that commentators consider logos as (a) an item by 
which we inquire (as an item analogous to the microscope through which biologists 
study organisms) rather than as (b) an approach by which we inquire (as an approach 
to things analogous to the microscopic study of organisms).  
As a result of thinking in terms of the former view, (a) some argue that logoi are 
“concepts” derived from Forms, and through logoi we attain knowledge mediately. 
Although I subscribe to the view that studying things in logoi, which are “images” 
in a sense, implies indirectness, I do not think that concepts can capture the sort of 
indirectness that Socrates has in mind. I do not see any reason for thinking that logoi 
are concepts since this would imply that logoi are mental representations existing in 
thought only.463   
Others prefer to render logoi as “definitions”, which I disagree with as well.464 This 
is partly because the “definition” does not fit the illustration of logos which comes 
later, when Socrates is ‘hypothesizing that there are such things as a Beautiful alone 
by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest’.465 This hardly looks like a definition 
                                                          
463 Pace Archer-Hind 1983, 135-136; Gaye 1901, 249.  
464 Bluck 1955, 13-16; 111-113; 160-173; 198-200.  
465 Phd. 100b5-6. ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ. Otherwise, it can be 
translated ‘a beautiful, itself by itself, is something’, as, for instance, Gallop 1975 
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in the sense of a Socratic definition, which was supposed to be referred to at the 
Phaedo 99e5 and 100a4.466  
The third alternative is to translate logoi as “theories”.467 “Theories”, I think, is the 
most accurate translation since it can account for Socrates’ broad use of logoi 
covering propositions, statements and even in some cases definitions and 
arguments.468 That said, we might need to be careful about taking logoi as theories, 
if theories are taken as mature and fully-fledged explanations, such as the theory of 
relativity. As argued above, Socrates’ refuge in logoi indicates the inauguration of a 
new approach rather than an approach based on strong theoretical, epistemological 
and metaphysical foundations shaped by the theory of Forms. 
Now, I think that examining the contrast between logoi and erga, both of which are 
taken to be images of things, would be helpful to better understand what logoi 
amount to.469 That said, it seems to be untenable to stress the idea that both erga and 
logoi are images. Socrates’s point is neither that both erga and logoi are images by 
the same token, nor that both would fail us in the same way when we aim at knowing 
things as they really are. In fact, Socrates himself emphasizes the untenable 
relationship between logoi and erga, as both being images, and undermines the 
                                                          
did. Cf. Sedley 2007:73 who underlines that the force of τι necessitates ‘there is ‘a’ 
Form of F.’ 
466 Cf. Gallop 1975, 178-179. Karasmanis (2006, 130-37) notes that a Socratic 
definition is supposed to answer ‘what a thing is’, for instance ‘shape is the limit of 
the solid (Men. 76a)’. ‘There is such a thing as a Beautiful alone by itself’ is not an 
instance of Socratic definition   
467 E.g. Gallop 1975. Long & Sedley 2010 translates logoi as ‘theories and 
arguments’. 
468 Rose 1966, 470. 
469 Trabattoni (2016, 42-43) suggests that ‘perfect knowledge requires direct insight 
(condition 1) into the forms (condition 2)’, but such knowledge is ‘only permissible 
to disembodied souls’. For Trabattoni, while the knowledge of sensible things can 
satisfy condition 1 (since it has direct access to its objects), it fails to fulfil condition 
2. On the contrary, ‘the act through which the soul gains a persuasion about 
propositions concerning forms’ satisfies condition 2 (since ‘its objects are ideal 
entities like justice, beauty and good in themselves’), it cannot fulfil condition 1 
(since ‘it must settle for propositional judgements ruled by persuasion)’. Trabattoni 
then argues that ‘the two metaphors of δεύτερος πλοῦς and of the mirror of water 
used to watch solar eclipses’ emphasize that ‘intellectual cognition…can do no better 
than make use of logoi’. In this respect, ‘the flight towards the logoi’ can satisfy 
condition 2 (if it aims at knowing forms), but not condition 1 (since logoi are 
images). I agree with Trabattoni’s analysis of the conditions of knowledge and ‘the 
relative weakness of δεύτερος πλοῦς [which] is emphasized by its implicit 
subjectivism’. I also endorse Trabattoni’s interpretation of the second sailing as it is 
more positive than it is usually assumed to be. See also ibid., 74-75; 192-193 
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comparison by claiming that the solar eclipse analogy emphasizing the idea of 
‘looking at images’ is in a way misleading.470  
As we can study things both in logoi and erga, they are two different approaches that 
we can adopt in our dealings with things.471  It seems that logoi should not be taken 
as images or copies per se; hence Socrates is at pains to remove this possible 
misunderstanding.472 At this point, it should be asked what sort of logoi are 
contrasted with erga.473 Consider the solar eclipse analogy: for Socrates, we can 
either look at the sun directly or look at its image. If we look at the sun directly, we 
would become blind. It seems that those who become blinded are natural scientists 
(probably most people as well) and they have already been blinded and mistaken, 
though perhaps they are not aware of it.474   
If logoi are compared with facts, then it seems reasonable that studying things in 
logoi is a sort of approach that excludes studying in facts, though we need not 
completely overlook facts in our inquiries.475 Accordingly, I submit that studying 
things in logoi is conducting theoretical investigations, surely with some help of 
sense-perception and empirical data. As suggested above, studying things in logoi is 
                                                          
470 See Burnet 1911, 109; Gallop 1975, 178; Bostock 1986, 159-161. I agree with 
Bostock that it is not clear for Plato in what sense logoi are images or likenesses, and 
hence ‘no close parallel is intended’. Gallop   
471 See, for instance, Gorg. 461c8, Rep. VII. 563a6-7 for Plato’s customary use of 
logoi/erga in the same verb-noun phrase, e.g. to do something in respect to both 
words (logoi) and deeds (erga). 
472 See Sallis 1996, 43. 
473 Note that ἔργον is contrasted with various types of things-spoken-of, such as ἔπος 
(utterance), μῦθος (tale) ῥήμα (saying), ὄνομα (name). See LSJ s.v. ἔργον I.4. 
474 Socrates said earlier, ‘I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry [natural science] 
(96c5 ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην)’. The natural scientists, as 
well as most people (οἱ πολλοὶ), confuse ‘the real cause’ with ‘that without which 
the cause could never be a cause’, and hence Socrates describes their situation 
‘groping about for it as if in darkness (Phd. 99b2 -5 ψηλαφῶντες…ὥσπερ ἐν 
σκότει).’ See also Rowe 1993, 237; Gallop 1975, 234 fn.61. The latter translates it 
‘feeling it over blindfold’. 
475 The recollection argument depends partly on seeing equal sticks and stones. By 
seeing them we are reminded what equal is. See Phd. 74d4-75d5. The second sailing 
and the study of logoi, then, refers to the period after one has discovered that equal 
sticks and stones resemble the Equal itself but fall short of it. That said, recollecting 
the Equal itself is not discovering the theory of Forms which is discussed at Phd. 
100b4-101b3. The argument that there is something besides all equal things, the 
Equal itself, is less sophisticated than the Form-Cause Hypothesis, which aims at 
explaining all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 
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not studying theories as such, rather Socrates suggests studying things from the 
perspective of logos.476  
What does studying from the perspective of logos mean? In order to answer this 
question, let me go back to the practice of true philosophers, which was discussed in 
Chapter 3. Here, let it suffice to say that true philosophers [1] aim to separate the 
soul from the body as much as possible in order to attain the truth and knowledge, 
and to [2] remain aloof from the body, its pleasures and sense-perception, in order 
to grasp (or view) things themselves, such as the Beautiful itself.477  
In this way, true philosophers aim at using their reasoning and intelligence as much 
as possible. The most efficient way to do so is to engage in theoretical studies, in 
which we use our intelligence and reasoning in contrast to relying heavily on our 
senses (as the study in facts does). It is reasonable that the second-sailing (Socrates’ 
refuge in logoi) describes the way true philosophers study things, as Socrates adopts 
it instead of other approaches; hence his practice in the second-sailing should 
exemplify the correct practice of philosophy, though perhaps not the best practice in 
every respect.478  
5.4.3 The Method of Hypothesis 
As argued above, the second-sailing is the method of hypothesis and the true 
philosopher's practice is theoretical investigation of things by this method. I have 
also suggested that this method is more laborious but safer, and because of this 
method’s tentativeness, its results (e.g. the theory of Forms and the proofs of the 
immortality of the soul) are subject to modification and/or development.  
                                                          
476 As mentioned above, it is hard to find an English translation that is fitting for all 
occurances of logoi in this passage. For instance, while λόγον at 100a4 seems to 
mean a “proposition” or “theory”, the phrase ἐν τοῖς λόγοις at 100a1 appears to 
denote arguments in general. In the latter, for Hackforth (1955, 138), ‘λόγοι seem to 
be arguments themselves, trains or processes of ratiocination; and the contrast there 
drawn is between observing physical objects (ἔργα) and constructing arguments, as 
alternative methods of studying reality’. See also Bluck 1955, 164-166. 
477 See Phd. 65e9-67b5. 
478 I agree with Benson (2015, 184) that the method of hypothesis ‘is not Plato’s 
entire philosophical method. A philosophical method, plausibly, consists in more 
than inquiry. It also consists in, for example, justification, teaching or persuasion, 
and perhaps demonstration’. That said, I am inclined to think that some aspects of 
the method of hypothesis, for instance its step-by-step progression, are consistent 
with Plato’s ideas on teaching and persuasion.  
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Socrates’ first description of the method of hypothesis is as follows: [1] ‘on every 
occasion I hypothesize whatever theory I deem most robust’479, and [2] ‘I set down 
as true whatever I think harmonizes with it – both about cause and about everything 
else – and as false whatever doesn’t’.480 Let me now briefly comment on the 
metaphilosophical aspect that the method of hypothesis would imply, before 
proceeding to examine its epistemological side.  
One well-known study that is often cited in research on the method of hypothesis is 
that of Robinson (1953), who argues that “to hypothesize” is used to refer to “a future 
action”, although Plato does not consistently use to hypothesize for referring to “an 
absolute beginning of a deduction”.481 Moreover, Robinson shows that for Plato 
hypothesizing is “deliberately” choosing an opinion rather than “adopting” an 
opinion “unconsciously”.482  
The idea of deliberately choosing the strongest logos seems to indicate a sort of 
expertise in logoi. Otherwise, we would hypothesize a weak logos, then we might go 
astray in our inquiries and fail to discover knowledge and the truth. Issues arise 
surrounding expertise in the arguments of Chapter 4, for if we lack expertise in 
arguments (hence unable to choose the strongest logos), we might become 
misologists, due to putting all our trust in an argument which is later falsified.  
Even if we are able to choose the strongest logos, the method of hypothesis suggests 
that it can turn out false, thus we should not put all our trust even in the strongest 
logos. The method of hypothesis, in this respect, seems to solve the problem of 
misology. If we hypothesize a weak logos, we would not be utterly disappointed 
when seeing later that it is false, since our logos was a hypothesis, we consider it 
provisional and tentative. If we believe we choose the strongest logos, we would also 
know that it is not refutation-proof.  
                                                          
479 Rowe (1992, 93) argues that with the strongest logos, which implies a 
multiplicity, Socrates is referring to ‘his form-participation hypothesis whatever 
seems to him at the time (‘on each occasion’) the strongest’. 
480 Phd. 100a3-7. Robinson (1953, 131-134) suggests that ‘harmonizing with’ can 
mean either ‘to be consistent with a hypothesis [everything that is consistent with a 
hypothesis is true]’ contra ‘to be implied by a hypothesis [if something is not implied 
by my hypothesis it is false]’. I will discuss the issue surrounding the meaning of 
‘harmonizing’ below. 
481 Robinson 1953, 99-103. 
482 Ibid: 109. 
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Furthermore, Robinson maintains that the method of hypothesis suggests that one 
avoid ‘positing at the same time the truth and falsity of the same proposition’, though 
this ‘does not mean never changing one’s mind’.483 In other words, for Robinson, 
‘what is posited [by the hypothetical method] is always provisional and tentative’, 
and ‘the hypothetical method consists in holding one's opinions provisionally and 
not dogmatically (author’s italics)’. 484 In support of the idea of provisional opinion, 
Robinson refers to the Republic, where Socrates, when commenting on his opinion 
about the stories suitable for their young people, says, ‘we must be persuaded by the 
argument, until someone persuades us with another and better (Rep. 388E)’.485 
The notion of provisional opinion, I submit, implies that the method of hypothesis 
demands a sort of self-awareness and the recognition of our cognitive fallibilities, 
both of which hint at a sort of forward-looking dogmatism indicating belief revision. 
Epistemic modesty thus steers a course between the extremes of scepticism and 
dogmatism in the Phaedo.486 As discussed in Chapter 4, Socrates suggests that his 
friends must be careful about trusting arguments and allow some room for the 
possibility of rendering wrong judgements. The method of hypothesis suitably 
comes with epistemic norms, which allow us to deal with arguments properly (hence 
to attain the truth and knowledge about things) and to escape misology. With regards 
to the discovery of a method which provides the correct epistemic norms, Socrates’s 
second-sailing is also productive. 487  
                                                          
483 Ibid:110. Cf. also Phd. 90b4-c6 for a criticism of the procedure above. 
484 Ibid:98. But cf. Wolfsdorf 2008 claims that hypothesis refers to cognitively secure 
propositions. 
485 Ibid: 111. For the author’s similar examples of tentativeness and rigour until being 
refuted Cf. Phd. 107b, Rep. 610a, Soph. 259a. 
486 Trabattoni (2016, 86) partially encapsulates my reading of the Phaedo about the 
limits of human understanding: Plato aims at ‘paving a new path for human thought, 
a difficult yet possible one, founded on the careful use of logos, of dialectics, and of 
critical reasoning: a path as removed from scepticism, which deprives man even of 
the capacity to attain knowledge he actually possesses, as it is from dogmatism, 
which harbours the illusion of being able to attain certain and infallible knowledge. 
While granting logos a foundational character with respect to truth and knowledge, 
Plato does away with the dangerous illusion that makes logos infallible’.  
487 I partly agree with Robinson (1953, 149), that young Socrates adopts the method 
of hypothesis after his study of Anaxagoras. My worry is that Socrates’ adoption of 
his own approach mentioned at Phd. 97b6-7 is before his study of Anaxagoras. Then 
either Socrates does not talk about the method of hypothesis in Phd. 97b6-7 or after 
his disappointment with Anaxagoras Socrates re-adopted an advanced version of the 
same method. Although it is not clear how fully formed Socrates’ stance was, he was 
at least interested in enquiry by using the method of hypothesis.   
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Having discussed a metaphilosophical aspect of the method of hypothesis, let me 
now turn to an exchange between Socrates and Cebes about this method. In the 
relevant section, Socrates explains how he is going to use the method of hypothesis 
and what he is going to hypothesize:  
[T40] ‘I want, though, to tell you more clearly what I’m talking about. I think 
that at the moment you don’t understand.’ 
‘Indeed I don’t’ said Cebes, ‘not altogether.’ 
‘This is what I’m talking about,’ he said, ‘nothing new, but what I’ve never 
stopped talking about, on any other occasion or in particular in the argument thus 
far. Well, I’ll set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which I’ve 
pursued. I’ll go back to those things that have been our frequent refrain, and start 
from them, first hypothesizing that there are such things as a Beautiful alone by 
itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest. If you grant me these and accept that 
they exist, I hope to use them to demonstrate to you the cause, and to discover 
that the soul is immortal.’488 
Scholars generally assume what Socrates has never stopped talking about are Forms, 
which are called by Socrates “our frequent refrain”.489 In this case, Socrates is aware 
of the fact that Cebes might fail to understand, as Cebes might not fathom that 
Socrates would use Forms in explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. That is, 
Cebes is familiar with Forms, yet he fails to link Forms with a theory of causation. 
What is new is that Socrates hypothesizes the strongest logos, namely the Form-
Cause Hypothesis, to explain coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and to demonstrate 
that the soul is immortal. 490   
It is important to observe that when Socrates made a similar remark about 
demonstrating his second-sailing at Phaedo 99c9-d2, he asked Cebes, ‘would you 
like me to give you a demonstration (ἐπίδειξιν), Cebes, of how I’ve pursued 
                                                          
488Phd. 100a8-b9 βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ 
μανθάνειν.  
  Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα. 
 Ἀλλ’, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ ἀεί τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ 
παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι 
ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ 
πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ’ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ 
καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, 
ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή. 
489 Gallop 1975, Burnet 1911, Rowe 1993, Bluck 1955.  
490 Trabattoni (2016, 194) rightly observes that ‘the logos in question here is not an 
idea as such, but the discourse stating the existence of the ideas’. 
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(πεπραγμάτευμαι) my second voyage in search of the cause?’491 Similar wording is 
used at Phaedo 100b3-4 too, as quoted above, where Socrates tells Cebes that ‘I’ll 
set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which I’ve pursued’.492  
In the earlier sentence, the second-sailing refers to Socrates’ study of things in logoi 
in order to find the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, yet I do not think that 
Socrates, at that moment, has decided on the strongest logos, which is the Form-
Cause Hypothesis. In the earlier instance, Socrates is retelling the story. In the latter, 
however, Socrates has already committed himself to the Form-Cause Hypothesis, 
the strongest logos. By next using this hypothesis, he will try ‘to demonstrate to 
[Cebes] the cause [of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be], and to discover that the soul 
is immortal’.493  
Now, let me quote the second description about the method of hypothesis where 
Socrates explains how one should deal with other people’s criticism of the initial 
hypothesis and its conclusions: 
[T41] But you for your part would, as the saying goes, be scared of your own 
shadow and inexperience, and you’d cling to that safe part of the hypothesis,494 
and answer accordingly. But if someone were to cling to495 the hypothesis itself, 
                                                          
491 τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, 
ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; 
492 ἔρχομαι δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι. 
493 Phd. 100b8-9. In the second sailing, Socrates talks about ‘search of the cause (τὴν 
τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν)’ while in the form-hypothesis passage he refers to ‘the sort of 
cause (τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος)’. In this respect, I presume that in the former Socrates 
does not decide on what sort of cause he will search for whereas in the latter he 
comes to a decision about the sort of cause.   
494 Rowe (1993, 247) suggests that ‘ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς’ should be 
translated as ‘holding onto to that safety of hypothesis…since no part of the 
hypothesis has been identified (ἐκείνου) as ‘safer’ than any other’. This is because 
Rowe seems to think that there are two parts: [1] Forms exist and [2] Forms are 
causes [it is because of the beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful]. Rowe 
is right that Socrates does say anything about whether [1] or [2] is safer. Benson 
(ibid., 200) argues that ‘according to which the safe part of the hypothesis should be 
understood as the safe consequent of the hypothesis [aitia thesis], which bypasses 
the necessity of the conjunctive Form-Reason hypothesis’. That is, for Benson (ibid., 
201), ‘the aitia thesis “agrees” with the Form hypothesis, the latter somehow reveals 
the former, and other answers [which are proposed by natural scientists] to the aitia 
question do not “agree” with it’. My suggestion is that ‘safe part of the hypothesis’ 
is ‘the Form F in x is the aitia of x’s being F’ while the other part is the way Forms 
are related to particulars. Socrates has already raised his hesitation about the latter at 
Phaedo 100d4-6. I will have more to say about these lines below. 
495 The meaning of ἔχοιτο at 100d3 has been the subject of much debate. Here, I 
adopt the reading of Burnet (1911, 101): ‘‘if anyone fastens on’ or ‘sticks to 
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you would ignore him and not answer until you had managed to consider its 
consequences and see whether or not you found them harmonizing with each 
other. When, however, you had to give an account of that hypothesis itself, you 
would do so in the same way, first giving again as another hypothesis whichever 
higher one seemed best, until you came to something sufficient. But you wouldn’t 
throw together what you were saying all at once, would you, like those who 
practise disputation, by holding a conversation about both the starting-point and 
its consequences, at least if you wanted to discover something real?496 
Here, it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term ‘harmonizing (συμφωνεῖν)’. 
As mentioned above, Socrates initially described the method of hypothesis as 
follows: (1) hypothesizing the strongest logos, and (2) setting down as true whatever 
harmonizes with it and as false whatever does not. One of the most cited studies on 
the meaning of συμφωνεῖν is Bailey's, who stresses the musical connotation of the 
term. Regarding the second description, Bailey points out that Socrates’ point ‘makes 
good methodological sense’, because ‘if inconsistent propositions follow from a 
hypothesis [the διαφωνεῖν relation]’, it is sufficient to consider that hypothesis false. 
That said, it is not logically sound to accept a hypothesis as true if all its results are 
consistent with each other (the συμφωνεῖν relation).497 
However, Bailey finely points out that the consistency reading of συμφωνεῖν is not 
consistent with Plato’s use of it in other contexts.498 What is more problematic about 
the consistency reading, for Bailey, is its application to the first definition: ‘for any 
hypothesis, there will be an infinite number of propositions which are consistent with 
it, but which we have no independent reason to assert...[and which might be] 
inconsistent with each other’.499 For instance, I might hypothesize that ‘[H] it is 
snowing’, and put down the proposition that ‘[P1] it is −4°C’. H and P1 are consistent 
                                                          
ὑπόθεσις’, that is, if he refuses to consider the συμβαὶνοντα till the ὑπόθεσις has been 
completely established’.    
496 Phd. 101c9-e3 σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, 
ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. εἰ δέ τις 
αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ’ 
ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ 
ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν 
ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ 
οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ 
ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν; 
497 Bailey 2005, 96.  
498 Ibid, 97. In the Cratylus, it is suggested that all the names they have discussed 
συμφωνεῖ with each other, as all their referents are in flux. Bailey observes that 
names ‘have more in common than that [being consistent or in agreement] by virtue 




with each other, yet I have no reason to consider P1 true unless I go out and use a 
thermometer to measure the temperature. Similarly, I might propose that ‘[P2] it is 
−6°C’, which is also consistent with H, yet both P2 and P1 cannot be true at the same 
time.  
Accordingly, Bailey suggests that the συμφωνεῖν relation must offer something 
stronger than consistency, namely entailment: I can accept that those propositions 
are entailed by my hypothesis being true (e.g. it is snowing, it therefore must be 
cold). However, the entailment reading, for Bailey, does not work in the second 
description:  
It is true that water is H2O; from this, it follows that water is a compound; and it 
also follows that water contains oxygen. But neither of these results entails the 
other. A stuff need not contain oxygen in order to be a compound, while there is 
at least one stuff which contains oxygen without being a compound, namely 
oxygen itself, or at any rate a pure sample of it. If Socrates means "entail one 
another" by ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ, then the results of the hypothesis that water is 
H20 do not ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ. But that is no reason to deem false the hypothesis 
that water is H20.500 
I cannot do justice to all the facts and arguments involved in Bailey’s study. Allow 
me to instead conclude by presenting Bailey’s solution to the problem. Bailey begins 
by suggesting that the musical connotation of συμφωνεῖν can help us to better 
understand its logical implications.501 For Bailey, the relation of a hypothesis and its 
results ‘holds between propositions if they stand as explanations of one another, 
                                                          
500 Ibid., 98. For Bailey, the entailment reading also makes the first definition 
ludicrous: ‘From the hypothesis that water is H2O it does not follow that I am in my 
office; nor does it follow, from the same hypothesis, that I am outside my office. But 
we had better not put down as false both these non-entailed propositions, for it cannot 
be that I am neither in my office nor outside’. 
501 Bailey (ibid., 104-5) suggests that ‘the Phaedo is a dialogue thoroughly soaked in 
musical allusions’, and hence the accuracy of alluding to musical systems. 
Unfortunately, I am not able to discuss the relation between musical and logical 
systems. Let me just quote: ‘Two notes an octave apart do not bear the same relation 
to one another. For while blending is a symmetrical relation, the precise relation of 
lying in such and such a ratio to another pitch is asymmetrical… in both cases, the 
musical and the theoretical, something new emerges from the combination of the 
two things so related - a blended unity - which does not emerge, for instance, when 
we sound a pitch together with another six semi-tones above it, or when we conjoin 
truths such as "Cats are mammals" and "Sydney is in Australia". The two pitches do 
not form a συμφωνία and blend into a musical unity, just as the two propositions do 
not blend into an explanatory unity’. 
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albeit in different ways’.502 One relation is what Bailey calls ‘generalizing 
explanation’, which is exemplified as follows: 
P1 Electrons in such-and-such a relation conduct electricity. 
P2 Metals are conductors. 
P3 Copper is a conductor. 
P4 Pennies conduct electricity. 
Moving from P4 to P1, according to Bailey, we ‘explain particular facts by 
subsuming them under more and more general laws – “higher principles”, as Plato 
would call them’.503 Bailey then offers another relation, which he calls 
‘particularizing explanations’: Every proposition below gives explanatory support 
for the ones above, e.g. P4 supports P3, P3-P2, P2-P1. Bailey applies the figure 
above to the Form-Cause Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis. There is such a thing as the Φ, and if anything else happens to be Φ, 
then it is Φ by the Φ. 
ὁρμηθέντα. 1. When something is Φ, then Φ-ness is somehow in that thing.  
2. Anything that is Φ by the Φ is different from that by which it is Φ. (It is by 
Simmias' largeness that he overtops Socrates, not by his nature.)  
3. If Φ and Ψ are opposites, then the Φ or Ψ in things will not tolerate the advance 
of the other: either it will retreat or perish on the approach of its opposite.504 
According to Bailey, each pair (hypothesis and 1, 1 and 2, and 2 and 3) has both 
generalizing and particularizing relations. For instance, (Result 1) if a flower is 
beautiful, then the Form of beauty in the flower is explained by (hypothesis) there 
being a Form of the beautiful, and if anything else happens to be beautiful, then it is 
beautiful by the Form of the beautiful. This is the generalizing explanation. The 
particularizing relationship is as follows: ‘The things that can have Φ in them - 
Simmias' size, Socrates' fingers, Phaedo's face - are not the sort of things that have 
opposites: this is why such things must be different from the causal agents in them, 
as 2 asserts. 2 gives particularising explanation for 1’.505 
Bailey concludes that there is something special about the συμφωνεῖν relation, which 
does not hold between every consistent proposition, ‘as certain privileged intervals 
form stronger and more interesting relations between their pitches than other equally 
musical intervals within the ἁρμονία’. As we have seen above, there might be other 
                                                          
502 Ibid., 106.  
503 Ibid., 107. 
504 Ibid., 108. 
505 Ibid.  
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ὁρμηθέντα consistent with the Form-Cause Hypothesis, yet they might not form a 
‘symphonic’ relation as the above three propositions explain, and are explained by, 
that hypothesis.506  
Let me now quote Bailey’s comment on the idea of provisionality: ‘[t]he whole point 
of calling something a hypothesis in the first place is to indicate its provisionality, 
the fact that it is not yet known for all that it is supposed, and is to that extent 
revisable.’507 In this respect, we should observe that the συμφωνεῖν relation, which 
Bailey finely demonstrates, is not easy to form. It is demanding and laborious, as is 
suggested by the second-sailing analogy. Finally, we should notice that the 
συμφωνεῖν relation is not only hard to form, but also that the συμφωνεῖν relation 
might become better. Bailey brilliantly relates this notion of provisionality and 
indeterminacy to music, and the mysterious expertise in choosing a particular 
proposition: 
From the starting point C, one will get a συμφωνία with the F a fourth above it, 
or alternatively the G a fifth above – both notes are suitably related to the original. 
But one cannot, as it were, go for both of these pitches together. For the F and the 
G do not blend into a συμφωνία. They are not related to one another as each is to 
C. One must choose one of them at a time if one intends to develop a musical 
complex of the right sort from C, and there may at first be no more reason to 
choose one rather than the other. This strain of indeterminacy brings out the 
element of unexplained talent that will be required for a successful application of 
the method. Socrates has no story to tell about why you should put down as true 
one particular proposition from the many candidates that will emerge.508 
I think this is why it is hard to utilise the method of hypothesis. The συμφωνεῖν 
relation is demanding, provisional and even indeterminate. One needs to choose one 
from many premises which harmonize with the initial hypothesis, yet why we should 
a particular proposion among many “symphonious” ones is left somewhat obscure. 
This obscurity probably stems from Socrates’ emphasis on self-discovery, which is 
stressed at the end of the final proof of the immortality of the soul at the Phaedo 
107b-c. All the hardship inherent to the method of hypothesis and in forming the 
συμφωνεῖν relation fit with the point about the second-sailing, which is that it is more 
laborious.  
                                                          
506 Ibid., 111. 
507 Ibid., 100 fn.5. 
508 Ibid., 114. 
160 
 
5.4.4. The Form-Aitia Hypothesis (the Theory of Forms) 
Here, it is not necessary for my purposes to discuss the theory of Forms in detail and 
to review alternative interpretations of it.509 Rather, I will briefly comment on how 
Plato uses the theory of Forms in the Phaedo. Some scholars argue that the Phaedo 
presupposes a certain metaphysical system. They suggest that Socrates tries to prove 
the immortality of the soul by using this metaphysics, yet he does not justify his 
metaphysical system. These scholars defend their reading by stressing [1] that 
Socrates refers to Forms as ‘those things that have been our frequent refrain (Phd. 
100b5)’, so that the interlocutors and readers are supposed to be familiar with the 
metaphysics, and that [2] the interlocutors clearly express their knowledge of it, as 
they do not ask for further clarification.510  
On the other hand, some scholars claim that Plato does not presuppose a 
metaphysical system, but he tries to justify it in the Phaedo. To this end, Plato 
introduces the theory of Forms step by step and uses it for proving the immortality 
of the soul. For instance, it is argued that Socrates discusses five different aspects of 
the theory of Forms, each of which is used in the proofs of the immortality of the 
soul.511 It is also suggested that Plato begins the Phaedo with some presuppositions 
and ontological commitments found in the so-called early dialogues, such as the 
Meno, Euthyphro, etc., then he ‘develops a comprehensive metaphysics’.512 
Moreover, one of the most fundamental difficulties about the theory of Forms is the 
Form/particular relationship. Socrates says:  
[T42] I ignore those other explanations, because I am confused when they are all 
around me, and I keep the following at my side, in my straightforward, amateurish 
and perhaps simple-minded way: nothing makes it beautiful other than that 
Beautiful’s presence, or association, or whatever its mode and means of accruing 
may be. For I don’t go so far as to insist on this, but only that it is because of the 
beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful.513  
                                                          
509 For some seminal readings see Vlastos 1954, Fine 1993 and McCabe 1994. 
510 Phd. 65d5, 74b1, 78d8-9, 92d6-e2, 100c1-2, 102a10-b1. Some adherents of this 
view are Archer-Hind 1883, 36-38; Burnet 1911, 33, 60, 110; Bluck 1955, 11 fn.1, 
16; Hackforth 1955, 50, 142-143; Gallop 1975, 97. 
511 Grube 1935, 291-294. 
512 Dimas 2003, 181. 
513  Phd. 100d3-6τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, —ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι—
τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ 
αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως 
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I think that scrutinizing this difficulty might help us find an explanation about the 
epistemic nature of the theory of Forms in the Phaedo, as Plato does not seem to 
suggest an answer for this issue.514 In this respect, I agree with the scholars that 
Socrates, or Plato, is noncommittal here.515 That said, I do not think Plato is 
noncommittal if this implies either that Plato has not thought extensively about the 
Form/particular relationship or that he did not find it significant for his purposes, or 
that he is not serious.  
Above all, I believe that Plato is serious about his noncommittal stance. This is 
because Plato knows that he does not have a model that could explain the 
Form/particular relationship even to his own satisfaction. Regarding the existence of 
Forms, and their causal and explanatory role, Plato offers a detailed account, which 
offers a sort of συμφωνία, though it does not seem to be as clear and rigorous as we 
might wish to have.  
At any rate, Socrates’ position regarding the Form/particular relationship is in line 
with his own approach, namely the method of hypothesis. It seems to me that 
Socrates (or Plato) has not discovered the strongest logos about the Form/particular 
relationship. Moreover, as mentioned above, choosing the strongest logos is not a 
random act, as we need to choose ‘consciously’. Socrates does not know a well-
reasoned proposition about the Form/particular relationship that harmonizes with the 
hypothesis itself and its consequences. That is, instead of breaking the harmony by 
adding a random proposition, Socrates prefers to maintain the harmony until a proper 
proposition is found. 
In a sense, we do not bet on the strongest logos randomly, but we need to have some 
justification for it. Socrates, I presume, could not make a rational choice among 
several alternatives, and hence the rational act is not to insist on the strongest logos 
about the Form/particular relationship. Then there seem three philosophical stages: 
[1] determining the nature of the real causes, [2] showing that Forms are real 
                                                          
προσγενομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ 
[γίγνεται] καλά.  
514 However, Fujisawa (1974, 40-45) divides the idioms used for the Form/particular 
relationship into three groups, namely (1) ἔχειν-idioms (x has F), (2) μετέχειν-idioms 
(x participates in Φ), (3) παράδειγμα-idioms (x has F in virtue of being a likeness of 
Φ). He argues that Plato only uses ἔχειν-idioms after the interruption at Phd. 102a3, 
which implies that Plato has an answer for the Form/particular relationship. Even if 
this is so, it is still a mystery why Plato did not clearly say so.  




causes,516 and [3] discovering that the soul is immortal by using the theory of Forms 
and the method of hypothesis.  
To conclude, Socrates has gone through four distinct phases of intellectual 
development:517  
[1] The study of natural science (96a6-97b6) by which Socrates attempts to 
find causes (aitiai) among facts (erga).  
[2] Socrates adopts a different approach (97b6-b9), although Socrates did not 
express what it is. Socrates simply tells his interlocutors that once he 
impulsively threw together his own kind of approach, he did not adopt the 
approach of natural science. 
[3] The study of Anaxagoras (97b8-99b6): This is the first-sailing by which 
Socrates hopes to find teleological explanations. Besides this, I suggest that 
Socrates was attracted to the idea of universal theory, also found in 
Anaxagoras’s concept of nous, which could explain all coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be. Socrates was denied teleological explanations, though he 
would still be glad to learn them, and he had decided to find another universal 
theory by using the method of the second-sailing, namely the method of 
hypothesis. With a view to find that sort of theory, Socrates took refuge in 
                                                          
516 Here, I follow Sedley’s (1998, 121) formulation of Plato’s ‘Three Laws of 
Causation’: if x is a real cause (a) x must only be F, and not also not-F (head example 
at Phd. 101a) (b) x must not be the cause of the opposite of F-ness (Socrates sitting 
in a cell example at Phd. 98cff.) (c) x’s opposite must not cause this F-ness (addition 
example at Phd. 101b-c). 
517 Ross (1951, 29) claims that the autobiography section is a display of the discovery 
of the theory of Forms. From a metaphilosophical perspective, I think, it also depicts 
the correct practice of philosophy. Moreover, Benson (2015, 199) raises the 
possibility that ‘Plato may think that the entire passage from 95B through 107B 
represents an inquiry—that is, an application of a method for learning the 
immortality of the soul’. I do not think, with Benson, that the section from 95b to 
107b is an application of the method of hypothesis. That said, I also believe that the 
section from 95b to 99d offers valuable insights about the correct practice of 
philosophy, which cannot be reduced to the method of hypothesis. For instance, 
Socrates’ enthusiasm for natural science stresses the significance of an inquisitive 
mind; the restoration of Socrates’ intellectual sight, so to speak, emphasizes the 
importance of vigorous inquiry; Socrates’ refuge in logoi to escape intellectual 
blindness underlines that we ought to be aware of the limits (and the nature) of 
cognitive faculties.      
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logoi and had studied in them the truth about things by means of the method 
of hypothesis. 
[4] The three steps above enabled Socrates to discover the theory of Forms 
and to show that the soul is immortal to a certain degree (100b-107a).  
5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out with the aim of  explaining Plato’s insights on philosophical 
method in the Socrates’ autobiography section. I have developed a model for the 
second-sailing by maintaining that Socrates’ second-sailing is not inferior to the first-
sailing in every respect. I have argued that Socrates’ choice of taking refuge in logoi 
(the second-sailing) is purpose-relative, the second-sailing may be better than the 
first-sailing with regards to its safety and feasibility, while it is less sturdy and more 
laborious.  In this respect, I submit that we can gain a better understanding of the 
second-sailing if we interpret it from the perspectives of safety, provisionality and 
laboriousness, instead of only highlighting the axiological relationship (superiority-
inferiority) between the first and second-sailing.  
Therefore, the axiological relationship between the first and the second-sailing is 
more complex than usually assumed, as we also need to consider purpose-
relativeness. If this is so, we should be more thorough and careful regarding the 
axiological relationship between teleological explanations and explanations in terms 
of formal causes. Although Socrates would still be glad to learn how nous explains 
in terms of what is best, there is no reason to think that the method of second-sailing 
is totally worse, as it is safer and more feasible, but also more laborious. That is, it 
would have been better, with respect to stability and comprehensiveness, if Socrates 
were successful in finding teleological explanations in the first-sailing.  
Inasmuch as the theory of Forms properly and consistently explains coming-to-be 
and ceasing-to-be, it is not worse than teleological explanations. On the other hand, 
since the theory of Forms is still in need of further inquiry and development, the 
theory of Forms is worse than teleological explanations with respect to stability and 
completeness. However, since the second-sailing is safer and more feasible than the 
first-sailing, with regards to the compatibility of its method and human cognitive 
faculties, it is better than the first-sailing in this respect. The two sailings share the 
164 
 
same goal, namely explaining coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and the second-
sailing gets there in the end. 
Finally, I have argued that the second-sailing is the study of things in logoi by means 
of the method of hypothesis. I also maintained that Socrates was attracted to 
Anaxagoras’ idea of nous not only because nous is supposed to explain in terms of 
what is best (teleological explanations), but also because nous can explain everything 
(a universal theory of explanation). To this end, I have suggested that Socrates was 
denied teleological explanations, though he would still be glad to learn, yet he was 
able to find a universal theory of explanation, namely the theory of Forms.  
This chapter adds to my discussion of the metaphilosophical component of the 
Phaedo in the following manner: the tentativeness implied by the method of 
hypothesis requires us to be cautious and careful whilst putting trust in arguments, 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The meaning of Socrates’ second-sailing is safer, though 
this is not a philological but a philosophical claim, yet it is more laborious and the 
results are less stable than the other. The safety of the second-sailing would help us 
to escape misology, since it helps us to escape intellectual blindness. However, as it 
is more laborious and its results are less certain, we need to be careful and thorough 
in following the method of hypothesis. In this respect, we should not put all our trust 
in an argument too quickly, but we need to work hard to find safer and more steady 
arguments, or, as Bailey (2005) suggests, to form a more complex and symphonious 
theory. 
The relationship between the method of hypothesis and philosophical humility also 
helps us to better understand the epistemic status of first-order theories dealt with in 
the Phaedo. If we consider the metaphilosophical component of the Phaedo, we 
would partially save Plato from the criticism of being reckless in the way he proves 
the immortality of the soul and explores the metaphysical theory, namely the theory 
of Forms. In this respect, we can observe the rationale behind Socrates’ demand for 
a further inquiry, simply because his method does not easily and quickly provide 
certainty.  
To summarize, I submit that the development of the theory of Forms and of the 
proofs of the immortality of the soul are incomplete. Therefore, Socrates’ friends and 
Plato’s readers are invited to search for stronger arguments. In doing so, I believe 
that Plato is strongly hinting at philosophical humility in the Phaedo, and the 
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structure of conversation (the way in which Socrates and his interlocutors interact), 
comprised of Socrates' approach to arguments and his conclusions (his demand for 
further inquiry and epistemic carefulness), exemplifies the correct epistemic norms 























The present study was designed to determine the effects of metaphilosophical 
components to better understand the Phaedo. To this end, I explore the epistemic (or 
intellectual) norms governing philosophical inquiry and conversation. It is not 
unexpected that Plato presents insights on the correct method of philosophical 
argument, as he studies metaphilosophy in other dialogues, such as the Theaetetus. 
One of the more interesting findings of the Phaedo is that the meaning of the second-
sailing analogy and the hypothetical method appear to be in accord with the 
metaphilosophical component, namely epistemic modesty.  
It is also appealing to see that the way in which Socrates and his interlocutors 
converse is in agreement with the Phaedo’s metaphilosophical component. We 
might explain this relationship by maintaining that a better way of exploring the 
norms governing philosophical argument can be demonstrated through a display of 
correct philosophical conversation. In this respect, the findings of this investigation 
complement those of earlier studies emphasizing the relationship between the 
dialogue form and philosophical arguments (McCabe & Gill 1996, Peterson 2011, 
Long 2013).  
The second major finding was that Socrates encourages his friends to examine the 
arguments discovered in the Phaedo further, for them to arrive at an argument 
located at the uppermost point within the scope of human epistemic access. We thus 
need to consider that Socrates encourages open-ended argument and stresses that his 
arguments do still have room for improvement, although he does not suggest an 
endless open-ended investigation. I therefore submit that Socrates recognizes that 
human understanding is limited in the purification passage discussed in Chapter 3, a 
recognition which is a basic tenet of philosophical humility; hence Socrates 
acknowledges that his first-order theories might be amended and developed.  
The epistemic (or intellectual) norms governing philosophical conversation/inquiry 
in the Phaedo, as I suggest in Chapter 1, consist of the following: [1] we ought to 
consider our adversaries being as cognitively capable as ourselves (as our epistemic 
peers), [2] we ought to be both critical and flexible (in the case of Simmias and 
Cebes), and [3] we ought to be willing to develop our views and welcome objections 
(in the case of Socrates).  
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In Chapter 2, I stress the fact that Socrates’ initial speech in the Phaedo is considered 
a defence as if in court. Although any philosophical work aims at persuasion, the 
idea of defence further stresses Socrates’ aim to persuade his interlocutors and reach 
an agreement that the soul is immortal. This is why, I argue, it is significant to look 
at the meta-dialogical and metaphilosophical component of Socrates’ speech. In 
addition, I partially analyse the Protagoras to reveal insights on productive 
communication, critical thinking and careful checking. I then use these insights to 
trace the meta-dialogical element of the Phaedo.  
Chapter 3 examines the section on the true philosophers’ willingness-to-die. I submit 
that if we adopt the norms governed by the willingness-to-die argument, we would 
become worthy of philosophy and true philosophers. That is, the willingness-to-die 
argument has a powerful principle which operates in the practice of philosophers; it 
thus adds to the metaphilosophical component of the Phaedo by underlining the 
limits of human cognition during embodiment and the fallibility of human 
knowledge.  
In Chapter 4, I scrutinize the misology argument from a metaphilosophical 
perspective. I suggest that the misology argument stresses that we are all prone to 
becoming haters of arguments, although those who are dealing with arguments used 
in disputations (antilogike) are more so. I argue that Socrates, as a remedy for hatred 
of arguments, proposes that if we lack expertise in arguments but desire to attain 
knowledge and care about the truth, we ought to follow the epistemic (or intellectual) 
norms governing the attitude of philosophical humility.  
Chapter 5 focuses on Socrates’ second-sailing, for by spelling out its meaning, we 
can gain a better understanding of the correct norms of philosophical argument. I 
suggest that the second-sailing, despite scholarly opinion to the contrary, is not 
inferior to the first-sailing in every respect. To this end, I explore the second-sailing 
in terms of the concept of purpose-relativeness. On the one hand, the second-sailing 
is safer and more feasible; hence it is better in this respect. On the other hand, since 
the method used in the second-sailing (namely the method of hypothesis) offers 
provisional results and is more laborious, the second-sailing can be considered worse 
in these respects.  
I submit that the meaning of the second-sailing is compatible with the overall 
philosophical tone of the Phaedo, namely epistemic modesty. Besides, the 
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provisionality of its results is stressed by Socrates, as he advises his friends to inquire 
further until they reach a point where they need not look for further justification. 
Although Socrates is confident with his demonstration to a certain degree, he does 
not explicitly tell his friends what the highest point is, nor what they should expect 
to discover. I thus submit that either Socrates is not sure how to define that furthest 
point or he expects his friends to decide on their plan of action by themselves.  
From a metaphilosophical point of view, I think, either option seems to indicate that 
Socrates (or Plato) does not wish to look like an epistemic authority, who claims to 
possess certain knowledge and who knows the correct philosophical direction we 
should journey. This lack, however, does not mean that Socrates (or Plato) is unable 
to set a philosophical course and inform us of our philosophical destination. We, for 
instance, might suppose that true philosophers should set off in the direction of the 
Good (as Plato did in the Republic) or teleological explanations (as Plato did in the 
Timaeus), as it is usually assumed to be. Nevertheless, I think that the lack of clear 
allusion to any destination implies that Socrates is not an epistemic authority in the 
Phaedo.  
My point, accordingly, is that such directions are not clearly mentioned in the 
Phaedo, though Plato might be aware of some possible directions; hence the reader 
is not given the right direction by an authoritative voice. From a metaphilosophical 
perspective, the readers, too, are invited to provide freedom of choice to others and 
to refrain from using an authoritative voice. The reasons for this avoidance are (a) 
that humans, during the embodiment of the soul, do not have direct epistemic access 
to the objects of knowledge, and (b) that human cognition is fallible. Our inquiries 
are thus likely to go astray. In short, the correct epistemic norms that would endow 
us with the power to face up to the challenges posed by (a) and (b) are governed by 
epistemic modesty. 
In the rest of the epilogue, I would like to comment on the theory of Forms with 
respect to its epistemic status in the Phaedo and in the Parmenides. To this end, I 
review a passage from the Parmenides where Plato allegedly criticizes the theory of 
Forms, before I compare this passage with the Phaedo.518 The aim of this 
                                                          
518 The most devastating argument of the Parmenides is supposedly the ‘Third Man 
Argument (TMA)’. It is a paradigm case criticizing the theory of Forms since the 
idea of ‘separation’ assumed in the theory leads to ‘infinite regress’. The scholarship 
on TMA is vast but the following two seminal works are quite essential: Vlastos 
1954 and Waterlow [Broadie] 1982.  
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investigation is neither to achieve a thorough understanding of the criticism nor to 
explain the philosophical purpose of the criticism in detail. The Parmenides is 
interesting because we can compare young Socrates and old Socrates with regards 
to his position on the epistemic status of the theory of Forms. 
Before exploring the Parmenides, I would like to note that Socrates does not strongly 
cling to the theory of Forms in the Phaedo. He is especially careful about the 
Form/particular relationship. Although Socrates discussed several aspects of the 
theory of Forms, the readers are given hints that Socrates’ arguments can be pursued 
further. The theory of Forms can thus possess a stronger explanatory power, and the 
initial hypothesis and its results can be further harmonized.  
The Form/particular relationship is one of the main points of attack of Parmenides 
in his eponymous dialogue. From a metaphilosophical perspective, the Parmenides 
can be considered criticism about how Socrates presents the material about the 
theory of Forms. In this respect, the Parmenides provides an antidote to its readers. 
That is, there is a metaphilosophical component in the Parmenides, which reminds 
the readers of a sort of philosophical humility.  
To put it simply, Socrates in the Phaedo talks about the theory of Forms in line with 
a sort of philosophical humility, while Socrates in the Parmenides makes several 
claims on the theory of Forms, as if he is an epistemic authority and Parmenides 
challenges Socrates. Socrates of the Phaedo thus illustrates the epistemic norms of 
philosophical argument governed by epistemic modesty, while the way Socrates 
presented and defended the theory of Forms in the Parmenides depicts other 
epistemic norms governed by the idea of epistemic authority.519 
By stressing the difference between the Parmenides and the Phaedo regarding 
Socrates’ defence of the theory of Forms, I would like to underline how young 
Socrates is troubled by his strong convictions of the arguments that surround the 
theory of Forms. The tribulations of young Socrates, in defending the theory of 
Forms, is somewhat similar to the fate of misologists. In other words, it is suggested 
to the reader that they need to be careful about putting trust in an argument if they 
lack expertise in arguments, as discussed in Chapter 4. Similarly, the second part of 
the Parmenides, which is the so-called philosophical training (or dialectical) part, 
                                                          
519 No scholar places the Parmenides before the Phaedo. It is also generally accepted 
that the Phaedo antedates the middle books of the Republic, and the Parmenides 




might relate to the misology argument, as this part is about gaining expertise in 
arguments to defend the theory of Forms. 
Before briefly commenting on the dialectical part of the Parmenides, let me make 
some remarks on the theory of Forms presented in the Phaedo and Parmenides: [1] 
the theory of Forms criticized in the Parmenides is almost identical with that of the 
Phaedo,520 [2] the Parmenides’s criticism of the theory of Forms is neither fatal nor 
insignificant,521 [3] the criticism results probably from Plato’s self-reflection or from 
his discussion with others,522 and [4] Parmenides’s criticism is of positive value; 
hence Parmenides is not ‘the destroyer of the theory of Forms’, but ‘a guide’ who 
tries to help young Socrates to develop and defend it.523 
Here, I am not going to comment on the idea that the “Deductions” in the second 
part of the Parmenides might appear fallacious; as some scholars argued that Plato 
aims to reproduce and criticize ‘Eleatics’ deductive form of reasoning’ and that the 
‘Deductions’ expose the ambiguities of “the One” and “being” of Parmenides.524 Nor 
will I examine whether the Deductions provided ‘basic conditions for the 
instantiation of characters in particular things’ on which Plato bases his late 
ontology.525 No matter what Plato’s purpose is exactly, I subscribe to the view that 
Plato intended the antinomies to be genuinely compelling.526 
To put it simply, Parmenides’ critique of the theory of Forms is serious, and 
Parmenides genuinely wishes to save Forms, and the ‘Deductions’ are compelling. 
Here I will neither examine the problems of the theory of Forms indicated by 
Parmenides nor discuss whether Parmenides’ worries are well-founded. For my 
purposes, it is significant to observe that Socrates does not have relevant solutions 
to Parmenides’ objections. If Socrates offers a solution, another problem arises.527 
                                                          
520 Robinson 1942, 58; Fine 1995, 36-38. But cf. Brumbaugh 1980, 42-45 who claims 
that Parmenides criticizes ‘other’ theories of Forms. 
521 Robinson 1942, 58-59; Runciman 1959, 91-92; Ryle 1939a: 314-317 
522 Cornford 1939, 101; Fine 1995, 39-42 for an analysis of Aristotle’s criticism of 
the theory of Forms and Plato’s own critique. 
523 Parm. 135b5-c7. See Runciman 1942, 90; Sayre 1978, 134; Cherniss 1932; 128-
130; Ryle 1939b, 131-135; Schofield 1977, 140-142.   
524 Cornford 1939, 112-114. 
525 Sayre 1978, 134. 
526 Schofield 1977, 140-142. 
527 Rickless (1998) argues that part II of Parmenides solves some of the problems. 
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Now, I limit my argument about the Parmenides to the objection to the scope of 
Forms, as it can shed light on Socrates’ philosophical expertise and the correct norms 
of philosophical argument: 
[T43] ‘Not at all,’ Socrates answered. ‘On the contrary, these things [sc. a form 
of human being, or fire, or water and things that are like hair, mud and dirt, or 
anything else totally undignified and worthless] are in fact just what we see. 
Surely, it’s too outlandish to think there is a form for them. Not that the thought 
that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn’t troubled me from time to time. 
Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into 
some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of 
the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself 
with them.’  
‘That’s because you are still young, Socrates,’ said Parmenides, ‘and philosophy 
has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to 
consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about 
what people think, because of your youth (Parm. 130d3-e4).’528 
There is need to observe that young Socrates is talking to old Parmenides, although 
the encounter is probably Plato’s fiction.529 By mentioning Socrates’ age, I do not 
wish to point to the philosophical and dramatic absurdity that Socrates has already 
developed the theory of Forms in his early life.530 Rather, I argue that Socrates in the 
Parmenides suffers from a sort of confusion that is similar to the one he related in 
the autobiography section of the Phaedo. 
Both in the Phaedo and the Parmenides, we observe Socrates’s self-reflection, 
through the eyes of Plato, on his intellectual fear. In the Parmenides, due to the 
difficulty pertaining to the scope of Forms, Socrates is ‘afraid of (δείσας)’ falling 
into some pit of nonsense and being harmed, and hence he ‘hurries away (φεύγων)’ 
and clings to the agreed on moral sorts of Forms such as the Just, Beautiful and Good 
(see Parm. 130b8-9). Similarly, as we have seen in Chapter 5, in the Phaedo Socrates 
was ‘utterly blinded’ because of his study of natural science and was afraid of 
becoming ‘totally blinded’ in his soul through observing things with his eyes, like 
                                                          
528 Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· 
εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ᾖ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε 
μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε 
εἴς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ’ οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ 
ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω. 
Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται 
φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ 
ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. 
529 Cornford 1939, 64. 
530 More 1916, 123; Rickless 2006, 3-4. 
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those who look at the sun during eclipse; hence he decided to take refuge in logoi 
(see Phd. 99d4-e6). 
Secondly, it is pertinent to note that Parmenides tries to eliminate Socrates’ fear by 
telling Socrates that he has not yet been ‘gripped by philosophy’, as Socrates still 
cares about people’s ‘opinions (δόξας)’. Although it is not clear who these people 
are and what they believe, it is safe to assume that these people are not philosophers, 
as Socrates benefits from listening to Parmenides, who is a philosopher. Now, let me 
remind the readers of the lines of the Phaedo where Socrates is considered to be the 
only person who can give an account of Forms properly (Phd. 76b10-12). Turning 
to the Parmenides, Socrates has not yet been gripped by philosophy; hence he 
probably lacks expertise in philosophical argument. One might thus expect that 
Socrates of the Phaedo and Socrates of the Parmenides have different philosophical 
proficiencies.531  
There is no clue that might make us think that the theory of Forms which Socrates 
presents in the Parmenides is worse than that of the Phaedo. In fact, it is not 
important that the theory of Forms is identical in both dialogues. It is sufficient that 
the theory of Forms is a philosophical theory, and the Phaedo and the Parmenides 
might be presenting different but related versions of the theory of Forms.  At any 
rate, I argue that the way in which young Socrates argues for the theory of Forms is 
different in these two dialogues.532 It is thus possible to see how Socrates stands 
towards the theory of Forms in each case. 
The difference between the young and old Socrates arises out of the epistemic (or 
intellectual) norms that govern Socrates’ attitude towards the theory of Forms. It is 
pertinent to observe that Socrates has not yet been gripped by philosophy; hence 
Socrates cannot yet be a philosopher in the Parmenides. In the Phaedo, on the 
contrary, philosophy most probably has gripped Socrates, if we would consider 
Parmenides’ comment on Socrates’ future life to be true. Socrates, however, acts as 
if he is an epistemic authority in the Parmenides although he does not have the 
necessary expertise in arguments.  
                                                          
531 That said, it might seem implausible that Socrates in the Parmenides lacks 
expertise in arguments but is able describe the theory of Forms at least as well as he 
did in the Phaedo. For instance, compare Phd. 102b1-2 and Parm. 130e5-6. 
Dramatic and philosophical consistency, I believe, are not of profound concern for 
Plato. 
532 For a view that the theory of Forms defended by Socrates in the Parmenides is 
different than that of Plato’s middle period dialogues such as the Phaedo, see 
Rickless 2006, 5-6. 
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Similarly, we also need to observe the contrast between the attitude of 
Zeno/Parmenides and Socrates. While Socrates is rather pretentious and even uses 
an ad hominem argument against Zeno,533 Zeno and Parmenides welcome Socrates’ 
attempt and admire his enthusiasm. Besides, Parmenides can detect the problems 
that might arise out of the theory of Forms, yet Socrates seems to be unaware of these 
problems. 534 Now, let’s recall Socrates’ attitude towards his interlocutors in the 
Phaedo: Socrates was kind, welcoming and encouraging, as I have argued in Chapter 
4.535 In this respect, old Socrates’ attitude towards his young interlocutors in the 
Phaedo is similar to old Parmenides’ attitude towards young Socrates.  
Besides, the Parmenides suggests that young Socrates lacks expertise in arguments, 
and thus his excessive trust in arguments (e.g. the theory of Forms) might not be 
appropriate, especially if we consider the epistemic norms devised for those who 
lack expertise in arguments in the misology argument. Now, I would like to quote 
Parmenides: ‘Socrates, that’s because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, 
and just, and good, and each one of the Forms, too soon, he [Parmenides] said, before 
you have been properly trained’.536 The difficulty stressed by Parmenides is that if 
someone ‘won’t allow that there are forms for things and won’t mark off a form for 
each one, he won’t have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn’t allow that 
for each thing there is a character that is always the same’.537  
The nature of training and expertise that Socrates lacks is not relevant for my 
purposes.538 What is of significance is to notice that after completing his training 
Socrates will be able to ‘achieve a full view of the truth’ and to defend the theory of 
Forms, philosophy and dialectic.539 If Socrates cannot defend the theory of Forms, 
knowledge would become impossible for humans, and even for Gods.540 In a sense, 
                                                          
533 See Parm. 128af. See Zuckert 1998, 885-886. cf. Cornford 1939, 67-68 for the 
idea that Plato does not care much about Zeno as a philosopher.  
534 Rickless 2006, 54.  
535 See Phd. 88e4-89a6. Meinwald (1991, 6-8) underlines the resemblance of 
Parmenides and Socrates of the middle and early period dialogues, such as the 
Phaedo and Meno, regarding the role of cross-examination. 
536   Parm. 135c8-d1 Πρῲ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι 
ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. 
537 Parm. 135b6-c2.  
538 Some candidates are: [1] ‘the construction of antinomies in the manner of Zeno 
(Schofield 1977, 140)’ [2] ‘the dialectical training (Runciman 1959, 99)’ [3] ‘the 
procedure is to resemble Zeno's in so far as it takes a hypothesis such as 'that x exists' 
and deduces the consequences (Cornford 1939, 104)’ [4] ‘a necessary propaedeutic 
to the search for truth but not itself that search (Cherniss 1932, 129)’. 
539 Parm. 136c5. 
540 Parm. 134e7-8. 
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then, misology and Socrates’ underdeveloped argument about the theory of Forms 
might lead to the same consequence: like misologists, and those who believe in them, 
the believers of the theory of Forms would be deprived of knowledge and the truth, 
although Socrates in the Parmenides might save himself (and everyone else) thanks 
to Parmenides’ help and dialectical training.  
In writing the Parmenides, not only did Plato aim to save the theory of Forms but he 
also intended to briefly touch upon the subject of the correct method of philosophical 
argument. As I have argued, it is dangerous to put all our trust in arguments if we 
lack expertise in arguments. In a sense, then, the Parmenides is both an attempt to 
develop and modify the theory of Forms and Plato’s metaphilosophical study about 
one’s attitude towards theories and arguments. 
One might, however, object to my story by maintaining that the Phaedo looks 
forward to the Parmenides for the improvement of the theory of Forms.541 I agree 
with the idea of looking forward, as any Platonic reader can hardly be startled to 
discover very specific links between the dialogues. However, I do not think it can 
harm my claim that the Socrates of the Phaedo follows the correct epistemic norms, 
as nothing I argue fundamentally hangs on the question which of the two dialogues 
is philosophically more appealing and advanced regarding the theory of Forms. 
Rather, it is interesting to observe that Plato clearly has some interest in 
metaphilosophy in the Parmenides and in the correct epistemic norms governing 
philosophical inquiry/conversation.  
To conclude, one of Plato’s aims in writing the Phaedo is to develop the correct 
norms of the practice of philosophers and to display these norms through the 
conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. These norms are based on 
philosophical humility and they naturally sit with Plato’s views on the method of 
inquiry in the Phaedo, namely the method of hypothesis. I thus think that the Phaedo 
endows the reader with intellectual virtues, along with the proofs concerning the 
immortality of the soul and the theory of Forms. 
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